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ONE NATION AMONG MANY: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF CROSS-BORDER TAX
ARBITRAGE
DIANE M. RING *
Abstract: Cross-border tax arbitrage arises where a transaction is subject
to two or more countries' differing tax regimes. Conflicts between the
tax rules create unique opportunities for the parties to engage in profit-
able tax planning—opportunities that would not be available if the
transaction occurred entirely domestically in one of the countries.
These opportunities have been a growing feature of the multi-juris-
dictional business world and have raised issues concerning whether and
how countries, such as the United States, should respond. This Article
examines cross-border tax arbitrage in the context of both domestic tax
policy and of other international tax issues, and considers potential
responses. It proposes an analytic framework for cross-border tax arbit-
rage based on specific case studies. The Article concludes by pro-posing
a balancing test for determining the appropriate treatment of specific
instances of cross-border tax arbitrage.
INTRODUCTION
The central challenge in international tax is navigating the rela-
tionship between an individual country's tax system and the rest of
the world—a question of how nations should balance competing de-
mands of revenue, domestic policy, retaliation, and global goals. The
question grows more pressing as the pace of intersections among tax
regimes escalates. The difficulty of this exercise manifests itself quite
clearly in the emerging questions about cross-border tax arbitrage.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for comments from
Anne Alston, Hugh Ault, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Michael Gram, Daniel Halperin, Jim Hines,
Lawrence Lokken, Julie Ruin, David Schizer, Daniel Shaviro, Reed Shtddiner, Alvin War-
ren, and participants in workshops at Harvard, Michigan, and NYU for their helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this Article. I would also like to thank my research assistants,
including Daniel Smith, for critical research work.
I Although a more comprehensive definition of cross-border tax arbitrage is offered
elsewhere in the paper, it is worth noting up front that the terminology may be awkward
for readers familiar with the financial literature. In that context, arbitrage refers to the
process of eliminating price gaps in the market—presumably a desirable function from the
perspective of a competitive market. This definition does not carry over into the tax area.
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Does cross-border tax arbitrage represent egregious abuse of the tax
system? Is it the natural outcome of a multi-jurisdictional world? What
is the proper view of cross-border tax arbitrage and how should its
analysis be framed?
In its simplest terms, cross-border tax arbitrage refers to a situa-
tion in which a taxpayer or taxpayers rely on conflicts or differences
between two countries' tax rules to structure a transaction or entity
with the goal of obtaining tax benefits (for example, reduced or no
taxation) overall. Had the structure or transactions taken place en-
tirely domestically; the net tax benefit (which was created by the
conflict between the two countries) would not exist. Thus, taxpayers
in the arbitrage transaction or structure exploit the intersection of the
two countries' tax systems to eliminate or reduce substantially their
income tax. Particular areas of tax law can prove to be especially fer-
tile "breeding ground [s] for arbitrage," either because one country's
tax rule is rather unique or because it is difficult to apply predictably. 2
The starting point for analysis of cross-border tax arbitrage, as
with most other international lax analyses, is recognition of the power
of globalization. The international scope of business, along with re-
lated changes in communication, cash flow restrictions, and regula-
tory practices, has increased the ease and volume of cross-border ac-
tivity. The reality of these changes helps shape international taxation
as a topic, and has contributed to the burgeoning growth of arbitrage.
The opportunity for cross-border tax arbitrage arises where trans-
actions are subject to two or more countries' tax regimes. This regula-
Whether advisable or not, the term "arbitrage" has been adopted in the domestic tax con-
text to describe cases in which a taxpayer can benefit from inconsistent tax treatment of a
transaction, including both normal arbitrage (which is eliminated by the market) and
pure arbitrage (which is not). See infra note 8 and accompanying text. Furthermore, "cross-
border tax arbitrage" has emerged as the term designating benefits obtained by taxpayers
through a conflict in two or more countries' tax rules, even where the transaction or struc-
ture does not precisely fit the domestic tax arbitrage definition. See infra note 14. Presuma-
bly the term was initially adopted in the international context because it conveyed a sense
of pitting two independent and inconsistent systems against each other for gain, reminis-
cent of how financial arbitrage plays on pricing in two different markets. Concern regard-
ing the appropriateness of the phrase cross-border tax "arbitrage," though important for
clearly identifying the subject matter and eliminating confusion, is one of terminology.
Given the prevalence of the term "cross-border tax arbitrage" in the lax literature, this
Article follows that usage.
2 H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lectuiv International Tax Arbitrage and
the "International Tax System," 53 Tax L. REV. 137, 153 (2000) ( -Whenever any country
adopts a rule that is either difficult to replicate or apply (for example, the U.S. rules for
distinguishing debt from equity) or markedly out of step with what other countries do or
are likely to do, a breeding ground for arbitrage is created?).
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tory intersection between two countries presents the potential for
conflicting rules. Despite many common features in our trading part-
ners' tax systems, the multitude of factors that produce lax law, in-
cluding social policy, administrative constraints, and political com-
promise render conflicting rules a likely possibility. 3
 Conflict in rules
produces one of two results: taxation by both countries (double taxa-
tion) or taxation by neither (nontaxation). Domestic tax laws and bi-
lateral treaties include mechanisms for limiting double taxation, 4
which is generally viewed as a barrier to cross-border activity. Where
the conflict in rules leads to nontaxation, taxpayers (and govern-
ments, perhaps because of reduced taxpayer advocacy on the issue)
have traditionally paid less attention. The internationalization of the
economy, however, combined with developments in technology, has
fueled taxpayer recognition of these tax-law conflicts as an opportu-
nity for profitable tax planning. 5
 Tax differences exploited by taxpay-
ers to achieve non taxation produce cross-border tax arbitrage.
5 See, e.g., COMM'N OE 'FIIE EUR. CMTYS„ REPORT OF THE COMMEITEE ON INDEPENDENT
EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION, 1992, reprinted in 4 TAX NOTES INT'l. 563 (1992) [here-
inafter EC Report] (noting that "[t]he existing tax diversity across Community countries is
the outcome of trade-offs" in each country regarding efficiency, equity, feasibility, and
social policy); Reuven S. Avi-Vonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303-04 (1996); Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 139-41.
Double taxation in this context refers to situations in which two countries both seek
to impose income tax on a taxpayer's item of income. The success in dealing with this
conflict derives from the general adoption in treaties, and often in domestic law, of an
allocation priority. See, e.g., Tsilly Dagatt, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.V.U. J. iN't"I. L. & Pot-
939, 939-41 (2000) (arguing that treaties play a less critical role in reducing double taxa-
tion and that the task can be handled adequately by domestic legislation). Under the
dominant approach, the taxing of active business income is allocated to the source country
and the residual right to tax active income, plus the right to tax passive investment income,
is allocated to the country of residence. This basic division, which has been argued to lack
a firm economic or analytic basis, has endured to the present, belying its practicality. See
Avi-Vonah, supra note 3, at 1306-13 (reviewing and justifying historical and current pat-
terns of taxing active and passive income); Michael J. Graetz, The David Tillinghast Lecture
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies,
54 TAx L. REV. 261, 324 (2001) (characterizing U.S. international tax policies, with the
differing treatment of passive and active business income as "a 'compromise' between CEN
[capital export neutrality] and CIN [capital import neutrality] "); Michael J. Graetz & Mi-
chael M. 011ear, The 'Original Intent' of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DuKE 14 1021,
1023-25 (1997) (noting the survival of active and passive income distinction).
5
 Michael Danilack, Associate Chief Counsel International at the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), noted that "technology and globalization have also increased access to arbi-
trage opportunities" as taxpayers experience borderless business flows but quite real tax
borders which produce significant arbitrage possibilities. Sindhti G. Hiriani, Special Counsel
Foley Tapped to Head Advance Nicing Aprement Program, 53 DAILY TAx REP., Mar. 17, 2000, at
G-10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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What should be the federal government's response to such arbi-
trage?° At the end of the 1990s, the U.S. Treasury Department
("Treasury") identified cross-border arbitrage issues as a high priority;
the international community is now displaying a growing interest.'
When exploring these issues, it is critical to specify precisely what is
included in and what is excluded from the concept of cross-border tax
arbitrage. As noted above, arbitrage is generally considered the "ex-
ploit[ation of] differences between the tax system[s] of two different
jurisdictions to minimize the taxes paid to either or both," 8 What, is
excluded from the concept here are those transactions that can be
characterized as cross-border "shelters." 9 Such transactions already
face scrutiny and examination under the developing shelter rules.
The arbitrage question differs because it confronts those transactions
that are benefiting from inconsistent treatment across jurisdictions,
but presumably have more substance than shelters. The scope of the
term "cross-border arbitrage" is reviewed further in Part I and Part IV.
The core tax policy issues for cross-border tax arbitrage can be
separated into two discrete sets of questions: (1) why and when is the
arbitrage problematic; and (2) whether and how a country, in this
case the United States, should respond. Answering these questions
demands a comprehensive consideration of tax policy goals, compet-
ing values, and practical constraints. Two rather polar responses can
be readily imagined. The first, favored by many taxpayers, argues that
the United States has no legitimate interest in whether and how much
6 See id. (quoting Danilack, "Perhaps one of the most fundamental issues facing all of
us right now is the extent to which cross-border tax arbitrage is appropriate.").
7 See, e.g., Ellen McCleskey, Panelists' Views Diverge on Benefits, Drawbacks of International
Tax Arbitmge, 42 DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 4, 1999, at G-2 (citing a Treasury official on the high
priority Treasury has given to cross-border tax arbitrage). Hybrid financial instruments
used in cross-border tax arbitrage was one of two major topics at the International Fiscal
Association's (WA) 2000 Congress. The National and General Reports from the Congress
covered a variety of questions including the nature of governments' responses to these
transactions. Int'l Fiscal Ass'n, Tax Treatment of Hybrid Financial Instruments in Cross-Border
Transactions, inn 85a CAMERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT'L (2000) (compilation of General and
National Reports from the WA's 2000 Congress) [hereinafter IFA General Report]. In
addition, one of the two topics for WA's 2004 Congress is double nontaxation of income.
8 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary on Tillinghast Lecture, 53 TAN L. Rilv. 167, 167
(2000). Another definition begins with a wider scope: "inconsistent national treatment of
the same entity or transactions that can produce multiple tax benefits or detriments."
McCleskey, supra note 7, at G-2 (quoting a definition of international tax arbitrage offered
by tax practitioner Gregory May). The inclusion of detrimental outcomes as part of the
arbitrage definition produces a particularly broad definition. More commonly, arbitrage is
considered the taxpayer-favored subset of conflicts, thus excluding double taxation.
9 See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
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tax is paid to a foreign country. 0
 If the U.S. tax rules are followed
(and the transaction is not otherwise challenged as a shelter), then no
further government. action or response is appropriate. In fact, the
United States should be quite satisfied that domestic taxpayers might.
be
 able to reduce their foreign tax burden. The second response, evi-
dent in the U.S. government's effort in the late 1990s to eliminate
certain arbitrage opportunities,'' reflects a generalized but not hilly
articulated sense that it can be inappropriate to manipulate the dif-
ferences between countries' tax rules to reduce or eliminate tax. 12
The very source of conflict between these positions is the reason
that neither constitutes an adequate response. Both positions, at least
in their extreme form, grant paramount priority to one of the tax sys-
tem's goals without adequate acknowledgment of the validity of the
others. The view that no action is warranted where U.S. rules have
been followed gives dominant. weight to national regulatory inde-
pendence, and perhaps implicitly to administrability, while giving
seemingly no weight to the economic distortions and equity harms
generated. Conversely, a blanket desire to eradicate cross-border tax
arbitrage elevates the elimination of distortions at the expense of
other factors, including administrability and domestic policy. A com-
prehensive policy for cross-border tax arbitrage must integrate and
balance all competing goals. As a result, however, any resolution
reached here will inevitably have an air of compromise. It will neither
seek full elimination nor full acceptance of cross-border tax arbitrage.
Steps taken to control arbitrage will reduce domestic autonomy and
increase harmonization, but these steps will not fully curb arbitrage.
Despite these limitations, the analysis of the arbitrage question should
be undertaken in a principled manner and proposals measured
against established tax criteria.
See, e.g., Myrna Zelaya-Quesada, Tax Policy's Talisman Discusses Cltallenges Created by
Globalization, 238 DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 11, 2000, at G-8 ('Some would argue that arbitrage
is not troubling because a transaction is characterized correctly tinder domestic tax
rules.").
l See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1 (2002) (finalizing regulations limiting a discrete set of
treaty-based arbitrage involving domestic reverse hybrid entities); I.R.S. Notice 98-11,
1998-1 C.B. 433 (announcing the intent of Treasury and I.R.S. to limit certain hybrid
branch transactions) (opinion withdrawn by I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34),
12
 See, e.g., Kevin A. Bell, IRS Official Addresses Cross-Border Arbitrage Policy, LEXIS 2002
TNT 59-6 (noting that Matthew Stevens, Special Counsel to the IRS Chief Counsel, ob-
served in an unofficial capacity that In a macro sense [cross-border tax arbitrage] is not a
good thing"): Zelaya-Quesada. supra note 10, at G-8 (describing belief that "tax arbitrage
creates double nontaxation, distorts economic behavior, and discriminates against taxpay-
ers who do not have access to arbitrage opportunities").
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Ultimately, this Article contends that the government can legiti-
mately respond to some instances of arbitrage but that the continued
existence of many more will be an ineluctable feature of a multi-
jurisdictional business environment. The conclusion is not surprising;
it acknowledges the strengths behind the polar positions articulated
above. More specification, however, is needed to translate this broad
determination into policy guidance. This Article proposes a balancing
test that identifies and evaluates the competing goals in each arbi-
trage case to derive an appropriate response. In addition, this Article
offers insights as to the factors that are most likely to be salient and
the types of risks that are most likely to arise with particular anti-
arbitrage policies.
It is important to be quite clear about the value and the limits of
this analytical framework. First, it provides a structure for discussion
of arbitrage that targets the core issues. Second, it weaves the diver-
gent strands of the arbitrage argument into a single debate by foster-
ing recognition of the multiplicity of national and international goals.
Third, it offers an approach for the policymaker attempting to answer,
in a coherent and reasonably uniform manner, the question of
whether to intervene and, if so, how. The balancing test, however, is
not self-applying. There will continue to be very significant questions
of policy to debate. That outcome is not a failing of the framework
but rather a reflection of the nature of the endeavor, which demands
the accommodation of a variety of competing policy goals in a wide
range of circumstances. Furthermore, evaluating the examples under
the balancing test is not a static exercise; it may change as tax rules,
policy goals, or other features of the tax system change. The balanc-
ing test, however, should enable comprehensive consideration of arbi-
trage without reliance on ad hoc case assessments, along with the de-
velopment of a sophisticated understanding of the arbitrage problem
and the responses that can be crafted.
Through the detailed investigation of this major example of an
international regulatory clash (cross-border tax arbitrage), the fun-
damental question of all global regulatory systems can be clarified
and distilled: What vision of international regulatory relations should
animate government policy? In making regulatory decisions in the
absence of full information, countries must determine the nature of
the relationship between and among nationally based regulatory re-
gimes. A nationalist-driven perspective emphasizes competition; a
more global perspective encourages cooperation. In reality, neither
approach likely serves national or international interests because nei-
ther nationalism nor globalism constitutes a defensible, definable
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goal. The real question is whose interests are to be taken into account
in making a policy decision and what outcomes will serve those inter-
ests. In tax matters, nations are the dominant actors and can be ex-
pected (at least loosely) to promote national interests." The paths
most likely to advance these interests will vary by time and context,
and may include a range of more or leks cooperative behaviors. It is
through the detailed investigation of cross-border tax arbitrage that
we can gain more insight into this universal regulatory question.
This Article's discussion is organized into four major parts. Part I
reviews the definition of cross-border tax arbitrage and presents four
case studies. Part II argues why and how cross-border tax arbitrage can
constitute a problem through reference to tax norms articulated on
both national and international levels. Part HI proposes the frame-
work for analyzing cross-border tax arbitrage cases and applies it to
the case studies. Part IV examines the relationship of arbitrage to the
other dominant issues in international taxation and considers how to
extend the insights from the arbitrage analysis. Finally; the Conclusion
contemplates the future of cross-border tax arbitrage and the perva-
sive subtext of tax harmonization.
I. THE SCOPE OF CROSS-BORDER TAX ARBITRAGE
A. The Bask Definition.
Before attempting to evaluate cross-border tax arbitrage, it is
necessary to establish a working definition. This step is purely a posi-
tive decision of how to classify a transaction or structure. Whether and
when it should be limited is the central question and is taken up in
the remainder of this Article.
Various definitions of cross-border tax arbitrage have been of-
fered by government officials, tax scholars, and practitioners." Gen-
erally, these definitions encompass situations in which countries' tax
rules governing a particular transaction or structure differ sufficiently
that the conflict results in tax benefits that would not exist had the
transaction or entity occurred entirely domestically in either country.
13
 Even at this stage of identifying national interests there is the question of whether
nations are likely to pursue short-term as opposed to long-term national interests. See infra
notes 25-27.
14
 See supra notes 1,8 and accompanying text; see also Philip R. West, Forrign Law in U.S.
International Taxation: The Search for Standards, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 147,149 (1996) (noting that
cross-border arbitrage transactions "involve the favorable and inconsistent tax treatment of
any item by two or more jurisdictions.").
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In cases of cross-border tax arbitrage, taxpayers avail themselves of
conflicting rules and gaps between national tax systems to reduce
their tax burden.
Two other problem areas in tax are likely to overlap with arbi-
trage, but they remain distinct: cross-border tax competition and tax
shelters. Unlike tax competition, 15 cross-border tax arbitrage can oc-
cur where two countries each operate robust tax systems and aim to
tax economic activity comprehensively. The fact that two such tax re-
gimes would still differ (as would be expected in a multi-jurisdictional
world) means that the opportunity for conflicting rules, and thus ar-
bitrage, exists. Thriving examples of cross-border lax arbitrage persist
independent of any traditional tax competition. Moreover, current
proposals for eliminating "harmful" tax competition would not im-
pact most arbitrage opportunities. 16 Of course, important similarities
exist, and Part IV investigates the links between arbitrage and tax
competition in greater detail.
In contrast to arbitrage transactions, tax shelters typically prompt
questions about shams and economic substance, reflecting the nature
of corporate tax shelters to test the limits of ambiguities in domestic
tax law. 17 The primary concern for shelter regulations is how to iden-
tify and stop transactions that generally lack substance without chill-
ing desirable conduct. The challenge lies not in the abstract goal, but
in the more concrete task of ascertaining what constitutes a shelter
15 Tax competition includes cases in which a country enacts a beneficial tax rule or re-
gime to attract certain foreign business investments. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE
13-18, 21-35 (1998) (emphasizing risks from certain forms of tax competition); Remelt S.
Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV, L.
REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000). But seeJulie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on
International Tax Competition, 89 GEo. U. 543, 546-49, 554-68 (2001) (offering a more
positive characterization of tax competition). See infra text accompanying notes 279-294.
16 See, e.g., OECD, supra note 15, at 37-62 (offering a series of suggestions including
stronger controlled foreign corporation rules, information exchange, and action against
tax havens); Avi-Yonah, supra note 15, at 1666-74 (advocating uniform withholding tax on
portfolio investments and "consumption-based" taxation of multinationals).
17 See, e.g., Hiriani, supra note 5, at G-10-0-11 (quoting Michael Danilack, Associate
Chief Counsel International at the IRS, "1 don't mean to raise for further consideration
whether transactions that can be categorized as abusive cross-border shelters are legiti-
mate. Rather, what I am raising is the somewhat more difficult question of whether arbi-
traging tax results in a nonsheiter transaction, runs afoul of U.S. tax policy interests.");
David L. Lupi-Sher, Corporate Tax Shelters Regain Vitality, 23 TAX NOTES 1[41'1, 197, 199
(2001) (considering whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversal of
the Tax Court finding of a sham transaction in United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), constituted a "victory for tax shelters").
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and how that will be determined. 18 Much attention has been devoted
to developing shelter gatekeeper-oriented rules that. emphasize re-
porting and documentation.° Although it is certainly possible for a
cross-border tax arbitrage to be a sham, that is not the core of the ar-
bitrage question." Achieving a cross-border benefit is generally more
attractive and secure than a shelter benefit because the former derives
from the conflict of clearly applied rules in two different countries,
not from a stretch of domestic law, which may be subject to domestic
anti-abuse rules, 21 To the extent . there is overlap in a case, it makes
sense to view the transaction tinder the rubric for shams because the
degree of substance in the activity will be the threshold question. 22
Thus, this Article begins with the premise that the transactions under
scrutiny would pass the initial test for substance and not merit
classification as shams or shelters. The relationship between corporate
tax shelters and cross-border tax arbitrage, however, highlights some
of the potential challenges in any effort to limit cross-border tax arbi-
19
 See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, Part I: Foreword, 55
TAX L. REV. 125, 127-29 (2002) (much of the challenge with corporate tax shelters is de-
veloping a definition to identify which transactions are good planning and which are shel-
ters); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: -Wig a Lesson from History,
54 SMU L. REV. 209, 220-23 (2001) (using Compaq Computer Corp. a. Commissioner, 113 T.C.
214 (1999), to illustrate the difficulty in discerning tax shelters). For a sense of the debate
over Compaq and the tax shelter questions it raises, compare Daniel N. Shaviro & David A.
Weisbach, The Filth Circuit Gets it Wrong in Compaq v. Commisioner, 26 TAx Nuns
191, 195-98 (2002) (criticizing the court's decision to uphold the "tax shelter"), with Wil-
I lain A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, Compaq v. Commissioner—Where Is the Tax Arbitrage! 94 TA x
Nom 1335, 1335-36, 1340-42 (2002) (offering a different perspective on the underlying
transaction and the Fifth Circuit's analysis).
19 See, e.g., N.Y State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on the Temporary and Proposed Tax
Shelter Regulations, reprinted in 89 TAx NoTEs 1447, 1448-50, 1454-79 (2000).
20
 For example, during the IFA's congress on hybrid financial instruments and their
use in arbitrages, the debate was framed as a choice between viewing arbitrage as "illegal
tax evasion" or as 'aggressive tax planning." Robert Goulder, Panelists Debate Tax Aspects of
Hybrid Financial Instruments, 88 TAx NOTES 1311, 1312 (2000). Even advocates of arbitrage
as good planning acknowledge that "fraud, deception, or sham transactions" are off limits.
Id. (citing French panelist Jean Marc Timrd).
21 See Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 143. Another feature of corporate tax shelters is the
fact that the tax reporting differs from the financial. Where this inconsistency does not
exist, the tax upside is often offset by the negative financial reporting implications of the
transaction. See Yin, supra note 18, at 225 (the Treasury Department has identified this
discrepancy as a major corporate tax shelter feature.).
22
 For a related example, see IRS Coordinated Issue Paper on Lease-Stripping Transac-
tions, UIL 9226,00-00, Effective Date: July 21, 2000, available at LEXIS 2000 TNT 147-10
[hereinafter IRS Coordinated Issue Paper]. The Issue Paper explores a variety of ways in
which a lease stripping transaction may be challenged, including tinder the sham doctrine
or under the transfer pricing rules. Id. Whether a transaction should be treated as a sale
for federal income tax purposes, or as a financing, is separately evaluated. Id.
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trage. The U.S. instinct in dealing with corporate tax shelters has not
been to advocate or implement a general anti-avoidance rule (with its
potential chilling effect) as seen in Australia and Canada. 25 Nonethe-
less, the recent domestic legislation targeting corporate tax shelters 24
and enacting understatement penalties and registration requirements
has ignited debate over the breadth of the rules and the ability to dis-
cern boundaries. As always, a tension exists between designing broad
reforms that may reach too far and designing targeted rules that may
encourage taxpayers' participation in a regulatory cat-and-mouse
game as they seek the next transaction just beyond "the law."
B. The Origins of the Arbitrage Problem: Why Countries' Tax Rules Wu,
An initial question that arises from the basic definition of cross-
border tax arbitrage, which is significant later in assessing possible
responses, is why do countries have different tax rules? Clearly no sin-
gle reason prevails. In fact we have only to look at the motivations be-
hind domestic tax law to imagine the range of reasons. Rules vary be-
cause of: (1) different policy choices—the political consensus about
tradeoffs may vary among societies with different values, traditions,
and expectations;25 (2) different judgments about the impact of given
rules—to the extent that all rule making requires decisions to be
made without full knowledge of the potential impact, it is quite plau-
sible for different decision-making groups (countries) to arrive at al-
ternative determinations; (3) politics—here used in the sense that
different political systems permit or facilitate different access to rule-
makers and allow different forms of power and influence; (4) ran-
donmess; 25 (5) path dependence;27 and (6) resources—a country
23 McCleskey, supra note 7, at G-2 (citing a Treasury official); see, e.g., STAFF or THE
JOINT CONINE. ON TAX'N, I07TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW RELATING 'EO TAX
SHELTERS 4-44 (Comm. Print 2002) (describing statutory and judicial COIISIGHDIS on tax
shelters).
24 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112, 6662(d) (2) (C) (2002).
25 See, e.g., Hucti J. AULT ET Al,., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAxATIoN: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIS (1997) (comparing nine countries' approaches to structural problems of income
taxation). Even within a given country, policy choices may change over lime but existing
regulations are not continually rewritten.
26 See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International
Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. bi"t. EcoN. L. 49, 58 (1999) ("The evolution of regulatory
policy across jurisdictions may to a considerable degree result from chance factors") (cit-
ing metric adoption as a matter of royal decrees).
27 Whatever combination of factors has led a country to pursue a particular pattern of
rules and taxation, once that path is chosen it tends significantly to dictate the direction of
further development. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
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could determine that an otherwise attractive rule is unrealistic due to
administrative, resource, and technical skill constraints. The scope of
reasons listed here suggests that one could readily anticipate a notable
degree of variation among countries' tax regimes, even when they
share many fundamental principles and goals. To the extent that.
cross-border tax arbitrage depends on the existence of conflicting
rules, a steady supply seems quite likely.
The enumeration of sources of tax-law variability is important for
policy purposes. The reasons that countries' rules vary can play a
critical role in thinking about. potential responses to arbitrage and
what those responses would entail. For example, where tax rules differ
because of policy goals, any plan to coordinate rules would require
the countries to balance their domestic policy choices against the
benefits from coordination with other countries. If path dependence
played a major role in establishing conflicting rules, then changing
the relevant arbitrage-related rule could have more widespread im-
pact. That is, when the arbitrage-related rule is changed, the country
may need to review its other domestic rules that were part of the
original regulatory path. National-level policies may need to be re-
evaluated once benefits from multilateral coordination (loosely
defined for the present) are factored into the equation of creating
policy. Whether this process constitutes a threat to "sovereignty" is
considered further in Parts II and III.
If administrability motivated a country to select a particular rule,
then unless the country's move to a different, internationally coordi-
nated rule offers discernable benefits to the country, the move might
be ill advised. Where there are competing judgments about the im-
pact of particular rules, 28
 a coordination or harmonization effort may
require countries to be persuaded about the likely advantages of the
alternative rules. Implicit in these tensions are more fundamental
questions about the value of regulatory diversity and the benefits that
arise from a system that tolerates experimentation.
HAM'. L. km 641, 643-58 (1996) (describing the role of "path dependence' in explaining
why legal and economic institutions have the current form they exhibit, even where it does
not seem the most efficient choice today).
28 The arbitrage problem 15 1101 about some countries having the 'wrong" rule, just dif-
ferent rules, although in some cases certain rules may seem to achieve specified goals
more effectively,
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C. Case Studies
To develop the framework for cross-border tax arbitrage, it is use-
ful to specify a few case studies to provide context for the analysis and
to serve as illustrations. This section outlines four sample arbitrages in
some detail. There is no intention to suggest that these are exclusive
categories of arbitrage, nor is the mission here to reach a conclusion
about their treatment. The case studies help ground the more ab-
stract discussions of arbitrage. For most of these examples, a detailed
discussion is available in the literature. The purpose of this section is
to convey enough information about the arbitrage's structure, opera-
tion, impact, and incentives to provide a useful hook for the later
analysis of cross-border tax arbitrage. (Readers already familiar with
these classic cases can briefly review this section and then turn to Part
IL) Part II identifies the relevant criteria for reviewing the arbitrages
and studies each arbitrage case for its efficiency effects. Part III then
outlines a more complete assessment of each arbitrage based on the
efficiency observations combined with other critical factors from the
balancing test.
1. Original Issue Discount in the United States and Japan
The United States has grappled with the taxation of original issue
discount ("OID") for several decades. The question centers on the
timing of interest income to the holder of an OID bond. 29 Prior to
1969, the United States waited until the maturity of the OID bond to
tax the holder on the interest income," although the corporate issuer
was taking current deductions for the OID. 31 This "wait and see" rule
provided nonparallel treatment and a significant deferral opportunity
29 In the classic (and simple) OlD bond, a purchaser pays $X for a bond that pays no
current interest but at the end of its term pays $X + $Y. Here, "I"' represents the interest
earned and the question is when and how to tax it. The holder of an OID bond is "guaran-
teed" a certain amount of interest, and in fact could restate the bond as being a bond with
a principal amount of $X and a rate of return of Z% where the interest deemed earned
each year was reinvested in the bond at the same Z% rate such that at the end of the
specified bond term the holder would have $X + $I; Note that the guarantee of receiving
this OlD return is more contingent than that for a holder receiving current actual interest
payments which are not reinvested in the instrument.
39 See S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2178-79 (ex-
plaining the pre-1969 taxation of OID and the reasons for change); Peter C. Canellos Sc
Edward D. Kleiubard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest, Deferral, and Discount After
1982, 38 TAX L. REv. 565, 567-68 (1983).
st JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 91sT CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1969, at 129 (1970).
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because the holder was perceived to have a virtually guaranteed re-
ceipt (unlike, for example, with a stock investment). Thus, in 1969,
Congress required current annual inclusion in the holder's income of
a pro rata amount of the gain to be received at maturity. 32
The ratable inclusion method, however, overstates income in the
early years and understates it in the later years." In theory that result
favors the borrower who could take larger interest deductions sooner
and disadvantages the bond holder who reports a larger portion of
income sooner. In practice though, the effect will not be a wash if the
taxpayers holding OID bonds are those for whom the timing of in-
come is not significant, such as tax exempts. 34 In light of these con-
cerns, Congress made significant changes to the OID rules in 1982
(and 1984), requiring interest to be calculated on a yield-to-maturity
basis reflecting the debt instrument's internal rate of return." The
overall pattern of lax reform in the area of OID demonstrates an at-
tention to the time value of money and the importance of more accu-
rately representing it. in taxation (even if in all areas of the Code this
principle is not pursued with equal vigor) . 36
The opportunity for cross-border tax arbitrage with OID bonds
occurred where U.S. issuers of OID bonds paired with buyers in a
country that did not require current accrual of the holder's interest
" For example, if the holder paid $100 for the bond and was entitled to receive
$133.10 at the end of three years, then the "gain" of $33.10 would be included in income
ratably over the three years ($11.03/year). As a result, the deferral experienced in the wait-
and-see method was eliminated. See, e.g., S. Rep. No, 91-552 (1969), reprinted hr 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2179-80 (explaining the change to a ratable method); Canellos &
Kleinbard, supra note 30, at 568, 568-69 (discussing Congressional enactment of prorated
system). The ratable method, however, did have a negative effect; the reported ratable
interest did not reflect the economic accrual of interest income. See infra note 33.
33
 If one conceived of the OID bond as having a single internal rate of return which
applied to the principal and the previously earned interest that was "re-invested" in the
OID bond, then interest income should be increasing each year. In the above example this
would mean that an OID bond purchased for $100 and paying $133.10 in three years has
an effective internal rate of return of 10% and thus the interest is not earned ratably but
rather $10 in year one, $11 in year two, and $12.10 in year three.
34 Sec. e.g., Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 30, at 568 (noting that in the period of
high interest rates around 1982, the "distortion was magnified through the issuance of
zero coupon ... bonds, which were generally sold to tax exempt institutions").
33 See §§ 1271-1275 (2000); see also Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 30, at 568-
69 (discussing 1982 Congressional tax reforms and resulting changes to the accrual rules
for discounts).
36 See. e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1276-1278 (stating that no current inclusion in income is required
for market discount bonds which, by definition, do not involve the original issuer in the
calculation of discount and thus cannot rely on the issuer to provide discount information
to holders).
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income. Japan, in particular, was a market into which U.S. issuers
sought to sell their bonds. The basic tax picture was rather attractive. 37
The U.S. issuer received current annual interest expense deductions,
while the Japanese holder paid no tax on the foreign bond interest
under Japanese law until the interest income was actually received
(for example, at the end of the bond period)." U.S. income tax also
was not imposed on the holder, presumably because the bonds in
question qualified for the portfolio interest exemption. 39 (In any
event there would be no U.S. withholding tax on the OID until the
U.S. issuer made payments to the holder.)'° Thus, the parties
benefited by pairing current U.S. deductions with deferred income
recognition in Japan.'" Had the borrowing been entirely domestic,
with either the U.S. issuer selling to U.S. purchasers or Japanese inves-
tors buying from Japanese issuers, this timing benefit might not have
been available. 42
37 This transaction is described in the past tense because the financial literature refer-
ences suggest it is not a current strategy. That said, Japan did not change its tax rules on
foreign OID bonds in a way that substantially affected the mismatching in timing with the
U.S. accrual taxation. Thus, in theory the transaction may still be possible. See infra note
38.
38 Under Japanese tax law, OLD is not classified as interest but rather as "other in-
come." See, e.g., Ibshihiro Masui, Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows: Japanese Responses, in
STAATEN AND S'rEUEM: FESTSCHRIFT FUR KI.AUS VOGEL 863, 865, 867 (Geburistag,
von Paul Kirchhof et al. eds., 2000) (describing the treatment of OID in Japan); Price Wa-
terhouse. Japan: An Overview of Japanese Individual and Corporate Income Tax Laws, in 4 AsIAN
PAC. TEXT INVESTMENT BULL. 7, 10 (1986); GittrErrn WAY ur AL., BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN
JAPAN, in TAX MANAGEMENT FOREIGN INCOME POR'IVOLIOS A-I05-06, C&A-9 (1991). Cer-
tain OID bonds issued in Japan are subject to withholding of 16% (pre-April, 1988) or
18% (post-April I, 1988) at issuance on the difference between the redemption amount
and the issue price. Crtirrrrit Wm,. ET AI-, StIPM, at 106, C&-A-9. Income on OID bonds
issued by foreign corp-orations is taxed at redemption. Id. at A-105.
I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881 (c).
4 D	 §§ 871(a) (1) (C), 881(a) (3).
41 See, e.g., HAL S. Scorr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSAC-
TIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 1034 (8th ed. 2001) (quoting J.P. Morgan, Swaps: Versatil-
ity at Controlled Risk, WORLD FIN. MARKETS, Apr. 1991, at 17 ("[I]n 1984, when Japan still
treated interest 'income' on zero-coupon bonds as nontaxable capital gain, [but] accruing
interest 'payments' on zeros were tax deductible by U.S. borrowers," the arbitrage was
exploited. "Financing packages utilizing swaps were devised in the market to exploit the
discrepancy, enabling a number of U.S. borrowers to procure cheap dollar funding, effec-
tively at the expense of the Japanese taxpayer."). Certainly foreign holders with deferred
home country taxation were not the only taxpayers in this timing position. Tax-exempt
bond holders, such as U.S. pension funds, often bear no tax on the interest.
42 In some cases domestic distortion may remain, such as the purchase of OID bonds
from U.S. issuers by U.S. tax-exempt investors.
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2. Double-Dip Lease
Perhaps one of the most ubiquitous of cross-border tax arbitrage
transactions is the "double-dip lease." 43 At the core of this transaction
is the ability to have two jurisdictions each treat their taxpayer (either
the "lessor" or "lessee") as the "owner" of a leased asset. By virtue of
owner status, the taxpayer is entitled to depreciation deductions
(typically accelerated) and any investment tax credits. (The key to
creating an arbitrage benefit is the availability of accelerated deductions
and/or credits, nal the fact that two taxpayers are recovering their re-
spective investments.) For example, imagine that Plane Co., located in
France, leases an asset (such as a plane) to Flight Co., located in the
United States. Assume that France determines Plane Co. is the owner
of the plane (perhaps because France uses a formalistic rule based on
legal ownership of an asset). Also assume that the United States con-
siders Flight Co. to be the owner of the plane (because the United
States uses a rule based on the economic substance of the lease trans-
action to determine asset ownership). 44 Thus, two different taxpayers
"own" a single plane and both take accelerated depreciation deduc-
tions (plus any available credits). The result derives from the conflict
between France's and the United States' rules for asset ownership.45
Finance leasing (see infra note 45) has been a significant commercial activity since
the 1960s. See, e.g., IFA General Report, supra note 7, at 22; C. Staffan Andersson et al.,
Cross-Border Leasing Provides Major Tax (and Other) Benefits, LEM 91 TNI 12-17 (discussing
international leasing and its advantages). For discussions of double-dip leases, see, for
example, Denise L. Blau, A Guide to Current Structures and Developments in the U.S. Taxation of
Cross-Bonier financings, in EQUIPMENT LEASING 1995, at 321-33 (PLI Corium L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. A4-4487, 1995); William A. Niacin IV & Richard L. Um-
brecht, Cross-Border Leasing Transactions: Pickles, FSCs and Double-Dips, in EQUIPMENT LEAS-
ING—LEVERAGED LEASING 25-107 to 25-112 (PLI Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. A4-1404, 1999); William W. Park, Tax Characterization of International Leases: The
Contours of Ownership, 67 CORNEA, L. REv. 103, 148-51 (1981); Michael Downey Rice, Cwt.
rent Issues in Aircmft Finance, 56 J. Ant L. & Com. 1027, 1034-40 (1991).
44
 Flight Co. would be treated as the owner in this case if the leasing transaction were
viewed as effectively a sale, with the payments made by Flight Co. under the agreement.
constituting the purchase price not a rental fee. See Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-19 I.R.B.
1156, 1157-59 (providing guidelines for determining whether a transaction constitutes a
finance lease or a true lease).
45
 Conflict can occur in two different ways. First, if a country follows a relatively strict
legal title approach, then the party with such legal ownership is deemed the owner with
little or no inquiry into whether the terms of the lease contract make the arrangement
seem more like a true lease (i.e. an 'operating lease," where the lessor is considered the
owner for tax purposes) or a sale (i.e. a "finance lease," where the lessee is considered the
owner for tax purposes). See, e.g., WA General Report, supra note 7, at 28-31 (outlining
distinctions between operating and finance leases); Andersson et al., supra note 43 (dis-
cussing different countries' standards for deciding ownership under a lease); Park, supra
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If the leasing transaction had occurred entirely domestically (ei-
ther in the United States or France), only one owner would be
identified and only one taxpayer would be permitted the depreciation
deductions. The taxpayer deemed to be the lessee would generally
take business deductions for the cost of the lease/rental payments
made annually. Those deductions, however, would typically be less
advantageous than ones classified as "depreciation" because of the
acceleration permitted for depreciation. In addition, investment lax
credits may be available for owners but not lessees. Thus, even in the
domestic case both taxpayers recover their investments (through de-
preciation deductions by the owners and through rental deductions
by the lessee). It is the availability of the second set of accelerated de-
preciation deductions (and investment tax credits) in the cross-border
scenario that creates cross-border tax arbitrage: 18 In addition to the
double-dip benefits, cross-border leasing can offer financing and with-
holding tax advantages as wel1.47 It is worth noting that conflicting
ownership rules could lead to a case in which neither country recog-
nized their taxpayer as the owner entitled to depreciation deductions.
In that case, though, the "burden" borne by the taxpayers is not clas-
sic double taxation; it more properly constitutes a "loss" of special tax
benefits designed with business incentives in mind. 48 Specifically, if
note 43, at 115-34, 148-51 (1981) (outlining various jurisdictions' approaches to lease
characterization); Ian Shrank, Legal Issues in Leveraged Leasing, in EQuIPNIENT LEASING
1995, supra note 43, at 576-77.
Second, even if a country does not strictly adhere to legal ownership and aims to
evaluate the substance of the lease, it might still reach a different conclusion about owner-
ship than another country. See, e.g., 1FA General Report, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that a
lease may be interpreted as an operating lease by one country and a finance lease by an-
other country).
46 For a hypothetical examining accelerated depreciation deductions, see appendix,
47 See, e.g., Andersson et al., supra note 43 (leasing can function "as an alternative to
buying with borrowed money," thereby keeping the liability "off the books"); Monica Bir-
inger, Cross-Border Equipment Leasing May Reduce Financing Costs for Canadian Users, 5 J. INT'I.
TAX'Iq 230, 230 (1994) ("[s]tructuring a transaction as au inbound cross-border lease may
reduce the cost of financing for Canadian users" and "characterizing the transaction as a
lease under the law of the lessor and a sale under Canadian law.... is often required for
withholding tax reasons"); John P. Flowitt, Selected Issues with Respect to Operating Leases, in
EQUIPMENT LEASING 1995, supra note 43, at 483-84 (remarking that although tax benefits
play an important role in many cross-border leases, "many aircraft lease transactions in-
volve cross-border issues for purely commercial reasons").
48 See, e.g., E. John Park, Cross-Border Equipment Leasing.• Recent Developments Related to Sec-
tion 168(g), 16 Vs. TAX RELY. 299, 302-03 (1996) (reporting Congressional interest in en-
hancing American competitiveness, and support from some trade economists for tax in-
centives that favor cross-border equipment leasing to improve international competit-
iveness).
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each country in the cross-border lease considers the other country's
taxpayer as the owner, no taxpayer receives accelerated depreciation
deductions.49
 The key loss is the difference in timing. The other likely
"loss" from non-owner status is access to investment tax credits—a tax
technique to spur investment activity generally, or in targeted sectors.
Thus, the "penalty" from tax-law conflict in the cross-border leasing
context arguably is not "inappropriate," uneconomic taxation, al-
though it is burdened more heavily than a domestic transaction be-
cause no party receives accelerated depreciation deductions or in-
vestment tax credits. 5°
3. Dual-Resident Companies
In this arbitrage based on residence rules, corporate groups in
two different countries can use a double-clip strategy with a dual-
resident company (DRC) to deduct. losses twice. Specifically, a corpo-
ration resident both in the United Slates and a foreign jurisdiction
(most notably the United Kingdom) serves as a member of a consoli-
dated group of related companies in each jurisdiction. (The dual-
resident status is possible if the two countries apply different tests, for
example, incorporation51
 versus management and control,52 and the
facts of the case allow a single corporation to satisfy the relevant test
in each country.) If this DRC has losses, then there is an opportunity
to use those losses against the income of the U.S. group and the in-
come of the U.K. group," For example, the DRC might borrow to
fund the acquisition of U.S. subsidiaries, The DRC would have little
42
 For example, if France views Flight Co. (the U.S. company) as the owner and the
United States views Plane Co. (the French company) as the owner, then the following tax
treatment would result: Plane Co. would be viewed as selling the plane thereby reporting
the "rental" income payment as income from a sale, offset by remaining basis in the plane
(or if installment-sale reporting is available, spreading the income and basis recovery over
a period of years). Under this scenario, Flight Co. would report the payments as rent, cur-
rently deductible on au economic accrual method.
5° Certain double taxation problems, however, can develop. For example, if the United
States treats a cross-border lease as a sale from the U.S. party to a foreign party, then the
payment into the United States is the sale price and might be U.S. source. If the foreign
country views the transaction as a lease, and the payment by the foreign party as rent, it
might impose withholding tax. In that case, the U.S. party risks economic double taxation
if it cannot credit foreign taxes paid. Park, supra note 43, at 143-44,151.
51
 The United States applies an incorporation test for residency, See I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (4)
(2000).
52
 The United Kingdom, for example, uses a management and control test. SCI, S. REP.
No. 99-313, at 419 (1986).
53
 For a numerical example, see infra note 132.
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income but substantial loss due to interest deductions on the debt.
The DRC losses would be shared with affiliated groups in both the
United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, a single corporation's
losses (those of the DRC) reduce two sets of income and ultimately
two sets of taxes, creating the double-dip effect. 54
4. Hybrid Entities
Once we define cross-border tax arbitrage as a situation in which
a transaction or structure receives different treatment under two ju-
risdictions' tax laws, the range of possible arbitrages seems almost
infinite. An active (and highly contested) source of arbitrage exists
with entity classification. When two countries classify an entity differ-
ently—for example, the United States views a business operation as a
branch, but the foreign jurisdiction deems it a corporation—substan-
tial arbitrage opportunities result. Although such conflict has always
been possible, the adoption of the "check-the-box rules" effective
January 1, 1997 provided these results with much greater certainty
and much less complexity. 55 Prior to these new rules, entity
classification (in particular the distinction between a partnership and
an association taxable as a corporation) turned on an analysis of six
factors." This multi-factor test applied to both domestic and foreign
business organizations.
Ultimately, Treasury determined that because classification was
virtually elective for a subset of taxpayers, then perhaps it should be
elective directly, with a lower cost and broader availability. 57 The final
54 For further discussion of dual-resident corporations, see, for example, S. REP. No.
99-313, at 420-21 (1986) (example and analysis of DRC transaction); Walter T. Ranieri,
The New Dual Consolidated Loss Temporary Regulations, LEXIS 90 TN1 6-65.
55 See Treas. Reg. § 301.77(11-2, —3 (as amended in 2001) (the "check-the-box regula-
tions").
56 See. e.g., Rev. Rill. 88-8, 1988-1 C.B. 403 (application of the multi-factor test). The
six factors were: (1) limited liability; (2) continuity of life; (3) free transferability of inter-
ests; (4) centralized management; (5) associates; and (6) objective to carry on business for
joint profit. Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). In reality, the last two of the six factors
were common to both partnerships and corporations, so the analysis focused on the first
four factors. See, c.g.,Joni L. Walser & Robert E. Culbertson, Encore Une Fois: Check-the-Box on
the International Stage, 15 TAX No'Its INT't. 53, 54 (1997) (reviewing the application of the
pre-1997 classification rules). If an entity had at least three of the remaining four features,
it would be classified as a corporation for tax purposes. Id.
" Dissatisfaction with the six-factor test grew as it became apparent that in many cases
an organization's tax classification was virtually elective with a little tax planning. The well-
advised taxpayer had significant control over entity classification. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 95-
14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 ("[t]he Service and Treasury recognize that there is considerable
flexibility under the current rules to effectively change the classification of an organization
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check-the-box regulations specify certain domestic and foreign enti-
ties as "per se" corporations. No election is possible, and there is no
flexibility regarding their taxation. For the remainder of business or-
ganizations not subject to the per se classification, however, the tax-
payer is generally allowed to elect its tax status either as a corporation
or a pass-through (partnership or branch, depending on the facts). 58
The extension of the election regime to foreign business organi-
zations generated considerable debate. Although both domestic and
foreign entities were analyzed under the old six factor test, some tax
commentators expressed serious concern about extending any elec-
tive classification system to foreign entities due to the risk of inconsis-
tent entity classification between countries and the potential arbitrage
it could facilitate." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or "Service")
itself acknowledged this risk," but ultimately issued the final check-
the-box regulations with treatment for foreign entities that mirrored
the regime for domestic entities. In both cases, certain types of enu-
merated business operations automatically receive corporation status
(for foreign entities, the regulations provide a country-by-country
list). The remainder may choose their classification. With these new
regulations came new opportunities for hybrid entities.
As an arbitrage category, "hybrid entities" is much larger and
more varied in its content than the other examples offered in this Ar-
ticle. Nonetheless, h is helpful to have at least one or two versions in
at will"); Walser & Culbertson, supra note 56, at 54 ("The pointlessness [of the effort to
apply the six factor test] was underlined by the general conviction that, with enough high-
priced tweaking of the organizing documents, most taxpayers were able to achieve the
classification they desired most of the time."); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on
the 'Check the Box' Entity Classification System Proposed in Notice 95-14 (Aug. 30, 1995), LEXIS
95 TNI 172-13.
In addition, the rise of limited liability companies (LLCs) under state law, which en-
abled taxpayers to create a business organization with limited liability but partnership tax
treatment, further weakened the role of the multi-factor test. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, A
Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WAnt. U. L. Q. 565, 566-71
(1995) (describing the development of LLCs); Walser & Culbertson, supra note 56, at 54
(LLCs enabled taxpayers to achieve both limited liability and pass-through taxation).
n See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, —3 (as amended in 2001).
69 See, e.g., Albertina Fernandez, Eighth Annual GI-Winn Tax Conference, LEXIS 96 TNI
1-3; Kathleen Matthews, IRS Official Discusses Check-the-Box Proposal for Foreign Entities, LEXIS
96 TNI 34-6; N.1: State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 57, LEXIS 95 TNI 172-13.
6° I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 ("consideration in the foreign area is the pos-
sibility of inconsistent, or hybrid, entity classification"); see also 64 Fed. Reg. 37727, 37727
(proposed July 13, 1999) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. Pts. 1, 301) (the preamble notes that
"Nile use of hybrid arrangements ... is greatly facilitated by the 'check-the-box' entity
classification regulations").
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mind to support the later discussion of a framework for cross-border
tax arbitrage. Two examples are described below.
a. Subpart F 61 and Entity Classification
One common use of hybrids is to avoid some of the limitations
and restrictions of the subpart F regime.62 For example, imagine a
U.S. person has a wholly owned operating entity in Country X, a
high-tax jurisdiction. 64 This entity constitutes a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC),65 thereby subjecting the U.S. person to subpart F's
antideferral rules. 66 Despite the fact that the CFC is a separate legal
entity and is not a U.S. corporation, sonic or all of its income might
be taxable currently to its U.S. shareholder, even in the absence of a
distribution from the CFC. 67 If the CFC earned passive income, that
income would likely be included on the U.S. shareholder's U.S. in-
come tax return immediately, eliminating the deferral benefit from
operating offshore. In contrast, most active income earned by the
CFC would not be captured by the subpart F rules and, therefore,
would not be subject to U.S. tax until the CFC made a distribution to
the U.S. shareholder, 68 Under the facts of the proposed hypothetical
here, however, the active income earned by the CFC still faces twat,
tractive taxation because the CFC itself is located in a high-tax juris-
diction. Even though current. U.S. tax is avoided, high Country X tax
is not. This is where a hybrid structure could be useful.
The U.S. person directs the CFC to set up an entity (Entity Y) in
Country Y (a low-tax jurisdiction). Entity Y is treated as a corporation
by Country X but is disregarded under U.S. tax law. Entity Y makes a
loan to the CFC, and the CFC deducts the interest payments because
Country X views the payments as made to a separate corporation.
61 The subpart F rules limit a U.S. resident's or corporation's ability to defer current
U.S. tax on foreign-source income earned through controlled foreign subsidiaries.
62 See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, l)rr'i ot"ruE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL, or INCOME
EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY, DEC.
2000, reprinted in 2001 DAILY TAX REP, S-34-36 (Stipp. 1 Jan. 3, 2001) []hereinafter Treas-
ury Deferral Study] (discussing use of hybrid entities to avoid subpart F rules).
63 The term "U.S. persons" includes domestic corporations, U.S. citizens, and U.S.
residents. I.R.C. §§ 957(c), 7701(a) (30) (2000).
" Sec Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at S-34.
65 I.R.C. § 957(a).
66 Id. §§ 951-962.
67 Id. § 951(a).
68 For a description of the types of income covered by the subpart F rules, see I.R.C.
§§ 951, 952, 956.
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These interest deductions reduce the CFC's operating income subject
to Country X's high tax rate (assuming no Country X thin capitaliza-
tion rules apply).. The interest payments received by Entity Y bear lit-
tle or no tax because Country Y is a low-tax jurisdiction. The remain-
ing question is the U.S. lax treatment. Generally, interest income
would be passive income covered by subpart E It must, however, be
earned by a CFC for the rules to apply. Here, the taxpayer would ar-
gue that because the United States disregards the existence of Entity
Y, the "interest" payment is really an internal cash flow and should be
disregarded for tax purposes (producing no subpart. F income). Thus,
Country X tax on the CFC's operating income is reduced, no
significant. Country Y tax is due, and no U.S. subpart F income is cre-
ated in the process. The success of this structure turns on the use of
hybrids and the discrepancies in entity classification.
b. Domestic Reverse Hybrids
Another type of hybrid, a "domestic reverse hybrid," produces a
different benefit.69 Consider a foreign corporation with a U.S. operat-
ing subsidiary. When the U.S. subsidiary pays a dividend to the for-
eign parent, there is no deduction and the payment is likely subject to
U.S. withholding tax under the applicable treaty. On the other side,
the dividend will probably benefit from a foreign tax credit or exemp-
tion in the foreign parent's jurisdiction. If instead of owning the op-
erating subsidiary directly, the foreign parent establishes a U.S. hybrid
holding company to own the U.S. operating subsidiary, a tax benefit
results. The key to obtaining this benefit. is that the U.S. holding
company is a hybrid—that is, the U.S. holding company is considered
a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, but is a pass-through entity under
the rules of the foreign parent's jurisdiction." In this alternative sce-
nario, the U.S. operating subsidiary pays a dividend to the U.S. hybrid
and the hybrid pays interest to the foreign parent. The following tax
°° Under common entity terminology, "an entity taxed as a corporation in a foreign ju-
risdiction but treated as a partnership or disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes is re-
ferred to as a `hybrid.' An entity taxed as a partnership or other pass-through in a foreign
jurisdiction but treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes is referred to as a 'reverse
hybrid,'" Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at 5-34 11.I.
7°
 This common example is outlined in 66 Fed, Reg. 12445, 12446 (Feb. 27, 2001)
(preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (2)(ii)). See also Lee Sheppard, Interrst Deduc-
tion Denial by the Bath Door, 22 TAN, NOTES lisrri 1494, 1494-95 (2001) [hereinafter Denial];
Lee Sheppard, U.S. Treasury Official Discusses International 'Arbitrage', 21 TAX Nam 1N•I,
696, 697 (2000) [hereinafter Arbitrage],
100	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 44:79
treatment results: Under U.S. tax law, the first payment is a dividend
and is excluded from the hybrid's income and is not deductible by the
payor." The interest payment from the U.S. hybrid to the foreign
parent is deductible and can receive the loiver withholding rate nego-
tiated in the treaty (if there is one) with the parent's jurisdiction. The
foreign jurisdiction, however, again views the payment received by the
foreign parent as a dividend from the underlying U.S. corporation
(not as interest from the hybrid entity). The "dividend" again benefits
from the foreign jurisdiction's applicable foreign tax credit or exemp-
tion rules. 72 Thus, for U.S. tax purposes, the hybrid transaction effec-
tively replaces a direct dividend distribution from an operating U.S.
subsidiary to its foreign parent (which is not deductible by the U.S.
subsidiary and faces U.S. withholding tax) with an interest payment to
the foreign parent (which is deductible on the U.S. side by the hybrid
entity and has reduced U.S. withholding under the treaty). The arbi-
trage benefit derives from the fact that in both scenarios the foreign
jurisdiction views the payment to the foreign parent as a dividend, yet
in the hybrid scenario the United States "relinquishes" its taxing
power because it views the payment as interest and assumes that the
other jurisdiction does as well (and will correspondingly tax it). The
conflicting classification of the U.S. hybrid entity lies at the center of
this profitable mismatch.
II. PROOF OF A PROBLEM
A. Introduction
Merely describing arbitrage cases is insufficient to demonstrate
that such transactions and structures constitute a problem requiring
intervention. This Part seeks to establish why concern over cross-
border tax arbitrage is legitimate and how that concern can be trans-
lated into a coherent response. First, this Part. develops the criteria
against which to measure cross-border tax arbitrage and applies them
to the arbitrage case studies. Second, this Part asks what the risks of
curbing arbitrage are and whether the harms from arbitrage outweigh
those from remedial action. This assessment is a predicate to the ef-
fort in Part III to design a suitable framework for analyzing and re-
sponding to cross-border tax arbitrage.
71 1.R.C. §§ 243,296 (2000).
72
 See, e.g., Denial, supra note 70, al 1494-95; Arbitrage, supra note 70, at 697.
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B. What Makes Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage a Problem in Need of a Solution?
I. Introduction
The breadth of literature exploring the newer subject of cross-
• border tax arbitrage is less extensive than that available for domestic
arbitrage. 73
 Already, however, the topic of cross-border tax arbitrage
has generated notable controversy." Some taxpayers maintain that
the existence of cross-border tax arbitrage warrants no government
action. At a minimum, this view demands that any government. re-
sponse be premised on demonstration of a problem. Thus, the first
step is to identify the relevant criteria against which cross-border tax
arbitrage can be evaluated. The core criteria underlying most evalua-
tions of tax policy—efficiency and equity—remain central in the in-
ternational tax realm. Therefore, the question, at least as an initial
matter, is whether cross-border tax arbitrage poses efficiency or equity
concerns. 75 Following that analysis, two related criteria, political ac-
countability and revenue impact, are briefly considered. Both are
closely linked to efficiency and equity, but can be better appreciated
through an independent statement of their role.
73 But see Rosenbloom, supra note 2, and AviNonah, supra note 8, for recent and
significant discussions of cross-border tax arbitrage. For an earlier, and influential, consid-
eration of the subject, see West, supm note 14.
74 See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 'Hybridity,' Mules, and Hinnies, 16
'MX NOTES INVI. 579, 579 (1998).
75
 One would expect that other regulatory fields (for example, banking, bankruptcy,
securities, environmental, and corporate) would prove a goldmine for thinking about
cross-border arbitrage, especially in a setting in which there is no supranational ruling
body. The reality, however, is that these fields ultimately produce little directly useful guid-
ance. In fact, it is difficult in most instances even to identify examples of arbitrage, as that
term is used in the international tax context. Although the literature from these fields
regularly uses the term "arbitrage" for cross-border activities, a careful reading reveals that
in these fields the term generally covers behavior that would be labeled competition in the
tax world—the specific use of regulation to draw business to a country's environment by
lowering the standard or level of regulation (whether that takes the form of lax rules or
lower standards). The regulated party gains a benefit not by seeking conflict per se be-
tween two applicable and governing regimes. but rather by shopping for the most attrac-
tive regime (leading to fears in the regulatory literature of races to the bottom). Actual
examples of arbitrage (of the cross-border tax arbitrage sort) prove difficult to find and
are not the subject of much attention or analysis in these fields. The degree of silence in
these other literatures serves as a barometer for the absence of a tax-like arbitrage. See infra
note 302. Ott a broader analytical level, however, the fundamental questions concerning
the relationship between and among countries' regulatory systems and how competing
interests should be managed pervades all substantive regulatory regimes.
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2. Efficiency
a. Introduction
The main efficiency question is whether and how cross-border
tax arbitrage distorts taxpayer behavior. The question, however, is
more nuanced than may be evident at first because of two special fea-
tures of the transactions under scrutiny: they are cross-border and
they involve arbitrage. Efficiency analyses in both of these areas have
developed context-specific tools and terminology. Before investigating
the efficiency outcomes in the arbitrage case studies, it will be neces-
sary to draw upon the contributions of the existing literature (regard-
ing international tax and domestic arbitrage) to efficiency analyses.
i. Efficiency in International Tax
In international tax, two basic efficiency perspectives are possi-
ble—worldwide efficiency and national efficiency. The two need not
be the same at a given time, nor is it universally agreed by scholars,
governments, or taxpayers which should dominate. 76 That said, most
discussions of international tax policy operate from the view that.
worldwide efficiency is desirable." From that baseline, international
tax theorists identify two major ways in which international tax rules
may distort behavior and undermine worldwide economic efficiency:
(I ) favoring investment either at home or abroad (violating "capital
export neutrality" (CEN)), or (2) favoring certain investors in a single
economic setting, thereby distorting savings decisions and potentially
impacting competitiveness of businesses (violating "capital import
neutrality"(CIN)). 78 For years these neutralities have formed an im-
76 Scc, e.g., Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at S-14 (incorporating CEN and CIN
into the analysis); TSILLY 13AGAN, THE COSTS or INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (Univ. of
Mich., Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 02-13, 2002), available at http://
ssrn.corn/abstractid=315373 (on file with the author) (exploring how countries should
decide whether to promote global efficiency and what that choice entails).
77 See Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at S-17 (1p)olicies that maximize global
welfare are considered first, because maximizing global welfare is probably the best way to
maximize U.S. economic welfare"). But see Graetz, supra note 4, at 270-77 (suggesting a
more complex view of the relationship between national interests and the global efficiency
goals sought through the pursuit of CEN and C1N).
18 Extensively debating the proper role of CIN and CEN in international lax policy is
beyond the scope of this Article. The question is, nonetheless, quite important. For recent
considerations of the subject, see Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at S-14; Dagan,
supra note 76, at 10; Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the
Right, Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525 (2001) (examining the
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portant. (but not uncontroversial) foundation for international tax
analysis as the touchstone for global efficiency." CEN is measured by
reference to a taxpayer's willingness to invest domestically or abroad.
Locational neutrality is achieved when a resident taxpayer is indiffer-
ent as between a domestic investment and a foreign investment with
the same pre-tax rate of return 80
 (this occurs when the taxpayer faces
the same marginal tax rate regardless of the investment choice
made). 81
The competing neutrality for organizing international tax policy,
CIN, calls for all investments made in a given country (regardless of
taxpayer) to face the same marginal tax rate. CIN can be thought of
as requiring that all business conducted in a given location face the
same total level of taxation, even though the taxpayers may be from a
variety of countries. 82 The choice between the two versions of neutral-
ity is debated on several levels, including their empirical effects and
the relevance of competitiveness concerns. 83
Despite this established backdrop for discussions of efficiency at
the international level, there is a growing view that although the CEN
and CIN constructs can be useful in orienting the efficiency analysis,
they may provide too limited and constrained a conception of
efficiency by highlighting particular measurements of global
efficiency.84 The efficiency inquiry in its fullest application should il-
luminate how cross-border tax arbitrage opportunities may impact
taxpayer behavior, what. distortions result, and what that should imply
for government action. Perhaps the bulk of that investigation can be
subsumed under the rubric of CEN and CIN as a convenient short-
conflict between neutrality and competitiveness in the context of subpart F); Graetz, supra
note 4.
79 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 4, at. 277-82.
00 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, sup? note 15, at 1604; Graetz, supra note 4, at 270.
Br
	 e.g., Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at 5-13—S-14; Graetz, supra note 4, at
270.
52
 For this reason, CIN is often characterized as supporting international competitive-
ness because it would require that a U.S. corporation doing business in France bear the
same total tax burden (and no more) on its French operations as a German or French
corporation competing in France. The CIN and CEN debates complicate the international
tax discussion because it is not possible to achieve both neutralities simultaneously (unless
the tax bases and rates in all countries are identical). See, e.g., Graetz, Su PM note 4, at 272;
Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94
ECON. 793 (1980).
81 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 272-77.
84 See, e.g., Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New
Approaches, 47 TAX Nons 581,586-87 (1990).
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hand, but it should not distract from the inherently broad scope of
the question.
In terms of furthering the analysis of cross-border tax arbitrage,
three points should be drawn from this traditional and pervasive
framing of efficiency in the international context. First, the discussion
highlights an important reality that must be confronted in Part III
when we explore possible responses—that efficiency from an individ-
ual nation's perspective may differ from global efficiency. Even glob-
ally efficient moves can generate some winners and some losers. In
the absence of a redistribution mechanism, countries predictably will
resist moves toward global efficiency that create national disadvantage
(particularly in the short term). 85 The impact of this national perspec-
tive on cross-border tax arbitrage is addressed in the discussion of
sovereignty in Part II.B.4.b. Second, in many cases, an arbitrage will
be inefficient by almost the same amount regardless of whether the
standard is CEN or CIN. 88 In those cases, the major debate will be
whether to eliminate the bulk of the distortion that both analyses
would identify as undesirable, rather than whether CEN or CIN
should be the exact measure. Third, the CEN/CIN difference will be
most important in those cases in which the arbitrage involves U.S. tax
rules specifically aimed at the question of how to interact with other
countries' tax systems. 87 For such cases, the choice between the two
efficiency measures is central to ascertaining and furthering the poli-
cies underlying the U.S. tax rule in question.
One final note on the international tax system's exploration of
efficiency: a single taxation principle can be identified and articulated
that reflects an expectation that income should be taxed once.88 The
complaints about cross-border tax arbitrage from government
88
 Recent work on international taxation and Pareto efficiency quantifies the intuitions
underlying many national-level objections to harmonization efforts: global efficiency may
not improve everyone's position if transfers between countries are not possible and losers
are not compensated. See, e.g., CHARLES BLACKORBY & CRAIG BREIT, TAX HARMONIZATION
AND PARETO-EFFICIENCY 13 (Univ. of B.C., Discussion Paper No. 98-16, Sept. 1998), avail-
able at http://www.econ.ubc.ca/discpapers/dp9926.ppdf  (on file with the author); DAGAN,
SUPra note 76; MICHAEL KEEN & DAVID E. WILDASON, PAREFO EFFICIENCY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION 15-16 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 371, Nov. 2000).
86 See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
87
 Sec infra note 146-147 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Avi-Vonah, supra note 15 (using the one-tax principle to justify controlling
only two specific aspects of tax competition, targeted beneficial tax regimes and haven
secrecy). Like these two versions of tax competition, arbitrage is not expected to reduce
transaction costs or increase efficiency (except in the limited case of facilitating delivery of
an intended tax benefit as in the tax-exempt bond case).
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officials, international organizations, and commentators indicate an
underlying rejection of the idea that cross-border income can face no
taxation. A single level of taxation is appropriate, and both double
taxation and nontaxation violate global efficiency and equity. Reliance
on this "single-tax" principle to support a focus on arbitrage requires:
(1) evidence of international agreement on the principle: 99
 (2) an
explanation of the greater prominence of concern internationally for
double taxation as compared to nontaxation; and (3) an examination
of the implications for arbitrage decisions.
What evidence demonstrates a generally shared vision that in-
come should be taxed once? Bilateral tax treaties clearly address the
cases of double taxation. Debate exists as to whether the bilateral tax
treaties can be construed to reject nontaxation as well." Given trea-
ties' elective status for taxpayers, any support for a single tax norm
from the bilateral treaty network would be more hortatory than estab-
lished policy. Even undercurrents of support for one level of tax,
however, are relevant. The concept of an international tax regime is
much more fluid than that of a domestic tax system because there is
no supranational authority, nor even a multilateral agreement. But
just as international relations theorists believe in the reality of pat-
terns, rules, and practices of international relations, international tax
scholars see a global structure for international tax, despite the ab-
sence of a binding framework, A broad set of shared ideas and norms
underlie the network of bilateral treaties, international organization
tax pronouncements, and domestic rules regulating cross-border
transactions.92
 Additional evidence for a single-tax consensus mani-
fests itself in a number of other multilateral and unilateral features of
the international tax system. 93
89 Understood as income being comprehensively subject to one country's tax rules.
90
 See, e.g., Avi-\bnah, supra note 8, at 169; Rosenbloom, supra note 2.
91 Sec.	 Avi-Vonah, supra note 8, at 169-71; Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 164.
9"-
	 generally Avi-Vonah, supra note 8, at 169-71; Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Co-
operation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 littook.  ].11,41'1, L. 1641,1641 (2001).
93
 For example, the OECD's report on harmful tax competition recommends several
actions that will reduce the opportunity for nontaxation in both the source and residence
countries: (1) adoption of domestic CFC rules that reduce taxpayers' ability to defer resi-
dence country tax on foreign source income (particularly income likely to face little or no
source taxation); (2) recommendation of other anti-deferral rules reaching taxpayers be-
yond the traditional scope of CFC legislation; (3) more limited use of exemption systems
as the tool for avoiding double taxation (in order to ensure taxation in either the source
or residence country); and (4) termination of treaties with tax havens. OECD Report,
supra note 15, at 37-50.
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Assuming, then, a level of interest in the international commu-
nity regarding nontaxation, why has double taxation received more
prominent attention? Tax treaties explicitly address double taxation,
and most treaty partners have domestic legislation designed to reduce
or eliminate double taxation, The most probable answer is that al-
though double taxation and nontaxation both create efficiency and
equity costs, the two situations differ. Double taxation exacts a high
price. Serious double taxation can completely eliminate the profit in a
transaction (or worse yet, extract more in tax than was earned in in-
come). Thus, governments have had an incentive to prevent
significant double taxation and taxpayers have had a strong interest in
seeking (and facilitating) protection. In contrast, nontaxation of in-
come will not eliminate trade (although it will distort the shape it
takes). The impetus for international cooperation here is less potent
(and taxpayers are unlikely to be pressuring governments for reform).
The difference may explain why the international community has, as
a historical and practical matter, not responded with equal vigor.
ii. Domestic Arbitrage
One further specification that will aid the efficiency examination
originates in the domestic tax arbitrage field with its established re-
search history. Domestic tax arbitrage questions have circulated for
many years,94 exploring both the nature of potential arbitrage risks
and possible remedies. In the domestic context, tax arbitrage refers to
transactions that "while not necessarily profitable before tax, are
profitable after tax ... because the tax law treats income and deduc-
tions asymmetrically, allowing an immediate deduction for an expen-
diture (such as interest costs), but allowing complete or partial defer-
ral or exemption of the income. "95 The literature focuses primarily on
interest deductions as the type of deduction involved in the arbitrage
structure, although the term is acknowledged to have a wider scope. 99
94 See infra notes 95, 97, 104, 106; see also Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage and the In-
terest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1988) (increasing Congressional concern
over tax arbitrage); Jerome Kurtz, The Interest Deduction Under Our Hybrid Tax System: Mud-
dling Toward Accommodation, 50 TAX. L. Rio:. 153, 170 (1995) (trend toward restrictions on
interest deductions).
95 David J. Shakow, Confronting the Problems of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987)
(citations omitted).
96 Id. at n.3; see also C. EUGENE STEUEALE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLATION 59 (1985)
("(b) ecause of the relatively high tax rate on interest payments, the most common form of
tax arbitrage involves borrowing to purchase tax-preferred assets").
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A major contribution from the domestic arbitrage field has been the
exposition of two versions of tax arbitrage—normal and pure. 97 The
classification of an arbitrage as normal or pure bears on the type of
response that may be appropriate.
Normal tax arbitrage describes situations in which a taxpayer
borrows" to buy a tax-preferred asset (one with a lower tax rate than
that applicable to the interest expense). Thus, for example, when a
taxpayer borrows to buy a house (which generates imputed income)
or machinery (subject to significant accelerated cost recovery), the
taxpayer has engaged in normal tax arbitrage." This arbitrage will be
profitable assuming that the after-tax rate of return on the investment.
(the "preferred asset") is higher than the after-tax rate of payment of
interest. on the borrowing.'" The taxpayer, having made a zero net
investment (borrows to buy), can generate profit from the tax sys-
temic" What. happens once this arbitrage exists? One potential effect
is that the resulting arbitrage profit "increases demand for the tax-
favored investment, thereby raising its price: 102 (Borrowing to invest
in tax-exempt. bonds is thought to be a classic case of normal arbi-
trage.)"3 This price effect may reduce or eliminate the value of the
tax benefit inherent in the preferred asset104
 (the arbitrage profit).
97 See, e.g., STEUERLE, supra note 96, at 59-70; Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deduc-
tions Be Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION
TAx 195, 203-05 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988); Shakow, supra note 95, at 2-3; Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recove,', Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 565-67
(1985).
As a starting point in the analysis, interest expense is assumed to be deductible.
99
 See, e.g., S•EuERLE, supra note 96, at 59.
m Id. at 60.
101 See Shakow, supra note 95, at 3. In fact, the taxpayer may be encouraged to engage
in transactions that only have value because of the tax treatment and would not otherwise
be pursued.
An alternative, "less negative" characterization of the home-purchase arbitrage is pos-
sible, The transaction of borrowing to buy a home could be interpreted as making the
home ownership incentive (seen in the nontaxation of the imputed rental income) avail-
able to all investors, whether financed through debt or their own capital. See Calvin H.
Johnson, It an Interest Deduction Inevitable? 6 VA. TAX REV. 123, 124 (1986) (examining this
line of argument); Koppelman, supra note 94, at 1162-66 (same); Warren, supra note 97,
at 560, 563 (same).
100 Shakow, supra note 95, at 2.
103 Id, For debt used to purchase tax-exempt bonds, interest deduction limits were
adopted as early as 1917. Sec Koppelman, supra note 94, at 1151.
I" See Auerbach, supra note 97, at 201, 211. The taxpayer's ability to borrow to acquire
tax-exempt bonds can "facilitate the sorting and capitalization and therefore benefit the
issuers of the debt by providing them with a lower cost of capital." Id. at 211; Shakow, supra
note 95, at 2; see also S • EUERLF., supra note 96, at 65-67; Koppelman, supra note 94, at
1172-74. Through this pricing effect, full capitalization of the tax benefit could be
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Even if the arbitrage profit is eliminated by the market, however,
there may still remain potential misallocations, along with distribu-
tional and portfolio effects." Moreover, a variety of factors, including
the inefficiency of the market, may converge to limit the reliability of
the market as a tool for eliminating arbitrage profit."
Pure tax arbitrage functions similarly to normal arbitrage, with a
notable exception. If a taxpayer buys and sells the "same" income-
preferred asset (a relatively circular transaction), then the taxpayer
has engaged in pure tax arbitrage.m For example, if a taxpayer bor-
rows and uses the funds to invest in an individual retirement account
(IRA), pure tax arbitrage has been achieved." The significant dis-
tinction between pure and normal lax arbitrage is that pure, unlike
normal, does not face a market equilibration that can lower the tax-
payer's return on the preferred investment." In the IRA arbitrage
above, the existence of the transaction does not lead to a decline in
the return on IRAs, as may occur in a tax-exempt bond arbitrage
transaction, when competition for the bonds raises their price/lowers
achieved with the bonds being held by the top-bracket taxpayers; Warren, supra note 97, at
564.
105 See, e.g., STEUERLE, supra note 96, at 67 (identifying large portfolio shifts due to
normal tax arbitrage); Koppelman, supra note 94, at 1190 (reviewing portfolio effects);
Warren, supra note 97, at 567 (noting that even if the market response does eliminate the
profit from normal arbitrage, the resulting situation and final allocation of the relevant
assets may nonetheless be undesirable).
106 See, e.g., STEUERLE, supra note 96, at 81-92 (discussing asymmetric tax treatment re-
garding different taxpayers where profitability in normal tax arbitrage depends on the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate and the relationship between financial arbitrage and interest
rates); Daniel I. Halperin, Panel Discussion on Cost Recovery, Indexation and Interest, in
Frederic W. Hickman, Interest, Depreciation, and Indexing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 773, 815 (1986)
(considering the market's efficiency in capitalizing the effect of the tax arbitrage profit);
Koppelman, supra note 94, at 1177-86 (noting debate as to why full capitalization may not
be achieved and reviewing some of the explanations); Shakoes, supra note 95, at 8-9 (not-
ing the explanation in the tax-exempt bond context that the bonds may be priced to at-
tract lower rate taxpayers with the corresponding effect of keeping the pre-mx rate of re-
turn higher than would be expected); Warren, supra note 97, at 564-65 (questioning
reliance on market effects to counter the problems of normal arbitrage because markets
may be inefficient, interim arbitrage profits would still be available during the equilibra-
tion period, and international capital flows may limit the effects of interest rate increases).
1 ° 7 One investment may include both kinds of arbitrage. See STEUERLE, supra note 96,
at 60-61 (describing a taxpayer's investment in a pension hind as including normal tax
arbitrage if the fund acquires real estate and including pure tax arbitrage if it acquires
interest-bearing assets).
108 Auerbach, supra note 97, at 204-06; STEUERLE, supra note 96. at 60; see also STEU-
ERIE, supra note 96, at 68 (describing a comparable transaction as the taxpayer in a sense
engaging] in transactions with himself").
1°6 See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 97, at 205.
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their return. Why? By recognizing pure arbitrage as a transaction in-
volving the "same asset," one can see that where investing and borrow-
ing occur in the same market no net change in demand is produced
and thus there is no price effect."° In some sense, the tax preference
is one of status that is not linked to the behavior of others or to a lim-
ited asset pool. If a taxpayer wants an IRA, lie or she simply arranges
the investment structure. Whether a neighbor wants to pursue the
same transaction does not affect the availability of the taxpayer's IRA
or its cost.. 111
Although not determinative, the labels of normal and pure arbi-
trage are useful in evaluating the need to respond to arbitrage. If the
market will be unable to eliminate the arbitrage profit, regulatory in-
tervention may be needed.
b. Efficiency Analysis of the Arbitrage Examples
What are the general efficiency concerns with cross-border tax
arbitrage? Essentially the expectation is that where the arbitrage
proves to be more tax advantageous than a parallel domestic transac-
tion, several effects will likely follow: (1) some domestic transactions
will be replaced by cross-border ones;" 2 (2) cross-border transactions
will be conducted with those countries for which the tax intersection
is most. fiworable; (3) there will be a disproportionate increase in
those commercial business activities for which an attractive arbitrage
exists; and (4) to the extent the transactions are not constrained by
the market, limits on the behavior will derive from sources other than
immediate market recalibration. The standard economic inquiry
would view these arbitrage effects as indicators of inefficient invest-
ment decisionslls by taxpayers (presumably undesirable, at. least
110 see. e,g. STEUERLE, supra note 96, at 68-69 ("In a riskless world with no transaction
costs, pure arbitrage would have little or no effect on most real variables."); Shakos, supra
note 95, at 5.
tai In very simplified terms, the taxpayer borrows in the market to invest in an IRA
that lends in the market to the taxpayer.
112 See generally Stuart Leblang, International Double Nontaxation: Hariton Misses the Point,
80 Doi Nuns 507-08 (1998) (arguing that cross-border investments face a lower tax bur-
den than exclusively domestic ones because of the advantage of cross-border tax arbi-
trage); Zelnya-Quesada, supra note 10, at G-8 (citing Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for
Tax Policy Jonathan Talisman's observation that Treasury is concerned about the eco-
nomic distortion caused by cross-border tax arbitrage and the resulting nontaxation of
income).
I" This assumes that the world without the arbitrage does not have other distortions
that the particular arbitrage happens to offset.
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where the effects were not the policy goals underlying the relevant tax
rules)." 4 Of course, even if the arbitrage is widely recognized as an
economic distortion, there may remain significant. disagreement re-
garding the appropriate government response. That debate turns
substantially on the nature and form of the proposed intervention
and its inherent risks (reviewed later).
To put the cross-border tax arbitrage distortions in more con-
crete terms and to predict whether the market may respond to the
arbitrages (that is, whether the arbitrages are more like normal or
pure), this section reviews the arbitrage case studies introduced in
Part I.
i. OLD Arbitrage
The U.S.-Japan OlD tax arbitrage (in which U.S. issuers obtain
current interest deductions while Japanese holders report no current
income)" 5 would likely produce market effects in both countries. U.S.
OID bonds may be more attractive to Japanese investors than "compa-
rable'Ho non-OID bonds or than "comparable" Japanese OID bonds.
In the case of the former (non-OID bonds), the U.S. OLD bonds are
preferable (despite similar issuer taxation) because the Japanese
holder can defer interest taxation until receipt." 7 In the case of the
latter (comparable Japanese OID bonds), the U.S. OID bonds could
be priced more attractively to the extent the Japanese OID bond is-
suer receives no current deductions and/or must withhold tax on is-
suance. 118 Thus, where a market of Japanese purchasers faces the tax
choices described above, the U.S. OID bonds would be a desirable
114 See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 97, at 211 (	 he "desirability [of the arbitrage, bor-
rowing to buy tax-exempt bonds] would therefore depend primarily on whether the gov-
ernment wished to encourage tax-exempt borrowing and, if not, whether it had the ability
to regulate the enouraged activity independently.").
"s See supra text accompanying notes 29-42.
116 The identification of comparable bonds requires some scrutiny because OID bonds
have a "reinvestment" feature by virtue of the fact that the interest is not actually paid but
is effectively retained and invested at the continuing internal rate of return.
117 Masui, supra note 38, at 865, 867 (if a Japanese taxpayer acquires a foreign, non-
OID bond and receives interest through a securities company handling payment in Japan,
then the Japanese final withholding tax at source applies; if the interest payment is not
made though an institution in Japan, then the withholding does not apply and taxpayers
are expected to report the income. If the Japanese investor holds a foreign OID bond the
"interest" is classified as "other income" to be reported when the bond is redeemed.).
118 AM err A•., supra note 25, at 263 (a generally final withholding tax is imposed at
issuance on the expected interest element of an OlD bond issued by a Japanese domestic
borrower.).
2002]	 Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage 	 111
investment. The market. reactions to this scenario could affect: (1)
who holds the bonds; (2) the relative issuance of OlD and non-OID
bonds; (3) the capital flow into the United States; (4) the cost of capi-
tal for U.S. bond issuers; (5) the number of U.S. holders of OW
bonds; (6) the collection of U.S. tax if an increasing number of OlD
bond holders bear no U.S. tax on the interest income; (7) the types of
bonds Japanese holders seek; (8) the ability of Japanese bond issuers
to compete for capital; and (9) the collection of tax revenue in Japan.
Although one can identify impacts, the final analysis would be much
more complicated and would depend on a variety of factors includ-
ing: (1) the size of the Japanese bond-buying market; (2) the portfo-
lios of investors; (3) the role of U.S. domestic tax exemptsll 9 in pur-
chasing OID bonds; and (4) the cross-border cash flows and invest-
ments.
Much of this investigation is quite reminiscent of domestic tax-
exempt bond analysis with some policy differences. In the tax-exempt
bond context, if the market capitalizes the tax benefit, then the price
is expected to move to a point where the investors obtain a return
comparable to taxable bonds and the tax-exempt issuer becomes the
ultimate beneficiary through a lower cost of funds.'" This result is
generally viewed as substantially consistent with the specific benefit
that the federal government intended to deliver through the exemp-
tion (a subsidy to the qualified issuers). Turning to OID bonds, the
U.S. tax rule represents an effort to tax income economically through
a yield-to-maturity requirement. No affirmative subsidy or incentive is
imbedded in these timing rules. If the market responds to the OID
arbitrage and enables the issuer to obtain a lower cost of funds clue to
arbitrage, the net effect. is not "efficient. delivery" of an intended sub-
sidy. There is no intended subsidy from the U.S. timing rule. Any U.S.
issuer able to tap the Japanese OID bond-buying market can seek this
benefit.. 121
 Several conclusions should be drawn from this preliminary
consideration of the economic effects of OID bond arbitrage: (1) the
market will play a pivotal role; (2) a clear determination of the net
effects of the arbitrage opportunity would be challenging to specify,
although some view U.S. corporate borrowers as winners and Japa-
"9
 U.S. tax-exempt entities would not be deterred by the current taxation of interest
on OID bonds because as tax-exempts, they typically bear no tax on the interest income.
199 Assuming there are sufficient top-bracket taxpayers. See sepia note 104.
191 See Scorr & WELLoNs, supra note 41, at 1034 (suggesting that in this OM arbitrage
the U.S. borrowers obtained cheaper funds at the expense of the Japanese taxpayer).
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nese taxpayers as losers; 122 and (3) no specific U.S. subsidy exists to
justify the distortions (the U.S. tax rule involved sought to implement
economic taxation).
ii. Double-Dip Leasing
Although the analysis differs somewhat from the OID bond case,
market effects on pricing and availability of double-dip leasing 423 are
comparable. If, for example, attractive double-dip opportunities exist.
for airplane leasing by a U.S. lessee from a French lessor, some com-
petition for French financing and for a share of the U.S. airplane-
buying market would be expected because of the potential tax
benefits from a cross-border transaction. The arbitrage benefits are
distinct from and in addition to the baseline benefit of accelerated
depreciation deductions. A U.S. purchaser acquiring a plane from a
U.S. manufacturer receives a subsidy/incentive from the U.S. gov-
ernment in the form of accelerated depreciation, with a present value
of X% of the cost. If the U.S. purchaser instead acquires a plane from
a French manufacturer (and France offers a comparable accelerated
depreciation benefit), then the subsidy for the cross-border transac-
tion is 2X% of cost. Thus, the cross-border double-dip opportunity
increases the distortion to produce more airplanes (and less of other
goods). Recognition of the economic distortions identifies the fun-
damental efficiency effects but a more detailed portrayal may provide
more guidance for U.S. policy. In this case, the U.S. purchaser would
be interested up until the point that the after-tax cost of the French
transaction (the contract price minus the value of the tax benefit)
matched that of a purchase from a U.S. (or other) seller. If followed
to this extreme, all of the arbitrage benefit would go to the French
seller. In that case, the U.S. purchaser is obtaining no additional in-
centive/benefit from the arbitrage, and we may want to continue al-
lowing the accelerated depreciation deductions to maintain the U.S.
purchaser's level of investment (although to the extent U.S. purchas-
ers have an incentive to seek out French sellers, the arbitrage may
negatively impact U.S. manufacturers). France's perspective on this
outcome depends on French interest in subsidizing the French
122 Id.; see, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters and the 'Com-
paq' Case, 21 TAX NOTES lrret. 1693, 1717 (2000) (exploring in the cross-border dividend
stripping context the differing impacts of alternative "pricing" scenarios for foreign tax
credits and noting the challenge of this inquiry).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
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seller—France may view its deductions as promoting French airplane
exports. Of course, that assumes that French planes are actually being
transferred. If the French company is acquiring its planes from a U.S.
manufacturer and onlending them to the U.S. purchaser through the
leasing transaction, then no French export subsidy is actually
achieved.
Another possibility is that the benefit from the arbitrage enures
to the U.S. purchaser if' the French sellers continue to cut their prices
to attract purchasers, thereby shifting the benefit to the U.S. pur-
chaser. In this case, the U.S. purchasers (airlines) may tend to invest
more in airplanes than before (with their lower cost, they can charge
lower fares). If the United States thought that the level of investment
under the baseline accelerated depreciation rules was about right,
then it may view such additional investment as "overinvestment" that
leads to "unfair" competition with other related industries, such as
transportation or entertainment. In reality, the ultimate allocation of
benefit would depend on a number of factors including market size
and composition, alternative country pairings for arbitrage, and mar-
ket efficiency. 124 If the experience with the tax-exempt bond market is
any indication, we might anticipate that the final allocation of benefit
is somewhere between the extremes of all to the seller or purchaser.
Empirical information indicating whether the net picture is closer to
one end or the other, however, would be useful in making the re-
quired policy choices here.
Related to the market capitalization of arbitrage benefit is the
question of impact on investment decisions and asset allocations. As
with tax-exempt bonds, even if the market capitalizes the tax benefit,
the resulting distribution of assets and investments might still be
troubling.' 25 A variety of possible distortions could result, including
(1) encouraging leasing activity in sectors for which this tax benefit is
possible (that is, particular assets); (2) encouraging leasing in a par-
ticular direction, such as U.S. lessee/French lessor; 126 (3) encouraging
Again, recall the U.S, domestic tax-exempt bond market. In theory, the market
could eliminate the arbitrage value as purchasers bid for the tax-exempt bonds up to the
point where the after-tax returns of taxable and tax-exempt bonds were the same. In real-
ity, a variety of factors may conspire to constrain this market effect including the issuer's
need to reach a larger pool of purchasers than that represented by top-bracket taxpayers
most benefiting from the tax-exempt status. See supra note 106.
125 See supra notes 105,106.
156 The U.S. tax rules governing accelerated depreciation restrict such deductions for
property used outside the United States. Thus, even if other tax rules and lease require-
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leasing with particular countries; (4) facilitating French exports; 127
and (5) decreasing tax revenues from the level at which they would be
if the countries had a common view of ownership. 128 In sum, the pos-
sible outcomes reflect multiple scenarios of economic distortion. 129
In deciding the government's response to double-dip leases, it
may be significant that this arbitrage could promote investment, an
original goal of accelerated depreciation.'" If the double-clip arbi-
trage is expected to further goals that motivated the tax preference,
should it be stopped? Even if the arbitrage appears to advance the
preference goals, that conclusion might change if a more specific view
of the "goal" were identified. For example, the arbitrage might ex-
pand the scale and degree of the incentive beyond what was intended.
Or the arbitrage might skew some generally intended investment in-
centives toward a narrower set of assets and locations where double-
dip benefits can be earned. These questions are considered in Part. III
as the part of decision .making that is required for a thoughtful re-
sponse to cross-border tax arbitrage.
Observations here about the tax conflict at the core of the arbi-
trage can be generalized. If countries measure income economically
(even assuming some shared constraints and departures such as the
treatment of imputed income), then de facto they are using very simi-
lar rules. Only where countries depart for policy or administrative
reasons, or where the rule itself has no clear economic answer (such
as source or entity classification), do the significant gaps and conflicts
in rule design appear.
ments were satisfied for an asset leased out of the United States, the U.S. accelerated de-
preciation benefits may be unavailable. 	 § 168(g) (1) (B), (h) (2000).
"1 See infra note 230. Of course, this effect would not exist if the French lessor acquires
the planes from a non-French manufacturer.
128 See, e.g., Scott I. Jerris, The Airline Industry and the Double Dip" 19 fivrt. TAXI 82, 86
(1993) (discussing apparent losers" in airline double-dip leasing).
' 29 See, e.g., Park, supra note 43, at 148, 151-55 (examining the "tax-induced distortion
of trade and capital flows" due to double-clip leasing).
130 See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and
the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1753-55 (1982) (reviewing the
Internal Revenue Code's departure from economic depreciation and cost recovery as part
of a program to encourage investment). Such a claim (regarding the arbitrage's promo-
don of existing investment policies) would in fact require the combination of an empirical
judgment about the arbitrage effects and an assertion about the degree and scope of the
preference originally envisioned by the legislature.
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iii. Dual-Resident Companies
Dual-resident companies"' present potential for arbitrage
benefits that may or may not be influenced by the market. Recall that
the benefits in this case are achieved by establishing a corporation as a
resident of two countries (for example, the United States and the
United Kingdom) with two sets of related corporations, the U.K.
group and U.S. group. Losses are "dumped" into the DRC and then
used to offset the income of the two groups as they file with the DRC
in their respective countries. Even if the U.S. operations and the U.K.
operations generate income, the ability to take the DRC's loss twice,
against both sets of income, can enable the combined group to pay
no U.S. or U.K. tax. Although there can be debate about which in-
come the loss should offset, clearly some income should be subject to
tax in one of the two jurisdictions. (This example illustrates a case in
which the distinction between CEN and CIN could make a difference,
but it is minor compared to the difference between allowing the arbi-
trage and limiting it under the less restrictive of the two efficiency
measures.) 132
Described in this fashion, with the emphasis on the residency
"status" of the DRC (which, at least in the United States, lacks a sub-
stantive component and depends on incorporation location), the
market would seemingly have little effect on the availability of this
benefit. If reincorporation posed no tax burdenst 33
 then as many tax-
191 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
132 For example, assume the U.S. group earns $100 and the U.K. group earns $100. If
the U.S. tax rate is 35% and the U.K. tax rate is 30%, then the two taxpayer groups owe
$35 of U.S. tax and $30 of U.K. tax respectively. If the U.K. group creates a DRC to acquire
the U.S. group, and the DRC has $100 of losses (perhaps financing costs from the acquisi-
tion), then the net tax picture changes. Economically, the total group now generates $100
net income ($100 U.S. income, $100 U.K. income, and $100 DRC loss). The U.K. group
(which now includes the DRC), however, reports $0 income and pays $0 tax and the U.S.
group (which also includes the DRC) reports $0 income and $0 tax. We could debate how
much tax in total should be paid on the net $100 (either $30 or $35 depending on how we
tried to characterize the underlying economic activity as U.S. or U.K. investment and
whether CEN ar CIN should apply, which is difficult precisely because of the dual resi-
dency) but clearly $0 is wrong by at least an amount of $30. Thus, in this case, the differ-
ence between adopting CEN or CIN is less significant than the difference between arbi-
trage and the least restrictive limitation (although the residual discrepancy underscores
continuing conflict in the tax rules).
133 The current debate regarding corporate inversions may substantially change the
tax picture for reincorporation. See, e.g., N.Y State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Out-
bound Inversion Transactions, 2002, LEXIS 2002 WTD 106-31; OFFICE or TA x PoLicv, Dt:P"r
or .rnr, TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(2002), available at LEXIS 2002 WTD 103-38.
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payers as had the appropriate subsidiaries1 4 could obtain this benefit.
The major limits would be the initial ability to generate losses for the
DRC and the existence of subsidiary groups in the relevant countries.
All newly created businesses could consider this "residence" benefit in
the planning stages and where feasible pursue it. A decision by one
multi-national to structure its organization to obtain this benefit
would not generally impact the ability of another taxpayer to do the
same. One of the fears underlying U.S. criticisms of the dual-resident
structure, however, was the belief that the arbitrage gave foreign cor-
porations (foreign-owned DRCs) an advantage over purely U.S. do-
mestic corporations in the competition for acquiring U.S. groups.
The unique tax benefits for a DRC were expected to provide the
foreign acquirors with incentives "to acquire U.S. corporations." 135
The foreign-owned DRCs would in theory bid higher for U.S. groups,
reflecting the value that the U.S. groups would bring them.'" (The
U.K. acquiror, through its ability to offset U.S. income with the DRC's
loss, might view the U.S. income as effectively untaxed, and thus be
able to afford a higher price for acquisition of the U.S. corporation.)
Through these acquisitions, the foreign acquirors would "gain an ad-
vantage in competing in the U.S. economy against U.S. corpora-
tions.""7 (Perhaps if the U.K. acquiror did not pay a higher price for
the U.S. corporation, then the benefit of the DRC's loss against the
U.S. income could translate into lower prices in the U.S. subsidiary's
business, impacting competition at that level.)
Although the perception of impact from foreign-owned DRCs
was strong138 (Congress received complaints of the unfair advantage
gained by certain foreign persons investing in the United States
through DRCs) the underlying reality' was less clear. (A similar set of
complaints was voiced about foreign acquisition of U.S. real estate
prior to the adoption of I.R.C. § 897, which taxes foreign persons' in-
vestments in certain U.S. real property.) Whether there was a market
impact from the DRCs bidding for U.S. corporations is a question of
fact. If the DRC arbitrage was pursued primarily' by taxpayers at the
stage of structuring and organizing their U.S. and U.K. operations, it
L54 The arbitrage requires two sets of subsidiary groups, one in each country.
135 Rosenbloom, supra note 2. at 146 (citing S. REP. No. 99-313, at 420 (1986)).
136 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 74, at 582 (stating that Congress was also concerned
that the dual-residents "scheme provided an undue incentive to acquire foreign assets").
"7 Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 146 (citing S. R. No. 99-313, at 420 (1986)).
"8 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 99111 CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
Acr or 1986, at 1064-65 (1987); Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 147.
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may have produced little market effect. Conversely, if the DRC arbi-
trage motivated foreign investors to acquire U.S. corporations as tax-
advantaged assets (like tax-exempt bonds), then depending on the
number of participants, a price effect may have occurred, Certainly
the "perception of abuse" was powerful, and the simplicity and clarity
of the DRC arbitrage made the case an easy target for ire and at-
tack."9
In evaluating the DRC arbitrage, three broader observations can
be made. First., the DRC arbitrage requires a multinational taxpayer
and thus favors global versus local ownership. Second, the DRC arbi-
trage exists only between a few countries and therefore serves as an
incentive to shift investment in that direction. Filially, the substantive
tax rule underlying the DRC structure (residence rule for corpora-
tions) varies widely and, in the case of the United States, is essentially
elective.H° No core policy goal other than administrability prompts
the residence rule;'`' no subsidy or advantage is meant to be con-
veyed.
iv. Hybrid Entities
The last arbitrage case study, which turns primarily on the status
of the taxpayer, is less likely to be constrained by the market, A tax-
payer's ability to designate a particular entity as a pass-through for
U.S. tax purposes and a corporation for foreign tax purposes opens
an array of arbitrage possibilities. One business's decision to avail it-
self of these structural opportunities, however, does not impact the
ability of other companies to achieve comparable gains. The fact that
multiple taxpayers go forward with hybrid entities imposes no limit on
the value of each other's arbitrage (except to the extent that the vol-
ume of arbitrage activity prompts governmental action—akin to the
139
 Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 147 11.45 (quoting a Congressional staffer's view that
the DRC strategy "belonged in the 'hall of fame of tax abuse"),
140
 Under U.S. tax law a corporation is resident where incorporated, regardless of ac-
tivities, management, or income. i.R.C. § 7701 (a) (4) (2000).
141
 The degree of linkage between corporations and countries of residence is the sub-
ject of debate, as commentators have begun to question whether it makes sense to speak of
a U.S. corporation or a French corporation in today's global economy. See, e.g., Reuven S.
Avi-Vonah, For Haven's Sake: Reflections on Invoxion Transactions, 27 TAx NOTES INTI. 225,
228-29 (2002) (discussing whether nu corporations have a "national identity"
and how that has changed over time); Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us?, HAIM Bus. REV., Jan.—
Feb. 1990, at 53.
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classic tax shelter, which works as long as all participants are discrete
and the shelter remains unknown to the government). 142
Although the market seemingly has no direct constraining
influence on this arbitrage (as it might with tax-exempt bonds), there
are several potential economic distortions that may follow. In particu-
lar, foreign investments might generally be favored over domestic
ones by U.S. taxpayers (so that hybrid entity arbitrages can be pur-
sued), and investments in certain foreign countries would be favored
over investments in others. Consider, for example, the hybrid entity
arbitrage of the subpart F rules 143 in which the U.S. person's CFC
(foreign subsidiary) in a high-tax jurisdiction was able to reduce that
high foreign tax through an income-stripping technique with a hybrid
entity in a third country while continuing deferral of U.S. tax under
the subpart F rules. The Service expressed a strong negative view in
Notice 98-1 1: "it is appropriate to prevent taxpayers from using these
types of hybrid branch arrangements to reduce foreign tax while
avoiding the corresponding creation of subpart F income. " 144 Subse-
quent comments from the Service indicated a general sense that al-
lowing these arrangements constituted an inappropriate capital ex-
port subsidy (that is, encouraged investment abroad). 145 Though the
United States may believe that some deferral is legitimate, the subpart
F rules set the parameters on when it will be available 146 by effectively
"I See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market in U.S. Corporate Tax Shelters, 18 TAx
Naas 2681,2682 (1999) ("tax-oriented products that are likely to survive discovery
are not characterized as tax shelters for purposes of this report however aggressive they
may be"); Peter C. Canellos, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters:
A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business
Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47,50 (2001) (the "common reaction of
the key organizations representing tax professionals has been to focus on what they per-
ceive to be the underlying weakness of tax shelter economics—the dependence on con-
cealment and the audit lottery"); David A. ‘Veisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX
L. REV. 215,226 (2002) (discussing the audit lottery aspect of tax shelter conduct).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
1" I.R.S. Notice 98-11,1998-1 C.B. 433, at 18-19.
1" See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Talks About Foreign Hybrid Notice, 78 TAX NOTES 402
(1998) (quoting Phyllis Marcus, Chief of Branch Two in the IRS Office of Associate Chief
Counsel International, that "these arrangements go beyond capital export neutrality, the
stated purpose of subpart F, and toward a capital export subsidy"). In addition, supporters
of efforts to attack this particular arbitrage, which seemingly violates or undermines only
the foreign countries' tax regimes, contend that "[t]he United States has a stake in closing
[them down because the] opportunities may give foreign industries a competitive edge
that could have an impact on U.S. firms and revenues." McCleskey, supra note 7, at G-2
(citing Treasury ITC Attorney Advisor Je Young Baik),
146 Deferral might be considered legitimate to support goals of capital import neutral-
ity and international competitiveness. The role and history of subpart F are hotly debated,
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aiming to prevent U.S. taxpayers from shifting income to low tax ju-
risdictions (presumably an inefficient move). When a foreign jurisdic-
tion imposes taxes comparable to the United States, a U.S. business's
decision to invest abroad generally seems motivated by business and
not taxes, and should be an efficient structuring of business activi-
ties."7
 If, however, the subpart F hybrid entity arbitrage is available,
capital would be encouraged to leave the United States for other
equally high-tax jurisdictions through which a hybrid entity strategy
could be run to ultimately produce low taxes (a strategy not achieved
within the United States). Thus, taxpayers would be influenced not by
a direct tax advantage (there would be none), but rather by the indi-
rect tax planning available only in the foreign jurisdiction. This pre-
cise argument is not enunciated by the Service, but seems to underlie
its substantive position and more general comments. 148,
The other hybrid entity example, domestic reverse hybrids, 149 ex-
hibits two possible distortions. (In this arbitrage, a foreign corpora-
tion using a U.S. hybrid holding company obtained "dividends" from
its underlying U.S. operating subsidiary that were treated as deducti-
ble to the U.S. payor and potentially untaxed to the recipient foreign
corporation.) First, as the preambles to the proposed and final do-
mestic reverse hybrid regulations suggested, the availability of this hy-
brid arbitrage with its tax benefits could give foreign acquirors a
and this reality will bear directly on tine treatment of arbitrage involving the subpart F re-
gime. Sec, e.g., NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR TIIE
21ST CENTURY, reprinted in 18 TAx Nums 1375 (1999) (arguing that current global
conditions have eroded the justification for the current subpart F regime, whose breadth is
harmful to U.S. based corporations). But see Treasury Deferral Study, supra note 62, at 5-50
(concluding that "lain anti-deferral regime continues to be needed").
147
 Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (2) (ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 40,157 (June 12, 2002).
See infra text accompanying notes 262-265. Implicit in this interpretation and characteriza-
tion of the decision to invest abroad in a nominally high tax country is an expectation that
this will promote both CEN and CIN assuming fairly similar tax bases.
145
 Official Defends Notice 98-11 Guidance As Quick Action on Inadvertent Loophole, TAx
Mt:NIT. FIN, PRODUCIN REP. 168, 169 (1998) (Attorney Advisor Will Morris of `Treasury's
International Tax Counsel's Office observing that the check-the-box loophole regarding
hybrids Is luring U.S. business overseas and, while the expansion of U.S. companies is
good, the general desire is not 'to have everybody overseas'"). To the extent this expansion
involves investment in jurisdictions with nominally high, but effectively low taxes (through
the arbitrage) CEN is violated because the taxpayer is not neutral as to the location of the
investment. It is also possible that the expansion violates CIN if only the U.S. taxpayers are
capable of obtaining such tax reducing benefits in the expansion jurisdiction.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. The United States relinquished taxing
rights on a payment under the treaty with the expectation that the treaty partner would tax
it. Due to the use of a hybrid entity, however, the United States and its treaty partner did
not classify the payment in the same way resulting in no tax in either country.
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financing advantage over comparable domestic acquirors. 15° Second,
this hybrid transaction may "defeat[] the expectation of the United
States and its treaty partners that treaties should be used to reduce or
eliminate double taxation for legitimate transactions, not to reward
the manipulation of inconsistencies in the laws of the treaty part-
ners." 151 To the extent the bargains embodied in agreements can be
circumvented, the contracting parties (countries) may be forced to
consider more costly alternatives including: (I) negotiation of more
detailed agreements; or (2) limitation of the scope of the agreements
to prevent unwitting sacrifice of revenue.
v. Observations on Case Studies and Efficiency
This preliminary effort to investigate the efficiency effects of the
four case study arbitrages reveals several important points. First, the
task is a challenging and complex one. Even in the domestic context,
where more attention has been devoted for a longer time to compa-
rable questions, debate is still active. This observation becomes rele-
vant to designing a decision-making process for government officials
encountering numerous and novel arbitrage examples. Second, the
analyses in different cases are likely to vary significantly in terms of
how benefits and burdens are distributed, whether that distribution
advances policy goals, and whether the magnitude of the distortions is
substantial. Third, where tax rules deviate from "economic" taxation
the potential for variation in tax treatment, and correspondingly for
distortions, increases.
3. Equity
In addition to efficiency effects, two equity effects factor into the
assessment of cross-border tax arbitrage, both of which have strong
grounding in the domestic tax arbitrage literature, and derive from
problems in the taxing of capital income. 152 The first focuses on the
15° See Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (2)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 40,157 (June 12,
2002); Preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.894-1(d)(2)(ii), 66 Fed. Reg. 12,445, 12,446
(Feb. 27, 2001),
151 Sec Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1 (d) (2) (ii), 66 Fed. Reg. 12,446 (Feb. 27, 2001)
(also citing the legislative history of 1.R.C. § 894(c), which denied treaty benefits for cer-
tain payments through hybrid entities).
152 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 106, at 815; Hickman, supra note 106, at 775-76;
Kurtz, supra note 94, at 173; Shakow, supra note 95, at 17 (reviewing some of the argu-
ments and debates on domestic arbitrage); James W. Wetzler, Notes on the Economic Substance
and Business Purpose Doctrine, 21 INS, 'lax Rev. 257, 258 (2001) (noting perception and
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ability of a select group of taxpayers to reduce their taxes through ar-
bitrage. Cross-border tax arbitrage may enable taxpayers to reduce or
eliminate their income tax base. Depending on the scale and volume
of arbitrage, revenue collection could be seriously undermined. As a
result, other parts of the tax base would need to bear a greater tax
burden to maintain revenue collections.'" This "disappearing tax
base" fear drives much of the movement against unfettered tax coin-
petition. 154 The general international tax literature supports the view
that cross-border tax arbitrage is a pursuit enjoyed by taxpayers with
income from capital, not labor.'" Thus, the pervasive availability of
cross-border tax arbitrage transactions to reduce taxes significantly
could impact revenue collection and the distribution of the tax bur-
den. The magnitude of this effect would depend on the volume of
arbitrage activity and the scale of the tax savings involved. On the sur-
face, one of the arbitrage case studies presented in Part I seems not to
exhibit this equity problem. Specifically, the subpart F hybrid entity
arbitrage enables the U.S. taxpayer to reduce its foreign income tax,
which presumably would increase its U.S. tax as fewer foreign tax
credits are created to offset the U.S. tax bill. 156 Whether this portrayal
of the arbitrage accurately reflects reality depends in part on (1) the
status of the U.S. taxpayer (in excess credit or excess limitation posi-
tion) ; 157 (2) the stage at which the inquiry is made (Is the existence of
compliance risks to the tax system from "a totally permissive attitude toward tax planning,"
and citing the history of sate harbor leasing).
153 See, e.g., McCleskey, supra note 7 (quoting Treasury Attorney Advisor le Young
Baik's observation that tax arbitrage across borders "ties into the broader issue of tax fair-
ness—namely equalizing tax burdens between capital investment and labor"); Zelaya-
Quesada, supra note 10, at G-8 (citing Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy
Jonathan Talisman's observations that cross-border tax arbitrage discriminates against
those taxpayers without comparable access to arbitrage benefits and may force the gov-
ernments to rely more on other revenue sources).
154 See Chris Edwards & Veronique de Rug)", International Tax Competition: A 21st-Century
Constraint on Government, 27 Tax NicrrEs IN•I. 63,80 (2002); sec also OECD, supra note 15,
at 14; Avi-Yonah, supra note 15, at 1575-76.
155
 Though not scientifically selected, the case studies described in Part 1 are all arbi-
trages involving investment of capital and tax titles governing leasing, ownership, interest
timing, en thy' classification, corporate residence, and consolidation.
1J6 Sec, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 74, at 582 (questioning the U.S. motive for limiting a
taxpayer's efforts to minimize foreign income tax). See infra text accompanying note 169.
157
 Based on the rules granting and then limiting the use of foreign tax credits, tax-
payers may find they have either excess (unused) foreign tax credits or excess limitation
(foreign income available to absorb foreign tax credits). In theory, a taxpayer's relative
position could vary from year to year although taxpayers often find themselves in the same
position repeatedly because of the nature and location of their business, the relative tax
rates, and their economic success.
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foreign operations a given, with the only question being their struc-
ture, or is the decision whether to invest abroad a business behavior
open to influence?): 158 and (3) the likely period of deferral. As to the
second factor, if allowing the arbitrage constitutes a subsidy for in-
vestment abroad, then a corresponding decline in U.S. tax revenues
and a need for alternative revenue sources could be anticipated.
The second equity concern, which may or may not be linked to
the first, regards the perceptions of abuse. 159 If the taxpaying public
perceives cross-border tax arbitrage as an abuse available to (and used
by) a limited pool of taxpayers (those with capital, as opposed to wage
income, who have the potential for cross-border operations), then
public support for and confidence in the tax system may be under-
mined. This confidence risk to the tax system can develop even where
the belief that some taxpayers are benefiting is factually inaccurate
because the market has capitalized the arbitrage benefit. 10 Although
it is not likely that large numbers of the taxpaying public have an in-
timate knowledge of the arbitrage strategies of U.S. corporations, this
information could have an influence in two ways: (1) sophisticated
high-tax individuals who do have such knowledge tiny be more in-
clined to pursue arbitrage or tax avoidance strategies themselves if
they perceive such conduct to be standard corporate behavior; and
158 For an analysis of the impact of foreign taxes on U.S. multinationals' decisions on
where to invest, see Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations
Invest?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 825, 825 (2000) (an empirical analysis of 1992 data on 500 U.S.
manufacturers and 60 potential foreign locations found that local average effective tax
rates have a significant effect on the amount of capital that U.S. N1NCs have in a given
location").
159 In the domestic tax arbitrage context, even where there is serious doubt as to
whether any real unfairness exists, the "appearance" issue is understood to carry some
practical implications for the system. See, e.g.. Wetzler, supra note 152, at 258.
160 See, e.g., STEU LIME, supra note 96, at 65-67; Koppelman, supra note 94, at 1172-74;
Shakow, supra note 95, at 2 (With normal lax arbitrage, one potential outcome is that the
arbitrage profit here "increases demand for tax-favored investment, thereby raising its
price and lowering its return."). During the equilibrium process, though, some taxpayers
would have benefited financially from the arbitrage. See Warren, supra note 97, at 564 ("ar-
bitrage profits will be available during the period of equilibration"). Moreover, the effec-
tiveness of the market in eliminating the arbitrage profit is far from guaranteed. See, e.g.,
Halperin, supra note 106, at 815 (considering the market's efficiency in capitalizing the
effect of the tax arbitrage profit); Koppelman, stipro note 94, at 1177-86 (noting debate as
to why full capitalization may not be achieved and reviewing some of the explanations);
Warren, supra note 97, at 564-65 (questioning reliance on market effects to counter the
problems of normal arbitrage because markets may be inefficient, interim arbitrage profits
would still he available during the equilibration period, and international capital flows may
limit the effects of interest rate increases).
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(2) the broader public may be cumulatively disillusioned as general
reports of corporate strategies periodically reach the headlines.mi
4. Two Further Criteria for Measuring Harm
Two additional concerns from domestic tax analysis illuminate
the arbitrage inquiry: political accountability and revenue effects. Al-
though both are closely connected to efficiency and equity, and much
of their analytical role could be restated in those terms, some advan-
tage is gained by separately considering them.
a. Political Accountability
The question of harm from arbitrage in terms of political ac-
countability derives from the fear that. voters may believe a certain tax
regime has been enacted, but because of a lack of transparency in the
tax rules (due here to arbitrage) they are unaware that the effective
tax regime is quite different for some taxpayers.' 62
 This situation is
undesirable because: (1) a democratic system relies on voting and
transparency in the law; and (2) more specifically, this lack of trans-
parency can foster opportunities for behavior such as rent seeking by
elected officials. How this observation should impact the analysis of
arbitrage is a bit more complicated. This may be a weak factor if in a
given case the arbitrage appears to further a U.S. policy. (That is,
transparency would be desirable, but the effects of the hidden tax
benefit promote goals supported by the voters so our fears may be
mitigated.) Also, rent seeking may be less of a factor in some arbi-
trages. For example, where a taxpayer obtains benefits from new tax
legislation that ultimately applies to only one or two taxpayers, the
161 See generally Julie Hirschfeld-Davis, Big Guns Hired to Fight Tax Reforms; Firms Enlist Ex.
lawmakers to Limit Expected Changes to Offshore Finance Breaks, BALT. SUN, Aug, 9, 2002, at 1A
("Fueled by public outrage, measures that would curb the now•legal practice—known as
`corporate inversion' ... are swiftly making their way through the House and the Sett-
ate."); Jonathan Weisman, Patriotism Raining on Tax Paradise; Lawmakers are Chafing at Firms
that Exist Offshore Only on Paper, WAssi. Pos . '', Aug. 21, 2002, at E01 (covering corporate
inversion transactions in which U.S. corporations effectively change their residency to
achieve tax reductions).
152
 The assumption here about the knowledge of the voters/citizenry (they do not
really know what is happening) seems the opposite of what is projected in the equity analy-
sis (we worried about the negative effects on the broader taxpaying public of knowledge of
corporate tax avoidance). It is possible that both could be somewhat true; the public could
have a sense that corporations and other sophisticated taxpayers are engaging in tax
avoidance, but be unaware of the specifics and thus be uncertain about where and how to
demand change from their political representatives.
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likelihood of rent seeking seems high. In contrast, where a taxpayer
benefits from interactions with other tax regimes (arbitrage), the risk
of rent seeking (at least at the initial stages of the arbitrage existing)
seems lower. Political accountability is likely to be a stronger factor in
the analysis where certain taxpayers are getting results clearly not in-
tended by voters (with "intent" loosely defined, given the difficulty of
ascertaining even Congressional intention), and the magnitude of the
benefits are significant. These are probably cases in which the
efficiency analysis itself would identify an important distortion from
the arbitrage.
b. Revenue Effects
An obvious goal of the tax system is to generate revenue to sup-
port government functions. If arbitrage significantly impairs the col-
lection of revenue, the effect is important for two reasons: (1) cuts in
government expenditures may be necessary, and (2) a shift in the tax
burden may be required to produce supplemental revenue. As to the
first, the cuts would be undesirable if the nation thought that it was
providing an appropriate level of services. If eliminating the arbitrage
benefit protects revenue on the U.S. side, then at least in the short
term that action is desirable from a revenue perspective. (Other con-
siderations may counsel against pursuing what appears to be an im-
mediate revenue gain.)
As to the second point, the ability of a select group of taxpayers
to reduce their tax burden through means unavailable to most other
taxpayers raises the possibility that the government will impose addi-
tional tax on those taxpayers unable to avoid tax. This constitutes
both an equity concern (as discussed above in section II.B.3) and a
revenue concern, to the extent it is not feasible to replace the lost
revenue through additional tax measures.
C. Assessment of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage: Is Intervention Appropriate?
Based on the preliminary examination on equity and efficiency
grounds, cross-border tax arbitrage poses potentially serious problems
by violating norms we traditionally support through the tax system,
however imperfectly. In fact, the critiques of government intervention
typically do not challenge the basic observations about efficiency and
equity effects of arbitrage. When, then, do the competing views on
arbitrage diverge? The conflict over cross-border tax arbitrage crystal-
lizes in evaluating the costs of responding to arbitrage. The costs of
limiting arbitrage fall into two broad categories: (1) administrability;
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and (2) risks to systemic values of sovereignty and diversity. Achninis-
trability connects the tax system's efficiency and equity norms to the
reality of a working tax regime, most particularly to the need to de-
cide which transactions to attack. Sovereignty and diversity capture
the residual interests impacted by arbitrage decisions.
1. Implementation of Anti-Arbitrage Measures: Line Drawing and
Administrability
Imagine for a moment fairly widespread agreement on the
efficiency and equity problems generated by cross-border tax arbi-
trage. It is at the next step, solving these problems, that the analysis
encounters the challenges of real world implementation. Translating
a goal of eliminating cross-border tax arbitrage into a plan of action
quickly highlights the more practical aspects of the task: line drawing.
Flow do we draw an intellectually defensible line between bad tax ar-
bitrage and good tax arbitrage (which would be allowed because it
constitutes good tax mininaization) 165
 in a multi-jurisdictional sys-
tem? 164
 One possibility is we avoid line-drawing issues by either com-
pletely eliminating or completely accepting cross-border tax arbitrage.
Complete acceptance would mean that governments would make no
effort. to unearth and root out arbitrage, and would therefore draw no
lines. As an ex ante policy position, however, complete acceptance of
arbitrage ignores, without flirt her consideration, the nature, variety,
and degree of harms caused by arbitrage. Even if the challenges of
curtailing arbitrage are significant, the option should remain available
to the government to protect its interests.
Another possibility is we avoid line drawing by completely elimi-
nating cross-border tax arbitrage. Once again, this path obviates the
need to make distinctions; it implicitly requires that the tax rules ap-
plied by the United States effectively mirror those of the foreign ju-
risdiction. Although greater coherence and uniformity of tax treat,
meat may make sense domestically, such aspirations at the global level
come at the expense of other policy goals including achninistrability
and diversity. In some cases this choice may even undermine
efficiency if the arbitrage counters a pre-existing inefficiency in the
169
 Commentators have argued that cross-border tax arbitrage is not wholly different
from general tax planning. Sec Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 144. The same debate over the
distinction between general tax planning that should be permitted and "excessive" tax
planning that should be curtailed rages on in the corporate tax shelter arena. See, e.g.,
Wetzler, supra note 152, at 257-58.
104
 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 144,147; Sheppard, supra note 74, at 581.
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system. Also, "eliminating" all cross-border tax arbitrage leaves no
room for arbitrages that further an intended national incentive.
Assuming these extreme positions are rejected, the inevitability of
arbitrage in a multi-jurisdictional setting compels us to confront the
question of line drawing, even before we decide where, on a norma-
tive basis, to draw the line. We need to be clear about what the "prob-
lem" is with cross-border tax arbitrage and how we decide when the
problem is severe enough to merit action. The preliminary step in
this process is to examine the specific line-drawing concerns.
The first major line-drawing critique challenges narrowly tar-
geted anti-arbitrage rules in cases in which comparable tax benefits
can be achieved by alternative transactions. 165 If only the simple, "ele-
gant" arbitrages are caught by anti-arbitrage rules, what is the
justificationP66 For example, tax benefits similar to those obtained
with DRCs can be gained through alternative, less direct tech-
niques. 167 What justifies anti-arbitrage rules that proscribe only
benefits obtained through the DRC structure, 163 but leave in place
substitute transactions? One response may be that the restriction of
one arbitrage is part of a learning curve and does not represent a
final vision of what transactions could and should be prohibited.
\Alien additional information on tax planning activities becomes
available to the government, the scope of the restricted and targeted
arbitrage transactions may increase. Arguably, the tax regime need
not await a fully designed, comprehensive attack on dual losses before
it makes inroads on a very popular mechanism.
Another explanation may be the recognition that the "unelegant"
version is quite convoluted to attack and by its very nature limited in
scope. The elegant version, with presumably fewer steps and lower
transaction costs, poses a much greater risk and may reasonably be
singled out for attack. Of course, this assessment may not be factually
accurate in every case; it is possible that stopping the easy version and
forcing taxpayers to pursue the more complicated tax planning op-
tions ultimately causes more harm clue to the deadweight loss. 169
KA As discussed more fully infm at text accompanying notes 206-210, a broad rule
seeking to deny all arbitrage benefits would be unduly inclusive and difficult to implement
for both taxpayers and the government.
166 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 144.
167 See id. (discussing other options for the dual-loss benefit).
169 See I.R.C. § 1503(d) (2000) (enacted to attack DRC arbitrage involving dual losses).
169 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 CoLum. L.
REV. 1312,1315-16 (2001) (the existence of "frictions" explains why in some cases taxpay-
ers pursue close substitutes of a prohibited nansaction and in other cases they do not);
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The concern for substitute arbitrage transactions recalls a similar
debate regarding financial instruments. Congress and Treasury have
produced legislation, regulations, and rulings aimed at curbing abu-
sive financial instrument transactions, even where comparable trans-
actions remain beyond the reach of the new tax provisions.'" The line
drawing is not unique to cross-border transactions and we have dent-
onstrated a willingness to regulate a select group of transactions in
which the restrictions have a positive impact on behavior and volume.
Line drawing can be valuable if the risk of encouraging taxpayers to
shift to more inefficient structures has been included in the eaten-
ltts. 171 Although cross-border tax arbitrage and financial instrument
transactions are not identical,'" both share the tension between
"good" tax planning and inappropriate tax avoidance.
A second line-drawing critique leveled at anti-arbitrage rules chal-
lenges the justification for U.S. attention to tax benefits, but not to
nontax benefits, offered by another country.'" That is, if U.S. tax law
has been satisfied, why care if a related tax benefit is available in the
other country? Why exhibit interest in that benefit. and no others?
Non tax benefits typically attract little scrutiny for reasons of practical-
ity and comparability. To the extent a tax system aims for equitable
treatment of its taxpayers, some assessment of each taxpayer's net
situation is necessary. If certain advantages or benefits conferred by
the federal (or state) government are not included in the calculus,
Shaviro, supra note 122, at 1712 (in the context of corporate tax shelter evaluations, there
is dead weight loss where we push taxpayers to structure their transactions even more
inefficiently to obtain a tax benefit); Wetzler, supra note 152, at 258 ("To the extent that
taxpayers still undertake tax planning despite the dead weight loss [caused by restructur-
ing the transaction to avoid the tax penalty) a permissive approach to tax planning would
be preferable because it would avoid the costs represented by the deadweight loss."); see
also Yin, sups note 18, at 209, 216-18 ("incremental changes" in tax law to combat tax
shelters may produce more inefficiency,
 and distortion if taxpayers decide to pursue an
alternative but more costly path to their tax benefit).
LTD Sec. e.g., Schizer, supra note 169, at 1318, 1343-45 (although it was understood thin
I.R.C. § 1259 (taxing constructive sales) could be easily avoided the provision was enacted
for policy and administrability reasons).
171 Sec id. at 1315-16 (considering the role of frictions and the likelihood that taxpay-
ers will pursue substitute transactions in the decision to tax certain transactions); David A.
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. Rev. 1627,
1631 (1999) (examining the role of efficiency in the (pest to draw lines in the tax law).
172
 roe example, the financial instrument cases often are entirely domestic so sover-
eignly concerns do not arise.
173 For example, just as taxpayers may benefit from the second set of accelerated de-
preciation deductions, they could benefit from regulatory provisions, or grants of land, or
technology.
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then the taxpayer's condition will not be accurately reflected. That
said, we do not, as a general matter, comprehensively incorporate the
impact of other regulatory programs into the tax picture. Although
the division of the government's legislative and administrative func-
tions into discrete spheres of activity, often with little or no overlap,
does have a somewhat arbitrary quality, practicality dictates these divi-
sions. Given the enormity of the current income tax system, the deci-
sion to set boundaries on what will be encompassed by tax analysis
carries strong administrative appeal. The exclusion of nontax benefits
reduces the number of rules to evaluate and ignores benefits that
might be harder to compare with tax provisions.
The third line-drawing critique asks why care if a taxpayer gets a
tax benefit in another country through the arbitrage, but not if the
taxpayer obtains a foreign tax benefit through a different means (for
example, tax rates). The absence of attention to "unrelated" tax
benefits (those not derived from conflicting tax laws) likely reflects
several factors. First, some unrelated benefits such as low tax rates may
correlate loosely with the services and infrastructure provided by the
other country,. In that case, the "advantage" garnered by the taxpayer
because of a benefit available only in the other country does not really
pose a competitive disadvantage to other taxpayers. Second, if there is
no direct link between the foreign country tax benefit and the arbi-
trage transaction, then the existence of that tax benefit should not
distort business behavior toward the specific arbitrage transaction.
Third, as with the non tax benefits, administrability may narrow the
scope of inquiry to limit the inclusion of numerous and diverse
benefits in the arbitrage analysis. The exclusion of "unrelated" tax
benefits from the arbitrage discussion also may reflect a systemic
compromise with the values of sovereignty and diversity that are ex-
amined in the next section. Efficiency, equality; sovereignty, and diver-
sity cannot all be fully realized in the tax world. "Unrelated" tax
benefits may have an efficiency effect, but inclusion of such rules in
the orbit of anti-arbitrage analysis places greater pressure on sover-
eignty, diversity, and acIministrability goals.
2. Implementation of Anti-Arbitrage Measures: Risks to National
Policy
In addition to the more traditional line—drawing regulatory con-
cerns, plans for implementing anti-arbitrage strategies trigger objec-
tions based on sovereignty and diversity grounds. Does cross-border
tax arbitrage warrant government intervention given the potential
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costs to these values from increased harmonization? 174 This section
independently evaluates this question even though some of the con-
tent in sovereignty and diversity could be reformulated in terms of
efficiency and equity. At a minimum, the terms are a useful shorthand
for a set of efficiency and equity issues. One caveat on these risks: the
degree of risk to sovereignty and diversity depends on the scope,
quantity, and frequency of "harmonizing" efforts. At present, large-
scale harmonization seems unlikely as well. It is the fear of such ef-
fects, however, that influences the behavior of nations in pursuing
limited, if any, harmonization.
Sovereignty concerns arise in both political and academic discus-
sions of cross-border tax arbitrage. 175 Each country is an independent.
actor in the global scene, 176 directing its primary attention and re-
sponsibility to drafting and enforcing its own laws." 7 The fear is that
as a country relinquishes its power to design its own tax policy, either
by generally basing its taxation on foreign treatment or by pursuing
multilateral options, sovereignty would be undermined. Tax rules
would, in theory, cease to reflect national policy goals. But why exactly
are incursions against sovereignty problematic? Several different an-
swers exist, depending on the context and the values captured by the
term "sovereignty."
First, sovereignty can have a loose and somewhat. hazy connection
to national identity and to the idea that a core power of the country is
sacrificed in the pursuit of tax harmonization, This usage most closely
tracks generalized objections to harmonization on sovereignty
grounds. Second, sovereignty can refer to the values of the political
process and decision-making system. In a democratic society, the ex-
pectation is that elected officials who are answerable to the voting
"4
 Even more classically unilateral measures should be understood to have a strong
harmonizing component.
15 Sec. e.g., Miranda Stewart, Commortaty Ion E.U. Harmonization), 54 TAX L. REV. 111,
123 (2000) ("Sovereignty is the defining feature of a nation state in public international
law; in a sense, it can be 'equated with Statehood.'" (quoting Ramon lieffery)).
176 See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, The Repletion,
 Criss-Cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions and
the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REG U LATO RV COM PETITION
AN I) COORDINATION 89, 98-99 (William &anon et al. eds., 1996) (examining the concept
of sovereignty). In contrast, under a federal system, the states may be equal, but they are
ultimately supercecied on many fronts by the national government. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro,
An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 Mien. L. Rev. 895, 895 (1992).
177 See, e.g., Picciotto, supra note 176, at 98 ("Some restrictions on the apparently un-
limited power to adopt national policies in the common interest are accepted as resulting
from the need to bargain with other formally equal sovereigns on the basis of the national
interest of each ....").
130	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:79
public design tax policy ever-cognizant of their connection to the
electorate.'" As the locus of decision making shifts to a more global
setting, the connection between the national electorate and the
power center is weakened.'" Sovereignty, understood as national self-
determination, is undermined. The fact that current political reality
may not match an idealized vision of democracy does not. necessarily
diminish the rhetorical power of this claim, although it does affect the
empirical assessment of how decision making actually changes with a
move to more global settings. Finally, sovereignty can serve as a proxy
for the pursuit of national interests. It is in this sense that sovereignty
plays its most direct role in the balancing test of Part HI—in the pro-
tection of domestic policy evidenced in the tax rules. When decisions
are made at the national level the assumption is that domestic inter-
ests are paramount and the goal is to maximize the national interest.
(understood as national efficiency or identified national policy
aims). 18° The shift of the rulemaking power (explicitly, in a multilat-
eral forum, or implicitly, in a matching approach) raises the distinct
possibility that the resulting tax rules will not maximize a particular
nation's interests.' 81 Even if the international community designs arbi-
trage policy to maximize global efficiency, individual nations may be
losers. In the absence of lump sum transfers from the winners to the
175 See, e.g., id. ("The exercise of [sovereign] power is legitimated within the state by
the generation of consensus around the national common interest through [Mei institu-
tions and processes of political participation involving all citizens on a basis of formal
equality.").
179 See David Charily, Regulatory Competition and the Global Coordination of Labor Stan-
dards, 3j. ECON. L. 281,299 (2000) ("It is much easier to design institutions that are
locally democratic titan globally democratic, particularly in terms of responsiveness to the
'cultural' aspects of what counts as democratic decisimunaking; nmreover, preferences and
social circumstances are likely to be more homogeneous within localities than across a set
of boundaries."); see also Shaviro, supra note 176, at 967-70,973-74 (considering the role
of experimentation and responsiveness to voters in deciding how much discretion state
and local governments should have in a federal system).
180 Admittedly this task is difficult; there are multiple goals, varying time frames, and
assorted information constraints. In addition, the competing visions of government behav-
ior (typically public choice and public interest) parallel the Leviathan critique of govern-
ment action and force us to question fundamental assumptions about whose interests are
being furthered. Nonetheless, some version of a national set of interests is likely to
emerge. EC Report, supra note 3 ("the choice of tax regime in each Member State is de-
termined by the different perceptions of the role of taxation in raising revenue and in
serving as an instrument of economic and social policy").
111 Cf. EC Report, supra note 3 ("whereas national governments are currently account-
able to their legislatures for taxation and expenditure matters, such democratic control is
much weaker at the Community level").
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losers, not all nations should favor the globally efficient rules, 182 The
implications of this aspect of sovereignty are discussed further in Part
IV's look at the connections between arbitrage and the tax harmoni-
zation debate.
The remaining policy objection to anti-arbitrage efforts regards
the impact on tax diversity. Not only is the existence of varying tax
systems around the world a natural and expected outconte, 183 it car-
ries potentially positive effects. 184 The opportunity for countries to
experiment with different tax rules allows a range of ideas to circu-
late, with the most successful rising to more shared prominence. One
example of this impact can be witnessed in the history of the United
States' Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA program") which
was developed as an alternative mechanism for resolving certain mul-
tilateral transfer pricing questions. 185
 At the introduction of the APA
program, many taxpayers and foreign countries were skeptical. After
several years of observing the program, however, both taxpayers and
foreign countries increased participation. Some foreign countries be-
gan to design and adopt programs of their own. 186 I-lad broad global
support been required for its implementation, the APA program
would have been significantly delayed, if adopted at all. The ability of
one or a few countries to innovate on a trial basis, however, enhanced
the likelihood of experimentation and percolation, allowing the
"best" ideas to gain more universal acceptance. 187
The value of diversity in decision making is well known in the
domestic judicial context. One advantage of a multiplicity of judicial
circuits is this "percolation" effect. An issue can be examined in sev-
eral circuits, with each circuit having the opportunity to develop its
182 Sec supra note 85.
183 See, e.g., EC Report, supra note 3 ("Whe existing tax diversity across Community
countries is the outcome of trade-offs" in each country regarding efficiency, equity, feasi-
bility, and social policy).
184 See generally Roin, supra note 15, at 557-6I (outlining some benefits from diverse ju-
risdictions); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Ques-
tion?, 3 .1. ECON. L. 257, 259 (2000) ("The optimal regulatory policy is unknown, and
regulatory competition will allow experimentation that reveals information about what is
optimal.").
1115 See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier. of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing
Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 Mimi. J. IN T'', L.
REV. 143 (2000).
186 See generally ERNST & 1'out46, LLP, GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING UPDATE, reprinted in
27 TAX Nlu•rEs INT'L 553, 557-69 (2002).
187
 Regardless of the long-term future and role of APAs, the observation here regard.
ing the increased likelihood of experimentation where diversity exists, remains.
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own resolution. After the various approaches have been tested and
critiqued, the most successful should emerge as the widely adopted
one (through Supreme Court intervention, purposeful adoption in
other circuits, or further federal legislation). 188 If responses to cross-
border tax arbitrage demand a high degree of conformity, then op-
portunities for percolation and gains from jurisdictional diversity will
be relinquished. Perhaps the best accommodation here is to pursue
more targeted harmonization after the benefits of diversity on a cer-
tain issue have been realized.
What weight should be given to the arguments that anti-arbitrage
rules189 may undermine sovereignty and diversity values? There is no
question that these goals are valuable. Nations are dependent on
revenue collection for their very lifeblood (money) to sustain their
governments. Moreover, tax systems developed to satisfy this funding
need also implement important nontax policy goals. It is no surprise
that governments, politicians, and even citizens express serious reser-
vations about any incursions against these domestic controls. That.
said, sovereignty and diversity are not limitless goals. For example,
sovereignty is already limited by a number of formal and informal
constraints. The power of international consensus generated through
international organizations such as the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), or the risk of retaliatory
measures from other countries, currently constrain national action. 19°
Even if sovereignty becomes further constrained by a move to limit
some arbitrage, however, that decision does not mandate use of a sin-
gle response. As explored in Part III, tailoring anti-arbitrage ap-
proaches to specific cases is both sensible and feasible,
188 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the 'Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 979 (2000) ("It has long
been a predicate of Supreme Court decisionmaking that before the Court grants certiorari
to finally resolve an issue, it will often choose to allow the issue to 'percolate' in the courts
of appeals, so that the Court has the benefit of multiple perspectives."). Of course in the
international context, the percolation cannot be resolved conclusively by a binding deci-
sion given the absence of a supranational authority. Nonetheless, a more informal percola-
don can occur.
189 Either ad hoc tax treatment mirroring foreign rules or collective agreement on tax
rules.
19° For example, in response to California's effort to impose worldwide unitary taxa-
tion, the Parliament in the United Kingdom enacted legislation ... that would have
authorized retaliation against non-UK-resident corporations that had a presence in a uni-
tary state. Due to changes in California's law, the state at issue, the legislation was never
put into force." JoANN NI. WEINER, U.S. DEP .T OF THE TREASURY, USING TOE EXPERIENCE
IN TnE U.S. SPA'T'ES -110 EVALUATE ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING FORMULA APPORTIONMENT XI'
'CllE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL (1999), available at LEXIS 1999 1,-VTD 182-23, n.32.
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With respect to diversity in tax policy, even in our federal system
diversity is not an absolute value. The pervasive scope of federal legis-
lative, administrative, and judicial powers moderate diversity. The bal-
ancing of diversity and uniformity on the federal level suggests that
they represent "conflicting" goals, managed through compromise on
a contextual basis. Individual state decisions provide the opportunity
for creative development of policies and programs that enhance local
sovereignty and community self-determination. At the same time, cer-
tain topics are reserved exclusively (or optionally) to the federal gov-
ernment when the value of uniformity and consistency across state
borders is deemed paramount. 01
 In the end, examples of conflicting
state legislation and federal uniformity coexist. The balance between
the two categories can shift over time as priorities change. At the in-
ternational level, there is no immediate risk that creativity will vanish
from the tax arena in the near future. No active policy currently on
the table calls for a supranational body with full binding authority to
dictate tax legislation. 192
These policy challenges to anti-arbitrage rides force acknowl-
edgment of what can be lost if we seek to eliminate cross-border tax
arbitrage. The entire debate arises, however, only because the arbi-
trage creates efficiency and equity problems at the outset. The sensi-
ble resolution involves an accommodation—a balancing—of all the
goals. The task in Part. III is to recognize the competing policy goals
driving the arbitrage debate and to devise a method for coordinating
their analysis and resolution. What. we should demand is an organ-
ized, thoughtful framework for appraising cross-border tax arbitrage,
ever-mindful of the fragile but necessary choices we make.
D. Conclusions on Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage
Critiques of anti-arbitrage rules raise relevant, and for their
scope, seemingly on-target objections. Although it is important to he
cognizant of the potential problems and pitfalls, it should be possible
to craft an approach to cross-border tax arbitrage that responds ade-
quately to the competing goals of the domestic and "international"
tax systems. Perhaps some pessimism regarding anti-arbitrage rules
101 See Nim Razook, Uniform Private Laws, National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform
State Laws Signaling and Federal Preemption, 38 Am. Bus. 14 41, 59 n.88 (2000) ("Among the
most significant examples of federally preemptive legislation are anti-trust, pure food and
drug, protection of labor, securities, civil rights and consumer laws.").
102
 Even the European Union is very far from substantial tax harmonization. See infra
note 304,
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derives from an unrealistic view of the tax system and too narrow a
vision of what could constitute a response to arbitrage. Holding U.S.
arbitrage policy to an idealized standard fails to recognize the realities
of tax policy making that permeate the system. At no point in the his-
tory of the U.S. income tax have we had a completely internally co-
herent system. Our departure from a Haig-Simons system due to
competing policy goals 193 has produced a tax system without clear
lines. We regularly call upon the tax system to balance competing
goals in a fairly contextual manner, and we do not label one policy as
superceding all others in code design. If efforts to curb arbitrage re-
quire line drawing and impose some limits on sovereignty and diver-
sity we should not be surprised or dismayed. A decision to ignore arbi-
trage, although fairly unambiguous, allows sovereignty, adminis-
trability, and diversity to universally trump efficiency and equity. A
better choice is to develop a way to evaluate the competing claims on
arbitrage. Willingness to consider responses to cross-border tax arbi-
trage does not mean a response will always be made, or that if made
the response will always be the same.
The next step is to develop an approach for arbitrage questions
that facilitates and enhances predictable, reasoned determinations
and incorporates the range of possible U.S. responses. Establishing an
approach does not erase the difficulty of line drawing and goal bal-
ancing. That challenging task will remain. What it can do, however, is
provide a framework for identifying core features of arbitrages and
their relationship to responses, thereby moving the discussion of
cross-border tax arbitrage beyond dichotomous characterizations to
encourage more comprehensive and creative ways of designing cross-
border tax arbitrage policy. Ultimately, successful limits on arbitrage
will involve careful consideration of both the nature of the underlying
transactions and issues and the range of remedies that can be crafted.
The development of such a framework is the subject of Part III,
III, IMPLEMENTING A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-BORDER
TAX ARBITRAGE: CHALLENGES AND OBSERVATIONS
A. Introduction
The analysis in Part II supports the conclusion that cross-border
tax arbitrage can be a significant problem. The next question, the
195 In a purely domestic context, the tax system accommodates competing goals, in-
cluding efficiency, equity, and ad ministrabil ity.
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subject of this Part, is how the United States should develop its re-
sponse to arbitrage. Although a nation's reaction to cross-border lax
arbitrage is unlikely to be flawless and uncontroversial, its policy can
follow a reasonable and coherent rationale. Arbitrage analyses and
solutions may be somewhat contextual, but they should derive from
and contribute to a broader framework. 19" What is this framework that
we should be applying?
The answer derives almost explicitly from Part. Ws delineation of
the criteria against which to evaluate the effects of arbitrage. Whether
an arbitrage constitutes a problem meriting intervention depends on
the evaluation of several goals—efficiency, equity, political account-
ability, revenue effects, acninistrability, sovereignty; and diversity.
Thus, the ideal framework is a balancing test that would be applied to
determine U.S. arbitrage tax policy on a case by case basis. 195 Unfor-
191 lAlddressing them [cross-border arbitrage transactions] on a transaction-by-
t•ansaction basis is like attempting to slay the mythological Hydra—you kill one head over
here, and [two] more appear over there." Cross-Border Arbitrage, Cheek-the-Box Draw Treasury
Monitoring Talisman Says, 4 TAX MGM. FIN. PRODUCTS REP. 781 (Dec. 17, 1999) (quoting
Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Jonathan Talisman).
195
 An obvious question follows from this presentation: Is there any real difference be-
tween Initial" creation of rules and a later" revision that justifies a separate process or
analysis in the arbitrage context? On a theoretical level there is no valid distinction be-
tween initial and revisionary rule making. At all moments in time we have a backdrop of
rules and are making decisions about whether to change that. backdrop either through
wholesale alterations in the law or through modifications and extensions, Either way, the
intellectual process should be the same—evaluation of current conditions, goals, and ins-
pacts. But on a practical level, there is a difference between cases of (1) changing rules
because of arbitrage and (2) drafting rules based on a broad set of facts. Most domestic tax
law is drafted without detailed consideration of the intersection with foreign regimes, Ex-
amples of this practice include timing rules and entity classification. See. e.g., supra note 60
(in the context of' entity classification, there was debate about whether to extend the "do-
mestic" plan to all entities given the risk of abuse through conflict with foreign law). Thus,
as a practical matter, the serious question of how to handle conflict with rules of other
countries often does not emerge until later. Moreover, a cursory glance at foreign tax laws
may not reveal the full global implications of the new rules. The existence and details of
arbitrages often are not known until the transactions occur. Realistically, one imagines that
rule ►akers are more educated about and alert to intersections between U.S. laws and
policies than foreign ones. That said, important domestic tax law interactions have been
missed. For example, the implementation of new accelerated depreciation rules in 1981
combined with available investment tax credits led taxpayers to pursue transactions that
were profitable only after taxes, Thus, responses to arbitrage develop differently from gen-
eral legislation. The process can be understood as one of refinement: round one, enact-
ment of domestic law with loose attention to global interactions (as a practical matter, not
because of theoretical limitations); round two, recognition of cross-border tax arbitrage
and the need to decide whether and how to respond. The international effects of U.S. tax
rules are relevant but not determinative to U.S. tax policy and should be included in a
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tunately, the implementation of such a balancing test faces three ma-
jor constraints and complications: (1) limited information; (2) na-
tionalism; and (3) game theory. The implications of these factors
must be explored before we can understand how the balancing test
will operate in practice. Thus, this Part is divided into five substantive
sections. The first traces the impact of the three constraints on the
balancing test. The second considers the techniques available for re-
sponding to arbitrage and their relationship to the balancing test.
The third explores whether there are any useful simplifications of the
initial balancing test that can be adopted. The fourth applies the bal-
ancing test to the case studies. The final section offers some observa-
tions on the balancing test and its application.
B. Constraints and Complications for the Balancing Test
1. Information
Any effort to implement the balancing test requires information
on the relevant elements. The difficulties we have experienced in
reaching a consensus on the efficiency effects of domestic arbi-
tragesim suggest that the efficiency inquiry will be even more compli-
cated in the multijurisdictional setting of cross-border tax arbitrage.
The issues are newer and less studied, and they implicate additional
factors due to the cross-border flows. Moreover, the information nec-
essary to reach conclusions regarding matters such as sovereignty re-
quires projections about the scope of tax policy and the anticipated
taxpayer responses to anti-arbitrage rules. Of course, these challenges
are not unique to the cross-border tax arbitrage balancing test. The
difficult), of the task, however, does not negate its importance. At this
point it is sufficient to note that informational constraints are an in-
herent, but not disqualifying, part of this process.
2. Nationalism
An important question identified in Part II plays a central role in
the implementation of a balancing test: Who is applying the test? An
individual country (such as the United States) or the international
community? The answer seriously affects the conclusions reached re-
comprehensive analysis. This step could be taken in round one, but in reality it often does
not occur until round two.
196 Sec generally supra notes 102-106.
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garding the factors, in particular efficiency and sovereignty. For ex-
ample, in assessing the efficiency effects of a particular arbitrage the
conclusions that would be reached if worldwide efficiency were the
measure (either CEN or CIN) may differ from those reached if na-
tional efficiency were the measure, at least in the absence of guaran-
teed transfers to the losers under the move toward global efficiency.'"
The absence of a supranational tax authority means that such trans-
fers cannot be compelled. As a result, the balancing test may look dif-
ferent from a national perspective. Of course, it may not be clear who
the winners and losers are going to be under a particular rule given
limits on information. In that case, countries may be willing, absent
another overriding national factor, to assume that global efficiency is
sufficiently aligned with national efficiency to be an adequate substi-
tute.
A national perspective will also impact the conclusions reached
regarding the assessment of sovereignty in the balancing test. As
noted earlier, "sovereignty" functions as an umbrella term for a num-
ber of concerns that may follow from an effort to harmonize tax rules
to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. The sovereignty definition most
relevant here is the use of the term as a proxy for the pursuit of na-
tional interests. If the resolution of a given arbitrage question is multi-
lateral agreement on a harmonized rule, that result may not fully
reflect a particular nation's interests. This result could occur either
because the country is an uncompensated loser in a globally efficient
move, or because the country has other policy goals not reflected in
the efficiency analysis that are impacted by the change in tax rule.
Correspondingly, the nation's own conclusions on the balancing test
may be influenced by the risks to sovereignty from a multilateral reso-
lution.
What should be made of these observations regarding the diver-
gence between national and global interests? First, there is a strong
temptation (implicit in much discussion of global efficiency) to view
all national departures as bad and inherently undesirable. That view is
unfair and inconsistent with the standards applied to other arenas of
international policy (for example, defense or environment) where an
assessment of national interests is presumed to be a critical part of the
process. 08
 The fact that national interests may form a part of the cleci-
197
 Regulatory diversity is unlikely to be a prominent feature in a nationally driven bal-
ancing test, given the degree to which it is a common benefit.
198 Sec Graetz, supra note 4, at 279-80.
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sion making does not mean that the nuanced, complicated, and
highly interactive dimensions of cross-border tax relations will be ig-
nored. Nor does it indicate that a significant divergence between na-
tional and global perspectives should always be anticipated.
SeCond, the fact that nations, which are the dominant decision-
makers in international tax, will evaluate policy outcomes with an eye
to national interests is both a political reality and a correlate to repre-
sentative democracy in a multi-jurisdictional world. National govern-
ments represent the interests of their underlying voters, a connection
that is an inherent and appropriate feature of the political process. 199
Third, observations about the potential conflict between globally
and nationally desired outcomes (clue to the existence of uncompen-
sated losers) suggests an important role for international organiza-
tions. If these bodies can play a persuasive and credible mediating
function by negotiating outcomes that recognize the possible losers
and seek to compensate their losses directly or indirectly, the gap be-
tween global and national perspectives on the balancing test may be
narrowed.
3. Game Theory
An obvious consequence of the fact that decisions about arbi-
trage and the balancing test are initially undertaken by nations on an
individual basis is the importance of game theory predictions in a na-
tion's calculation of not only whether, but also how, to respond to ar-
bitrage. For example, if a country concludes that the continued exis-
tence of a particular arbitrage is undesirable it might contemplate
both unilateral and multilateral responses. Depending on the pre-
dieted reaction of other nations to those responses, the original coun-
try may modify its anti-arbitrage plan. This need to take other nations'
actions into account further complicates an already challenging bal-
ancing test. Examples of the interactive effects of nations' behavior
are considered in the following discussion of response options. As we
develop more experience with cross-border tax arbitrage and with
anti-arbitrage strategies, we can apply a sophisticated understanding
I" Of course, there remains the question of precisely whose interests the national (le-
cisioninakers are pursuing. See supra note 180,
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of game theory to anticipate and structure behavior, refining the ap-
plication of the balancing test.. 20
4. Comments on the Balancing Test Complications
The preceding review of the effects of limited information, na-
tionalism, and game theory on the application of the balancing test is
not an indictment of balancing. These factors would likely impact. any
alternative approach as well. Understanding their role, however, helps
us predict the strengths and weaknesses of the balancing test as it
would be applied in practice. The next. step is to identify the possible
responses that. the United States could pursue if the balancing test
indicates that. action should be taken.
C. Options for Eliminating Arbitrage
The determination that. an
 arbitrage example is sufficiently trou-
blesome to warrant government intervention still leaves a significant
question unanswered: What kind of response is appropriate? The de-
cision can be broadly characterized as a choice between unilateral ac-
tion and multilateral action. This depiction, however, greatly oversim-
plifies the reality of crafting arbitrage responses. First, the distinction
between the balancing question of whether to respond and the im-
plementation question of how to respond is not so clear. Although the
two questions can be usefully separated, their analyses are inherently
interactive. Knowledge of the likely effects of various anti-arbitrage
rules may influence the decision of whether to respond.
Second, the broadly described categories of responses (unilateral
and multilateral) are not. mutually exclusive and may be used con-
temporaneously, sequentially, or conditionally as part of a response
plan. For example, the United States could decide to pursue unilat,
eral action first, with the expectation of forcing other countries into a
dialogue. 201 Conversely, the United States could seek a multilateral
change first, with unilateral action as a backstop. The multilateral ap-
proach could be preferable if the United States anticipated that a uni-
lateral move would elicit a retaliatory response by the other country
200 For a sense of the range of interactions captured by game theory analysis, see, for
example, ERIC KASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCT/ON TO GAME THEORY
(2001).
201
 At a minimum, a nation can adopt unilateral measures either as an interim or
longer-term strategy.
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without leading to multilateral dialogue. 2°2 A multilateral approach
could also be advantageous if there is limited support for a rule
change domestically (for example, because of agency capture). Evi-
deuce of an emerging international consensus would lend support
and power to a domestic effort to change the tax treatment.
Third, the definitional distinction between unilateral and multi-
lateral action is not as strong as it initially appears. Depending on
what type of unilateral response is adopted, it may be very close to
certain multilateral scenarios. For example, if a country decides uni-
laterally to institute a matching rule (it will follow the tax treatment
provided in the other country to the transaction) or to change its sub-
stantive rule to correspond to the dominant. global treatment of the
transaction, a notable degree of harmonization has been achieved. 203
In fact, the difference between this picture and one in which, as a re-
sult of multilateral discussion, a few countries change their rules to
reflect the global trend, may be minimal.
Fourth, the category of multilateral action is itself complex and
includes various options. Although the process underlying a multilat-
eral response should include dialogue and opportunity for debate
among nations, it need not take a particular form nor include the
ceding of authority to a multilateral body. In fact, change may not be
necessary for many countries depending on the degree of conver-
gence already evidenced in their tax rules. The scope of multilateral
dialogue can range from bilateral to small group to highly inclusive
discussions, based on the degree of interest, the complexity of the is-
sue, and the anticipated reaction of different parties.
Despite the interactive and complementary aspects of unilateral
and multilateral responses, they do differ in terms of the degree of
explicit discussion and cooperation they entail. Thus, an obvious
question arises: When is a multilateral approach likely to be success-
ful? One can identify a subset of cross-border tax arbitrage issues par-
ticularly suited to multilateral resolution, including cases in which: (1)
the problem is of a significant scale (to justify the intervention and
efforts of numerous nations); and (2) the subject is a somewhat arbi-
202 See infra text accompanying notes 255-256.
2°5 Unilateral harmonization can be considered Implicit cooperation" by "deferling)
to other countries by limiting the scope of regulatory jurisdiction or providing de jure or de
facto national treatment to foreign nationals." Joel P. Trachnnan, Recent Initiatives in Inter-
national Financial Regulation and Goals of Competitiveness. Effectiveness, Consistency and Coopera-
tion, 12 NNv. J. InT't. L. & Bus. 241,248-49 (1991).
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trary tax designation (such as corporate residence) 204 or a developing
trend (for example, accrual taxation, transfer pricing rules, or sub-
part. F rules).205
 Of course, even where harmonization of tax rules is
achieved at the multilateral level, there still remains the potential for
arbitrage. Although the rules on paper may be uniform, there can be
significant differences in the application of the rules, creating de
facto arbitrage (at. least where the enforcement variations are predict
able and known). 200
 In this case, though, where countries share the
same formal rules, procedures for resolving inconsistent rule applica-
tions may be realistic.
D. Simplification?
The foregoing identification of the balancing test and its inher-
ent. complexities raises the question of whether there is any way in
which to simplify the arbitrage inquiry a country needs to undertake.
Several potential simplifications are considered below.
1. General Soak-up Rule
Assuming the existence of cross-border tax arbitrage will not be
ignored (which is the "simplest" course of action), one simplifying
possibility is to adopt a general "soak-up" rule as the preliminary U.S.
position. Specifically, the rule would state that the U.S. tax treatment
reported by a taxpayer for a transaction must match the treatment in
the corresponding foreign jurisdiction (similar to a rule that required
tax/book conformity). One advantage of this rule is that it does not
require the government first. to identify particular arbitrages and pre-
scribe the tax reporting. In theory, it captures all arbitrages without
the government even knowing they exist. Additionally, this rule is
seemingly globally efficient by removing, for example, the "extra" de-
duction while securing the resulting revenue bonus for the United
States (motivating the label "soak-up" rule). Upon further considera-
2°4
 The arbitrary quality of the designation does not mean that countries would not
have intense views.
.2°5
 These would be issues for which the percolation of ideas may be more complete,
and substantial consensus already underway independent of the arbitrage.
206
	 reality was recognized in the IFA symposium on double-dip leasing. Partici-
pants discussed moving toward a uniform rule on asset ownership for depreciation pur-
poses, but then noted that, even if all countries adopted an economic substance rule, the
final determinations might vary because of differences in application of the standard. Sec
supra note 45 (discussing IFA report on cross-border leasing).
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Lion, however, this course of action is less desirable than it appears
and fails to deliver the predicted benefits for several reasons.
First, the broadly drafted rule applies not only to arbitrages in-
tentionally pursued by the taxpayer, but any case in which the tax
treatment in the other country differs. We can assume that taxpayers
in the "intentional" arbitrage cases are aware of the tax conflict and
are equipped to delineate the differences on their returns. The same
reporting obligation, however, would be imposed on a taxpayer who
may not be aware that the other party to the cross-border transaction
receives different tax treatment in the other country. Of course, the
U.S. taxpayer could, as a condition of all cross-border transactions,
require the cottnterparty to provide a disclosure as to anticipated tax
treatment. In reality, the transaction costs of pursuing the information
and the likely success of obtaining it may make this rule unduly bur-
densome for taxpayers.
Second, even though the rule as proposed does not require the
United States to specify the particular form of the soak-up (that is,
exactly what change to U.S. tax treatment will occur as a result of the
conflict in countries' tax treatment of the transaction), that determi-
nation must be made by the taxpayer upon filing, and by the govern-
ment upon andit. 207 In some cases the answer may seem relatively ob-
vious. For example, in the case of a DRC, the expectation might be
that the U.S. deduction for the loss should be denied. But upon closer
inspection the answer can be more confusing in the absence of case-
specific guidance. Should the U.S. loss be denied only where the for-
eign loss is actually taken and used to reduce foreign income? Or
should the residency of the DRC be reported differently because the
real conflict is in residence rules? Or should the U.S. group be decon-
solidated? Each of these choices creates different effects for the U.S.
taxpayer, and each could be viewed as an appropriate soak-up re-
sponse to the existing conflict with the other country. Of course,
there will even be debate in some cases as to whether the reporting in
the other country is truly in conflict with the U.S. tax treatment.
Again, using the DRC case as an example, the case study scenario
paints a fairly uncontroversial picture of conflicting tax rules. But
what about more convoluted methods for obtaining a comparable
benefit208 that do not involve a single entity or transaction with
207 The phrase "soak-up" may imply that the rule could just provide that the United
States will tax if the other country does not, but that enunciation of the rule still requires a
determination of each country's tax treatment for a given transaction.
208 See Rosenbloom, supra note 2, at 157-59.
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conflicting treatment. in the two countries? Would such substitute
transactions be captured in this broad soak-up rule?
Third, even though the broad soak-up rule seems to promote
efficiency by limiting the arbitrage benefit, closer inspection suggests
that this may not be true. In the absence of any case-specific inquiry
we do not know whether taxpayers are likely to shift to more costly
substitute transaCtions 209 (for example, an alternative to the DRC). 210
Also, the arbitrage under attack by the soak-up rule may, in reality, be
an efficient taxpayer response to existing tax conditions that cannot
otherwise be remedied through a more direct alternative. This is an
empirical question that would require a case-specific review to be an-
swered.
Fourth, the soak-up rule does not take into account whether
adoption of such a unilateral move is the best first move for the
United States. For example, depending on the context, that move
may be considered aggressive and lead to a retaliatory response. Fi-
nally, a comprehensive soak-up rule does not allow for the possibility
that the United States might. view the arbitrage as advancing U.S. pol-
icy. For example, if the underlying U.S. tax rule seeks to implement
particular policy goals, such as investment, it is possible that the
benefits from an arbitrage transaction involving that investment
would be interpreted as furthering the U.S. policy on that behavior.
Given these significant reservations, a broad soak-up rule is unlikely
to be a desirable U.S. response to the existence of cross-border tax
arbitrage.
2. Modified Soak-up Rule
Another potentially simplifying possibility could be a modified
soak-up rule that tried to take account of some criticisms of the gen-
eral soak-up rule. In the modified rule, the United States would
specifically identify both the arbitrage cases covered by the rule and
the reporting treatment expected. Ambiguity, due either to uncer-
tainty as to the foreign treatment or as to whether such treatment
should be viewed as in conflict, would be substantially eliminated. The
remaining three critiques from the broad soak-up rule, however, con-
tinue to apply. The very reason this soak-up rule is appealing (it re-
quires no further inquiry once an arbitrage has been identified be-
cause the response to all identified arbitrages is predetermined) may
200 See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 169, at 1315-16.
210 Sec Rosenbloom, sttpm note 2, at 157-59.
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cause it to be inefficient. Only a context-specific analysis would reveal
whether in fact it is truly efficient to curtail the arbitrage (either be-
cause of costly substitutes or because the arbitrage offers taxpayers
second-best self-help in resolving an existing inefficiency).
The modified soak-up rule also fails to evaluate the potential
game theory implications of an arbitrage that may make a different
response a better first move. This behavioral observation also relates
to the expectation that the unilateral move will be revenue-generating
for the United States. 211 If the other country implements a compara-
ble rule, it is not clear that the United States will gain any revenue
bonus, especially when the possibility of substitute transactions exists.
Finally, an automatic response to enumerated arbitrages does not
consider whether any U.S. policy is furthered by the arbitrage.
None of these objections is meant to suggest that the United
States should not seriously consider unilateral action in response to
the existence of cross-border tax arbitrage. What these observations
do, however, is challenge the suggestion that unilateral action should
be adopted as the United States' automatic first move for arbitrage. 212
3. Rough-Cut Balancing
Perhaps the most realistic accommodation that should be made
in the context of implementing the balancing test is simply to recog-
nize that the determinations reached regarding the various factors
will be inherently uncertain, debatable, and subject to change
(whether, for example, upon acquisition of additional information in
the case of efficiency assessments, or upon a change in underlying
information in the case of shifting government policy). We should not.
hesitate to pursue the balancing test just because we cannot, measure
the different elements with a high degree of confidence. The very
reasons that this task is difficult make any alternative path risky as
well. It is possible that in the future, with more experience in arbi-
trage analysis, we may be able to draw conclusions about the likely
211 See, e.g., infra note 256 and accompanying text.
212 The availability of multilateral forums will be relevant in balancing the efficiency
and game theory concerns. A unilateral first move that elicits retaliation may be undesir-
able if it unduly discourages certain transactions, and multilateral dialogue is unlikely (re-
sources, attention, time, and political capital are not unlimited and may mean many issues
will not reach the multilateral agenda). Similarly, if past experience indicates that immedi-
ate multilateral agreement is unlikely (see, for example, double-dip leases), then unilateral
action should not be premised on the assumption that it will only be short term and a
multilateral resolution will be achieved promptly.
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balancing outcome of certain categories of arbitrage and therefore
consider adopting a rebuttable presumption regarding their treat-
ment. At present, however, there is no indication that we have devel-
oped enough experience with the balancing test to implement such
an option.
E. Application to the Case Studies
In order to gain a sense of how the balancing test can be applied,
this section turns to the major arbitrage examples outlined in this Ar-
ticle. The mission is to sketch how the test can be used to guide U.S.
tax policy, what kinds of questions it prompts us to consider, and what
inquiries it requires us to make. Rather than pursue an exhaustive ex-
amination of each case, the analyses focus on the unique features of
each arbitrage most likely to influence the balancing, including
efficiency, line drawing, substitutability, sovereignty (especially na-
tional policies), and response options.
1. Original Issue Discount Bonds
How would the test apply in this context? The basic problem is a
distortion driven by the conflict between U.S. and Japanese timing
rules. 213 The U.S. policy (not perfectly achieved) of taxing interest
income in accordance with economic accrual governs the U.S. party
to the transaction (the U.S. corporate issuer), 214 As the efficiency
analysis in Part II suggested, we might anticipate that U.S. issuers
could offer lower rates of return, which would be good from a U.S.
perspective in that it allows those corporations a lower cost of capi-
tal—at the expense of the Japanese Treasury. Analysts have suggested
that the empirical results from this arbitrage indicate that the U.S.
corporate issuers are the economic winners (with a lower cost of
213 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
214 The United States has an accrual rule which it views as better approximating eco-
nomic income than prior "wait until the end' rules, The effect is not perfect because tax
rules assume a steady yield to maturity which may not match the structure of interest rates
on longer-term bonds. Sec, e.g.. Joseph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of
Long-Term Debt: Taking Into Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. Rr.v. 335, 348
(1989). The accrual rule is not uniformly implemented, For example, the taxation of mar-
ket discount bonds differs from that of OID bonds despite their economic comparability.
Administrability likely explains the greater flexibility granted market discount bonds. See,
e.g., supra note 36. In other contexts, the current accrual approach of OID is limited, See,
e.g., 1.R.C. §163(e)(3)(a) (2000) (denying a current deduction under certain circum-
stances for OID on bonds held by related foreign persons).
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funds due to the arbitrage) at the expense of the Japanese taxpay-
ers.215
To the extent the arbitrage shifts more Japanese investors to the
U.S. bond market there may be some effect on the mix of bonds is-
sued in the United States (OID v. coupon bonds). 216 Even if a shift.
toward OID bond issuances develops, it seems unlikely to produce a
dramatic revenue cost for the United States. That is, although U.S.
issuers might be inclined to issue more OID bonds (possibly leading
to less interest income being taxed by the United States), 217 the result,
ing lower cost of capital should correspondingly reduce the size of
interest deductions reported by the U.S. issuers.
With the likely domestic benefits and the minimal impact on un-
derlying tax policy (accrual), the OID case presents little impetus for
a unilateral U.S. response (denying the U.S. issuer's OID deduction).
The dominant U.S. policy involved (economic taxation of interest)
would be ill-served by any unilateral move away from current rules.
Thus, the United States should not under these circumstances adopt
cash-basis taxation here (the equivalent of a unilateral move). The
preferable action would be a "multilateral response," with the actual
action occurring on the Japanese side. The U.S. OID rules are part of
a trend to design income tax rules that are more consistent with con-
cepts of economic income, thereby decreasing distortions. To the ex-
tent countries adopt tax rules grounded in economic accrual, regula-
tory conflict and arbitrage opportunities diminish. Although many
rules have an "arbitrary" component that precludes viewing one
country's rules as superior, the OID regime arguably has a stronger
claim to correctness. The preferable multilateral response in this con-
text would be a recognition of the global value of economic taxation,
particularly in financial transactions. Given the trend toward eco-
216 See Scour & WELLONS, supra note 41, at 1034. Potentially the United States could
lose tax revenue if a larger portion of bond investors bear no current U.S. tax as compared
to the pre-arbitrage world. Actual calculations here would require determinations of
whether investors constitute additional participants or direct replacements of taxable par-
ties. Further complicating the prediction is the observation that, if U.S. issuers obtain a
lower cost of capital, then their interest expense deductions should be smaller
"6 The answers to these empirical questions are not simple, and at present they have
not been explored in the economic and tax literature. Fortunately, however, detailed reso-
lution of this specific arbitrage case is not critical to the more comprehensive question of
how to think about arbitrage problems in general.
217 As outlined earlier in Part IL this result would depend on a number of assumptions
about the role of the Japanese purchasers and whether they replaced existing taxable bond
holders or constituted an additional pool of investors. See supra text accompanying note
119.
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nomic accrual taxation, at least for debt and interest, Japan would be
urged to join this trend. The arbitrage example would serve as an oc-
casion to reconsider its own domestic policy. Although countries may
be wary of instituting accrual rules for market discount bonds,given
the degree of sophistication required for compliance, that. concern
seems weak in the OID context where the issuer can provide the
holder the data necessary to report income. Japan, however, contin-
ues its schedular withholding tax approach to interest, which does not
reflect economic taxation (in some cases, the amounts are not even
treated as interest and tax is due at redemption). 218
2. Double-Dip Lease
Recall that this arbitrage derives its values from two elements: (1)
the accelerated depreciation deductions which are frequently incen-
tive-based departures from economic depreciation; and (2) the asset.
ownership rules—where tradeoffs between administrability (for ex-
ample, ownership based on title) and substance (for example, owner-
ship based on economic indicia) set the stage for conflict. 2 t 9
The primary function of accelerated depreciation deductions has
been to foster investment activity. The cross-border tax arbitrage op-
portunity here presumably enhances that incentive. 22° Of course, the
investment goals of Congress may have been more nuanced—that is,
Congress may have sought investment at a particular level, with par-
ticular countries, balanced across particular industries. The availabil-
ity of the arbitrage might change these levels. For example, as de-
scribed in Part II, to the extent some or all of the benefit inures to the
U.S. lessee, it will presumably be able to make further investments in
airplanes (their lower costs allow them to charge lower fares). How
positively that investment should be viewed depends on why we en-
couraged investment initially and whether we are concerned, past a
certain point, about the U.S. lessee's advantage in competing with
other U.S. businesses (for example, transportation or entertainment)
that cannot obtain a comparable benefit.
Without good evidence of the intended scope of the investment.
incentive, or the degree to which the arbitrage varies from it, unilat,
218 See supra note 38.
218 See supra (ex' accompanying notes 45-49.
220 Depending on which party obtains the net tax benefit, U.S. investment in planes
will be increased (a little or a lot) or unchanged.
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eral denial of ownership benefits may not he appropriate. 221 The exist-
ing U.S. tax benefit for investment (the value of the acceleration) may
represent Congress's ideal incentive, or may represent the most Con-
gress could "allot" to this policy. If additional benefit accrues to a U.S.
taxpayer through the arbitrage intersection, it is not clear this result
would be viewed negatively. Moreover, if the United States unilaterally
eliminated the double-clip arbitrage by denying accelerated deduc-
tions to the U.S. party, the net effect is unpredictable and turns on
how the market has priced the transaction. Unless the market equili-
brates domestic and cross-border acquisitions, the U.S. acquirer may
now favor domestic purchasers untouched by the anti-arbitrage rule.
A multilateral review of the rules underlying double-clip leases
(the conflict as to whether economic substance or legal title should
determine ownership in leasing transactions) offers an alternative ap-
proach for constraining leasing arbitrage. Some initial multilateral
steps have been taken; the International Fiscal Association (IFA) ex-
amined the issue as its primary topic during the 1990 Congress. Un-
fortunately, little consensus emerged from the process. The 1990 IFA
General Report on Cross-Border Leasing (General Report) suggested
a uniform designation of all cross-border leases as operating leases (a
binding default classification). 222 The IFA Resolutions Committee,
following upon the work of the General Report, observed that many
of the industrial nations from which most leasing activity derives rely
on economic analysis to classify leases as either operating or
finance. 223 Accordingly, its resolution recommended harmonization
through reliance on an economic characterization, not through the
"random" selection of a legal classification (for example, deeming all
leases to be operating as proposed by the General Report). 224 Pre-
sumably, the expectation was that if countries all attempted to classify
and tax leases on the basis of their economic substance, then there
would be widespread harmonization. The resolution urged the OECD
to study this problem and make recommendations to its members on
221 In addition, unilateral denial of accelerated deductions that turns on foreign taxa-
tion will raise the burden of proof, information, and documentation issues identified ear-
her, where the counterparty is unrelated to the U.S. taxpayer.
222 IFA General Report, supra note 7, at 44. The idea of a uniform characterization had
been articulated before. See, e.g.. Park, supra note 43, at 176 (asserting that "Treasury and
OECD should encourage adoption of the accountants' standards in income tax treaties for




General Report, supra note 7, at 29-30.
224 Id.
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harmonization possibilities, ranging from unilateral to bilateral and
multilateral action. 225 Thus, even within the IFA, divergent views as to
the appropriate treatment of double-clip leases reigned and little real
consensus was achieved. 226
 In fact, the General Report had considered
the option of harmonization ultimately advocated by the Resolutions
Committee, but it concluded that "[ii t must be regarded as impossi-
ble to make all countries agree on making a distinction between op-
erating and finance leases and to do it the same way."227
The IFA's failure to achieve a consensus on this question suggests
that the desire for uniformity is not strong enough for countries to
depart from their individual preferences for economic substance or
legal ownership standards and commit to compromises on ownership
classification schemes. Or perhaps, even more likely, countries per-
ceive an export incentive operating in the double-dip lease, 229 and
thus, are less inclined to cooperate to remove that incentive. 229 This
view, if adopted by France in the case study, would presume that the
planes sold were French—manufactured. If French lessors could
achieve the same arbitrage benefit by acquiring planes from a U.S.
manufacturer and then leasing them to U.S. airlines, then France's
export effect would diminish or vanish.
Individual countries have in fact demonstrated a variety of reac-
tions to double-dip leases (although one notable theme seems to be a
lack of significant concern where the arbitrage is perceived to facili-
tate exports). 23° In leasing transactions, the United States has ad-
vanced its more general theme of economic "substance over form"221
225 Id.
=26 See, e.g., Andersson, supra note 43.
=27
 IFA General Report, supra note 7, at 44.
=28
 The U.S. tax benefits for outbound leases have been dramatically curtailed by do-
mestic restrictions on depreciation deductions for property used outside the United States.
See I.R.C. g 168(g) (1)(A) (2000).
229 Also, 11 is important to note that IFA is not a governmental-based organization; thus
many of the participants are tax practitioners who may hold different views on the arbi-
trage.
=3° Sec. e.g., Andersson, supra note 43 (anticipating that countries will not be quick to
eliminate tax benefits that aid exports); see also IFA General Report, supra note 7, at 32
(concluding that many of the countries providing National Reports on leasing did not
have special domestic tax rules for double-dip leases, and seemed to indicate little interest
in the foreign taxation of the lease transaction).
231 Src, e.g., Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1915) ("The incidence of
taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.... To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities,
would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress."). This
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(at least where there is "strong proof" that the substance differs from
the form).232 In the cross-border context, however, the United States
has hesitated to accept readily a taxpayer's reliance on substance
where it contradicts the form, particularly where that form is accepted
by the foreign country. 233 This position could stymie arbitrage by U.S.
taxpayers who are often nominally the lessee of a counterparty in a
jurisdiction that relies predominantly on "legal ownership." In such
cases the U.S. party would need to make a successful substance-over-
form claim to obtain the double-clip benefits. The Service, however,
has recently suggested that dual-tax ownership in a double-clip lease
will not be a concern where it derives from differing tax rules govern-
ing ownership. 234 Thus, if the foreign jurisdiction implements a dif-
ferent ownership rule (for example, legal title), the United States will
not be particularly stingy in accepting the U.S. taxpayer's substance
argument. But if the dual ownership arises where the United States
and the other country have the same (or not clearly different) legal
rule for ownership yet reach opposing conclusions, the Service will
scrutinize the U.S. taxpayer's claim of ownership.235 Why? The latter
case poses a significant risk that different facts were presented to the
two governments.236 The U.S. decision, previously more tacit and now
more explicit, to allow certain double-dip leases comports with this
paper's analysis. The basis for U.S. unilateral intervention is limited
given the intentional subsidy policy underlying the accelerated depre-
ciation deductions (and tax credits). 237 This leaves the international
community to prioritize the risks of this arbitrage. 238
expressed aspiration has not always matched the resulting tax analyses. Moreover, the dis-
tinction between substance and form may not always be easily ascertained.
232 sec, e.g., IRS Coordinated Issue Paper, supra note 22, at L-3; Tech. Adv. 111em. 97-48-
005 (Nov. 28, 1997).
233 See, e.g., Andersson, supra note 43; Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-48-005 (Nov. 28, 1997).
234 Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-48-005 (Nov. 28, 1997).
295 Id.
238 Id.; see also Coleman v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 178, 203-04 (1986) (relying on a "strong
proof standard" in a cross-border lease transaction for the U.S. party to claim ownership
contrary to the form of the transaction).
2" Nothing in this analysis, however, should be taken to suggest that Congress should
not revisit its decision to offer incentives for certain investment activities. Other countries
have made such changes. See infra notes 239-244. The merits of Congressional policy to
encourage particular taxpayer behavior is always open to reconsideration in light of addi-
tional information, changed factors, and shifting priorities.
238 The U.S. willingness to challenge, or at least investigate, sonic leasing cases does
not contradict this conclusion for no unilateral action. The United States targets cases in
which the contradictory ownership conclusions may be due to taxpayer misrepresentation,
not national sovereignty.
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Although the current. lack of success in mobilizing the interna-
tional community may indicate a limited value placed on this arbi-
trage problem, there are other indicators that the arbitrage could be
one well-suited to a multilateral resolution. A series of recent changes
in countries' tax laws have reduced the attractiveness of cross-border
leasing. These changes included more limited investment. tax credits,
lengthened depreciation periods, reductions in the corporate tax
rate, and attacks on leasing transactions that constituted shelters. 239
 A
few of these changes targeted cross-border leasing specifically. Most
changes belonged to a family of tax reforms affecting corporations
and investments more generally. For example, in August 1996, pro-
posed changes to Japan's declining balance depreciation method
were announced and dampened interest in the Japanese cross-border
leveraged leasing market. 24° Previously, Japan had taken center stage
in much aircraft leasing."'
The original U.S. partner for double-dip airplane leases had been
the United Kingdom (a U.K. lessor and a U.S. lessee). At that time,
the United Kingdom had high tax rates and up to 100% write-off of
cost in the first year of investments. 242 Later, however, the U.K. tax
authorities diminished the appeal of these double-dip leases by impos-
ing special rules for leases with a foreign user, perhaps indicating the
United Kingdom did not believe the rules advanced the interests of
U.K. plane manufacturers (either because the planes involved were
manufactured outside the United Kingdom, or because the United
Kingdom did not intend that incentive) . 243 Changes in the U.K. tax
rates and first-year recovery rules further limited interest in the leas-
ing. Whether broad-based support for a multilateral response to dou-
ble-clip leasing develops will depend in part on the degree to which
the changes in investment. and corporate taxation reduce the volume
of arbitrage. Further multilateral discussion along the lines of the 1FA
239 Cf. ..,1,nclerssori, supra note 43, at 2.
24° See Akira Akamatsu & Christopher P. Wells, Japanese Tax Bureau's Bombshell Puts Lev-
eraged Lease Market in a Tailspin, 13 TAx NOTES IN•I 1763 (1996); Richard S. Koffey &
Richard L. Umhrecht, Japanese Cross-Border Leasing into the United States, 43 TAx LAw 149,
149 (1990) (citing Japan as a growing and significant source of cross-border leasing into
the United States).
241 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 43, at 1036-37 (noting the prominence of Japan in aircraft
leasing); Thorold Barker, Airlines Seek Turbulence-Free Ride from Currency Exposures: To Hedge
or Not to Hedge Is a Thorny Problem That BA and Other Airlines Must Address. FIN. TtmEs (Lon-
don), Feb. 12, 1999, at 18 (leverage leasing with Japanese parties served as an attractive
financing option "until the Japanese government changed the law this year").
242 Rice, supra note 43, at 1035,
243 Id.
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dialogue may be valuable for national regulators, even if agreement
continues to prove elusive. 244
3. Dual-Resident Corporations
Through conflicting residence rules, DRCs benefit from the abil-
ity to use a DRC's loss against the income of the local related group in
two separate jurisdictions. 245 In the extreme this could lead to com-
plete nontaxation of income and loss of government tax revenue with
its attendant effects. 246 Thus, an initial question is what analysis under-
lies U.S. selection of its residence rule. The U.S. incorporation rule
prizes administrability247 over a substantive connection• between
country and corporation. This administrability goal remains pre-
served in the DRC arbitrage despite other effects from the arbitrage.
With respect to the broader role of DRCs, the United States an-
ticipated that domestic corporations would be at a competitive disad-
vantage in vying with foreign DRCs for acquisition of U.S. corpora-
tions because of the added value of the U.S. corporations to the DRC.
The accuracy of these predictions is debated, and they seem in-
sufficient to establish a strong risk to U.S. policy that should be de-
fended through unilateral denial of the losses. Although it may be
appropriate to eliminate one set of deductions, no clear grounds exist.
for the United States to be the country making that change. Moreo-
ver, the other country in the pairing would likely have comparable
interests and incentives and could quickly react to a unilateral U.S.
move to seize the available revenue (that is, deny the deduction). In
contrast with the previous case, double-dip leases, the DRC arbitrage
is not based on an incentive driven tax rule, thus other countries may
be more likely to react by withdrawing their "tax benefit" as well. Also,
the DRC involves related (in fact, consolidating) parties; therefore, a
244 See Sykes, supra note 26, at 66 (explaining that "it is valuable for national regulators
to participate actively in international standard-setting activities, even if those activities do
not result in a standard because of insufficient consensus").
245 See supra note 132 for a numerical DRC example.
246 Sec supra text accompanying note 132. Whether the existence of the benefit will
lead foreign owned DRCs to acquire U.S. corporations at a competitive advantage over
U.S. purchasers is less clear.
247
 Places of incorporation can be readily determined in most cases.
248 Such a "connections" residence test requires evidence as to the corporation's con-
duct of affairs with a potentially fact-intensive review.
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country may be less concerned about conditioning domestic tax
treatment on the tax treatment in the other country. 249
Ultimately, Congress targeted DRCs. The U.S. Senate Finance
Committee determined that a corporation that uses its tosses to offset
foreign income should not be able to use those same losses to reduce
another corporation's U.S. income. The rationale was that domestic
investors were being discriminated against vis-a-vis foreign investors
because the latter could enjoy a double benefit. 25° (This investor dis-
crimination concern resurfaced in legislative history regarding the
domestic reverse hybrid.) 251 The Committee proposed that losses of a
foreign-owned DRC be prevented from reducing the taxable income
of other U.S. corporations in its consolidated group. The ultimate
statutory reform enacted in I.R.C. § 1503(d) in 1986 provided that
"[,ti lie dual consolidated loss for any taxable year of any corporation
shall not be allowed to reduce the taxable income of any other mem-
ber of the affiliated group for the taxable year or any other taxable
year. "252 Regulatory authority was granted to exclude DRC losses that
did not offset a foreign corporation's income under foreign law. 255
The U.S. course of action raises the question of why Congress felt
compelled to act in a case in which the balancing test suggests it may
not have been advisable to do so unilaterally. Based on the legislative
history and commentary surrounding the arbitrage, 254 the most likely
answer is a combination of strong pressure from U.S. corporations
and a powerful sense of outrage at what seemed an insultingly blatant
thwarting of the single-tax principle. In addition, unilateral action was
available to Congress whereas multilateral action would typically re-
quire the administration's involvement.
After the United States implemented rules denying DRC losses,
the United Kingdom responded in 1988 with a regime. The United
States anticipated this move by the United Kingdom and specified in
249 See infra Part 1111.D.1, raising the question of whether taxpayers have adequate in-
formation to report on taxation in the other country.
290
	 S. REP. No. 99-313, at 420-21 (1986) ("The committee believes that the dual
resident company device creates an undue incentive for U.K. corporations (and Australian
corporations) to acquire U.S. corporations and otherwise to gain an advantage hi compet-
ing in the U.S. economy against U.S. corporations."). See supra text accompanying notes
135-139.
251 Sec supra note 150,
292 I.R.C. § 1503 (d ) (2000).
2" Sec JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 997II CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX RE
FORM A•r or 1980, at 1066 (1987).
254 Sec supra notes 135-139.
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the legislative history of I.R.C. § 1503 that the exception for DRC
losses not used in the other country would not apply to situations in
which the foreign country adopted a "mirror" rule denying use of
DRC losses. 255 Congress feared that in such cases the combination of
the foreign country's denial of loss and the United States' exception
from loss denial would effectively allocate all gain from the attack on
dual consolidated loss arbitrage to the foreign fisc. 255 The potential
for no loss deduction in either country seems undesirable as meas-
ured against goals of efficiency and equity. In fact, the legislative his-
tory specifically advocated the use of bilateral agreements to share the
gains from eliminating the DRC benefits. 257
The possibility remains that members of the global community
may identify residence rules as one of those pockets of regulation sus-
ceptible to greater harmonization, thereby resolving the efficiency
and equity problems of the arbitrage. This change would likely coif e
with little harm to diversity. The issue of "residence" has been brewing
from the early clays of cross-border taxation, allowing ample time for
percolation of ideas. In terms of sovereignty, residence rules are less
likely to he embedded in domestic tax policy because they are inher-
ently international in nature. Of course, conflict remains possible if
countries believe (accurately or not) that they may be losers in the
process (either because of the harmonization itself or because of the
specific residence rule chosen). The DRC outcome highlights a po-
tential risk of unilateral action—retaliation that results in inefficient
taxation. The fact that the taxpayers may be avoiding problems by not
using DRCs does not demonstrate that the unilateral moves were suc-
cessful tax policy. The taxpayers might be pursuing less desirable sub-
stitute transactions. Of course, taxpayers might have developed alter-
natives even in the presence of a coordinated bilateral reaction to
DRC benefits. The double denial of losses in the current government
positions, however, might have hastened the pursuit of planning al-
ternatives.
255 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 99111 CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT or 1986, at 1065 (1987) ("["1] he United Kingdom has indicated that it will seek to
prevent the use of interest-deduction related losses generated by U.S. corporations that are
U.K. residents against the taxable income of other U.K. residents.").
256 Id. ("Congress ... did not intend that such a rule of foreign law cause all the reve-
nue gains from termination of the [DRC] device to inure to the benefit of the foreign
revenue authority.").
257 Id. at 1066.
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4. Hybrid Entities
The last of the case studies is perhaps the most controversial. The
increased feasibility of creating a hybrid entity whose classification
differs across national borders has ushered in a new era of arbitrage
opportunities. Their success depends heavily on conflicts in entity
classification, particularly those conflicts enhanced by the U.S. check-
the-box regime. Despite this common thread in the hybrid entity arbi-
trages, each arbitrage case requires a different government response.
Therefore, it makes sense to address the two hybrid entity examples
separately.
In the domestic reverse hybrid entity case, 258 the combination of
conflicting entity classification of the U.S. hybrid holding company,
differing rules for interest and dividends, and treaty concessions on
source taxation produced little or no taxation of the transaction in
the United States and the foreign country. The arbitrage undermines
the U.S. treaty decision to relinquish taxing rights on the "interest"
payment. The decision was premised on the understanding that the
income would face taxation in the treaty partner country. In the ab-
sence of such foreign taxation, no double taxation would result and
the United States would have been unwilling to surrender its right to
tax the income. The conflicting entity classification rules of the two
countries effectively undid the "deal" and the expectations in the
treaty. Allowing the arbitrage to continue unfettered would
significantly undermine U.S. treaty negotiations and enforcement, of
bargains.
As a result, the United States has a strong interest in limiting this
arbitrage. In terms of how to proceed, both unilateral and multilat,
eral (including bilateral) options could be valuable. Given the lack of
any affirmative policy incentive supporting the arbitrage, and the fact
that it derives from the abuse of an international agreement drafted
precisely to handle cross-border coordination, a prompt response
would not be unreasonable. As a general matter, a unilateral reaction
can be achieved more quickly to contain the arbitrage (especially
where more than one treaty is involved). In this context, the response
presumably would be understood as a temporary measure. The fact
that the country on the other side of the transaction is a treaty part-
ner indicates the existence of a route for direct dialogue, as well as an
expectation that treaty-related 'natters will be the subject of mutual
258
 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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discussion and "equitable" sharing of reven ue. To prevent misunder-
standings, the preliminary role of unilateral action should be
identified in such a case. 259
The United States did respond to this arbitrage with regulations
reclaiming taxing jurisdiction over the income surrendered under the
treaty and not taxed because of the arbitrage. Now, the payments to
the foreign corporation in such hybrid cases will be treated as a divi-
dend for Internal Revenue Code (Code) and treaty purposes, thereby
denying the reduced treaty rate for interest and producing an income
classification consistent with that of the recipient country. 260 In ex-
plaining the motivation behind this new rule, the preamble to the
proposed regulation stated:
The IRS and Treasury believe that it is inappropriate for re-
lated parties to use domestic reverse hybrid entities for the
purpose of converting higher taxed U.S. source items of in-
come to lower taxed, or untaxed, U.S. source items of in-
come. To do so defeats the expectation of the United States
and its treaty partners that treaties should be used to reduce
or eliminate double taxation for legitimate transactions, not
to reward the manipulation of inconsistencies in the laws of
the treaty partners.261
The other hybrid entity arbitrage case 262 utilizes conflicting entity
classification rules to reduce a foreign subsidiary's taxable income for
foreign tax purposes, without generating U.S. taxable income under
subpart F. How should the United States assess the impact of the arbi-
trage? As outlined earlier, the arbitrage can be viewed as a benefit to
U.S. corporations at the expense of the foreign country's fisc (U.S.
corporation's high foreign tax is reduced) or it can be viewed as an
incentive to invest abroad (U.S. corporation can achieve an effectively
lower tax rate through foreign investment plus arbitrage). The resolu-
tion turns in part on the question of whether the arbitrage under-
mines an important. U.S. policy in subpart F. This inquiry has fostered
259 Here, the treaty partners might be more inclined to see the unilateral action as re-
storing the spirit of the treaty. Unilateral moves generally allocate the extra tax from
eliminating the arbitrage to the intervening nation. That outcome may irk other nations.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
26°
 T.D. 8999, 2002-28 I.R.B. 78 (Treasury Guidance Regarding Payments with Respect
to Domestic Reverse Hybrid Entities).
261 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1 (d) (2) (ii), 66 Fed. Reg. 12,445, 12,446 (Feb. 27, 2001).
262 See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
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substantial controversy. One view contends that the arbitrage under-
mines the subpart F tides. This assertion, however, requires knowing
the policy goals of subpart F itself—a source of significant debate. In
fleshing out the policy behind subpart F, conflict has erupted over its
historical intent, the coherency of any overarching policy, and the re-
lationship of those goals to the position of subpart F in the U.S. tax
system today. The resolution of this broader debate directly impacts
the examination of the hybrid entity arbitrage case. More pointedly,
the conflict over subpart. F highlights an inherent challenge in the
balancing test—the need to identify U.S. policy goals. Although it is
beyond the scope of this Article to undertake the task of sorting out
subpart. F policy generally, some observations may be possible in the
narrower case of this arbitrage.
As explored in Part. I, the immediate effect of this hybrid entity
arbitrage was the reduction of foreign income taxes, generally a desir-
able outcome from the U.S. perspective. Whatever the goals of sub-
part F may be, they are not to increase foreign taxes per se. 263 The ar-
bitrage example started with foreign income not subject. to subpart F
(perhaps because it was manufacturing income). Implicit in the ex-
clusion of this income from subpart F was the view that such income
deserved deferral because of the presumed business motive for its be-
ing offshore. The question, then, is why not allow that taxpayer to
take further steps to reduce foreign tax on the manufacturing income
already deemed permissibly deferred. A direct infringement of sub-
part F policy appears difficult to articulate. Certainly, though, poten-
tial distortions may follow from the arbitrage. A taxpayer making the
initial decision to invest abroad presumably has compared the costs
and benefits of domestic and foreign investment, and has decided
that the balance weighs in favor of foreign investment. Adding the
arbitrage to the mix would reduce foreign taxes on the foreign activi-
ties. At this point, the arbitrage only seems to lower the foreign tax
bill—at no cost to the United States. The arbitrage benefit, however,
may become incorporated into the initial locational calculus and may
lead taxpayers to invest even more abroad, thus altering the initial
balance. How then should we measure the arbitrage's impact on U.S.
subpart. F policy?
The answer depends on one's current views of subpart F. As a re-
sult, it is changeable in the event a new emerging consensus develops
263
 Historically, subpart F has been the locus for debate over the risks and benefits of
deferral of foreign source income.
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on the role of subpart F and antideferral regimes. Critical to the
evaluation of subpart F is a determination about the relative place of
CEN and CIN in U.S. tax policy. In contrast to many other cases of
arbitrage, the core U.S. tax rule at issue (here, subpart F) actually
concerns the allocation of investment activity globally and the rela-
tionship between tax regimes. If CEN is our dominant vision of global
efficiency then deferral should be very limited and thus subpart F ex-
panded. Accordingly, curtailing arbitrage that seems to undermine
subpart F would be appropriate (recall the argument that allowing
this arbitrage will encourage foreign investment generally because
taxpayers will realize the increased opportunities to reduce tax on
even manufacturing income where that income is earned abroad and
not domestically). 264 If, however, CIN is our dominant vision of global
efficiency, then deferral should be expanded and subpart F's reach
limited to its clear statutory terms. In that case, an arbitrage that does
not explicitly violate subpart F might not merit strong attack. Unfor-
tunately, inquiry in this case study is further complicated by the ob-
servation that taxpayers are effectively reducing Country X tax, which
seems in violation of even CIN (under CIN, activities in Country X
should bear the Country X rate of tax and not the U.S. rate of tax). If,
however, other taxpayers in Country X are pursuing comparable tax
reduction strategies, then CIN might support allowing the arbitrage.
Assuming for the moment a consensus that the arbitrage harms
U.S. subpart F policy (either on the CEN dimension or on the CIN
dimension if other taxpayers are not reducing their Country X tax), a
unilateral move would seem appropriate given the impact of the arbi-
trage on those subpart F goals and the degree to which any more mul-
tilateral resolution would likely involve a U.S. change in tax rules (en-
tity classification). Of course, the captured transactions would also
provide a revenue bonus (although it would presumably be short-
lived, given comparable U.S. and foreign tax rates, because taxpayers
would cease this hybrid transaction). 265 The net effect would be to
bolster the CFC jurisdiction's (Country X in the case study) tax collec-
tions by preventing the CFC from reducing that country's taxes. On
the surface, the CFC jurisdiction should be pleased with this unilat-
eral U.S. move. Whether that would prove true turns on whose inter-
ests the CFC jurisdiction is promoting. If that jurisdiction imposes
264
 See supra notes 145-148.
266 The rule could be designed as a low-tax kick-in (which is likely to be over-inclusive,
and not necessarily dictated if C1N is motivating our policy here), or as a more compli-
cated rule targeting this type of arbitrage.
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nominally "high" tax rates in response to domestic voter demands, but.
de facto supports and allows the arbitrage because it promotes the
interests of a select group of taxpayers, 203
 then the jurisdiction's reac-
tion may be mixed: publicly supportive and privately displeased.
The United States did attack this general use of hybrids in the
now infamous Notice 98-1 1 which announced that Treasury and the
Service planned to issue regulations governing the use of hybrids un-
der subpart F and effectively treat the interest. income as subpart F
income .267
 Taxpayers responded vigorously to the notice, accusing the
Service of acting as a "worldwide tax cop" (an allusion to the fact. that.
in the case study it seems that Country X is the immediate and obvi-
ous revenue loser in the transaction that the Service is intervening to
protect). 268
 Moreover, they questioned the sensibility of the United
States effectively seeking higher foreign taxes for U.S. taxpayers (by
stopping such taxpayers from reducing their foreign income tax bills
through the use of hybrid transactions). 269
 Technical critiques of the
government's proposed rules turned on Treasury's authority to issue
such guidance and the validity of any reliance on existing statutory
provisions to support the effort. 27° Shortly after Notice 98-1 1, tempo-
rary and proposed regulations were issued,27 t but following further
debate on subpart F they were withdrawn. New proposed regulations
were issued a year later ( July 1999). 272
 The preamble explicitly con-
fronted the relationship between the hybrid entity question and the
underlying tensions in subpart F,273 explaining that the proposed
regulations were based on Treasury and Service assessments of the
current subpart F regime and did not bar or limit future debate on
the proper role and direction of subpart F. 274
 The regulatory action
26°
 In fact, one could characterize a U.S. unilateral more here as supporting political
accountability in Country X to the extent that Country X voters did not know that foreign
corporations were reducing their effective rate of Country X tax.
2°7
 I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433-34.
2643
 Jim P. Fuller, U.S. Tax Review, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 299, 299 (1998); see supra text ac-
companying notes 63-68 (describing this hybrid entity arbitrage).
26°
 See. e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Notice 98-41: Tax Treatment of Hybrid Enti-
ties, 79 TAX NOTES 877, 881-82 (1998).
27° See id. at 878-79.
27 t See ID. 8767, 1998-1 C.B. 875 (temporary and final regulations providing guidance
under subpart F relating to partnerships and branches); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.952-1, 63
Fed. Reg. 14,669 (Mar. 26, 1998) (proposed regulations providing guidance under subpart
F relating to partnerships and branches).
272
 Prop, Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1, —2, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,727 ( July 13, 1999).
272 Id. at 37, 727-29.
274 Id.
160	 Boston College Law Review
	
IVol. 44:79
against the subpart F hybrid entity arbitrage generated more contro-
versy than the treaty-based regulations. 275 Violated treaty expectations
created a stronger policy claim than that available for the subpart F
rules.276
One final observation about hybrid entity arbitrages: independ-
ent of any unilateral intervention, the recurrence of arbitrages based
on entity classification raises the possibility that a multilateral ap-
proach may be valuable. If entity classification rules are the source of
much arbitrage, 277 then greater harmonization should reduce arbi-
trage. A multilateral response may consist of the United States evaluat-
ing the global landscape and determining that its decision to offer a
fully elective entity classification regime (for many entities) is some-
what out of step with most countries on this issue, is unsupported by
important U.S. interests, and that a wider harmonization can be
achieved at relatively little cost (to either diversity or sovereignty) by a
U.S. shift in classification rules. A change of entity classification rules,
as opposed to subpart F or withholding rules, could further harmoni-
zation and secure global consensus on the topic. This characterization
of entity classification harmonization implicitly assumes that the in-
creased harmonization would be desirable. The expectation is
justified not only by the presumption of no serious sovereignty or di-
versity concerns (given the long percolation period for classification
questions and the U.S. focus on fairness and waste), but also by the
recognition that taxpayers are unlikely to pursue high transaction cost.
alternatives. Anecdotal evidence, including informal conversations
with tax practitioners, suggests that the check-the-box rules have in-
creased arbitrage not just rerouted it, perhaps because the certainty of
the new classification regimes encourages more classification-based
tax strategies. Absent indications to the contrary', enhanced uniform-
ity on this question seems worthwhile.
275 See, e.g., Thomas R. May, Treasury Attacks Domestic Reverse Hybrid Planning, 22 TA x
NOTES Itert. 1869,1872-76 (2001) (critiquing the domestic reverse hybrid regulations on
grounds that they go beyond the statutory authority of I.R.C. § 894 (c) and may violate the
nondiscrimination provisions of article 24 of the U.S. Model Treaty).
276 The powerful role of treaty-based interaction between countries' tax rules and the
potential bargaining underlying it was noted earlier by Philip West in his examination of
the ways in which domestic and foreign tax law can be connected. West, supra note 14, at
180-82. It is also likely that the tax planning opportunities created under subpart F hybrid
entity arbitrages were more extensive than those under domestic reverse hybrids.
277 Despite the degree of maneuvering and flexibility available under the prior entity
classification regime, the check-the-box rules opened new opportunities in planning.
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D. Comments on the Arbitrage Framework
This outline of the balancing test and its application to the four
case studies demonstrates its complex role in arbitrage analysis. The
test can be the structure for both conveying the line-drawing process
and for disciplining its implementation. The fact that each analysis
requires balancing of competing claims and goals in no way mitigates
the importance of a more formal structure for the process. To com-
plete the review of the balancing test, this section offers some con-
cluding observations on its use.
First, the content of an arbitrage's evaluation under the balanc-
ing test. is not permanent. If, and when, U.S. policy goals change, the
balance achieved may also change. The IRS and Treasury have explic-
itly warned, for example, that such a policy shift may occur following
the increased attentions to subpart F. Second, the balancing test is not
a static tool, but, is part of a fluid analysis. A decision about an arbi-
trage case may not be possible at. a given moment in time. If limited
information exists regarding the nature and impact of an arbitrage,
the government can consider an interim step designed to collect data
and monitor the arbitrage. For example, the United States could insti-
tute information reporting requirements for taxpayers to receive cer-
tain U.S. tax benefits. Also, some gatekeeper requirements could be
instituted to aid in the gathering of information. (Unlike the tax shel-
ter context, however, the purpose of these requirements would not. be
de facto discouragement of particular transactions, but rather docu-
mentation of the scale, range, and size of the relevant behavior in or-
der to evaluate the significance of the arbitrage.)
Third, a central element. of the analysis is the ability to discern
which U.S. policies are animated by particular tax rules. It is worth
emphasizing again that this step is an art, not a science. Not only can
there be disagreement about the policy goals themselves but also de-
bate as to the scope and degree of those goals. The subpart F regime
serves as a prime example of such debate, but. other topics are not
immune to controversy—witness the inquiry into the incentives be-
hind accelerated depreciation.
Finally, the balancing test does not purport to restrict the range
of responses that a country may adopt. In fact, many techniques exist,
including reporting requirements, unilateral disallowance of U.S. tax
benefits, revision of domestic law, bilateral agreements, and multilat-
eral consensus (formal or informal). Certain cases may be more
suited to unilateral action than others, but multilateral responses are
always available. Moreover, the relationship between unilateral and
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multilateral responses is very flexible and can be deployed quite effec-
tively when, for example, unilateral action is used to prompt. a
broader discussion of the arbitrage, or when the creation of a multi-
lateral consensus allows a nation successfully to implement unilateral
measures. The importance of multilateral dialogue cannot be under-
estimated here because the arbitrage analysis itself only goes to the
question of whether the arbitrage produces enough harm that we can
and should intervene through available mechanisms (unilateral
and/or multilateral) to eliminate the arbitrage benefit. A critical
question remains—how to allocate the benefit captured from the anti-
arbitrage response (assuming there is a discernable benefit and tax-
payer behavior does not change so drastically as to eliminate it). This
question is at the heart of much of international taxation; the design
of tax rules not only impacts taxpayers as such, but it also distributes
revenue between and among nations. Ultimately, these distributional
concerns behind anti-arbitrage rules will be resolved through the in-
tersection of negotiating strength, compromise, trade, and considera-
tions of inter-nation equity.
The implications of a country's decisions about cross-border tax
arbitrage, including whether and how to respond, extend beyond the
specific case to broader issues in international tax. The next Part takes
up the important connections between cross-border tax arbitrage and
two dominant and controversial topics in international tax: tax com-
petition and tax harmonization.
IV. BEYOND CROSS-BORDER TAX ARBITRAGE-COMPETITION AND
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL TAX COMMUNITY
A. Introduction
The primary undertaking in this Article has been the question of
whether and how countries, such as the United States, should respond
to cross-border tax arbitrage. To appreciate fully the texture of the
debate and its ramifications, it is necessary to step back and consider
the broader context in which this question arises. The United States is
one nation among many—each with the power to tax and a regula-
tory framework to collect it. What vision should animate decisions
governing the important intersections between and among taxing
authorities? In particular, how does the arbitrage discussion relate to
two alternative visions of international regulatory dynamics—com-
petitive and cooperative?
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Implicit in this Article's focus on arbitrage is the view that exam-
ples of tax competition 278
 and arbitrage are sufficiently distinct to war-
rant independent consideration of each. That said, significant com-
monalities exist. and conclusions reached for one may offer guidance
for the other. Moreover, both examples of tax competition and arbi-
trage force its to confront harmonization: How much cooperation
and competition should be part of the international regulatory vi-
sion? This Part reviews the intersections of competition and harmoni-
zation with cross-border tax arbitrage.
B. Tax Competition and Arbitrage
What is cross-border tax competition? A simple description would
characterize this as behavior by which a jurisdiction seeks to attract
business and investment activities through significant, sometimes tar-
geted, tax reductions and benefits. 279 The furor over tax competition
attaches to whether such competition is good or bad, how to tell the
difference, and how to respond. The OECD 1998 Report on Tax
Competition identifies what it considers two versions of harmful tax
practices ("tax havens"280 and "harmful preferential tax regimes"),
which it classifies under the general heading of "harmful tax conipeti-
tion."281 Bad tax competition, so defined, involves the use of tax good-
ies targeted at foreign investment. Other tax commentators have built
upon this foundation to suggest that there is indeed good and bad tax
competition, with the line between the two drawn to reflect the trade-
offs—harm to efficiency and equity from competition compared with
the benefit to countries from designing their own fiscal, revenue, and
spending policies to reflect national goals, values, and interests. 282
278 The term "tax competition" could refer to specific examples of countries targeting
tax rules to gain investment, or to the more conceptual issue of how countries should seek
to interact on a regulatory level. This section uses the term "tax competition" for the
specific targeted tax rules which are the subject of intense discussion and scrutiny in the
international tax community.
279
 Regulatory competition has an intentional quality, with related behavioral conse-
quences for both the regulator and regulated. See. e.g., Charity, supra note 179, at 282-83
(regulatory competition characterized loosely [as] any situation in which one jurisdiction
sets a ... standard because that standard gains an advantage vis-a-vis the economy of an-
other jurisdiction").
288
 "Tax havens" are denoted by the presence of four factors: (1) no/nominal taxes;
(2) lack of effective information exchange; (3) lack of transparency; and (4) no substantial
activities. OECD, supra note 15, at 22-23.
221
 Id. at 8.
20 See.	 Avi-Yonah, supra note 15.
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Not all tax analysts readily concede that cross-border tax competi-
tion poses such clear efficiency and equity harms. Hence, they ques-
tion whether it should be aggressively restricted. Where tax competi-
tion can, for example, be characterized as competition on the
package of government services provided for a given tax rate, taxpay-
ers can seek out their preferred level of service, leading to more
efficient tax systems. 283 A country could offer a lower tax rate; but one
very rough implication (assuming a comparable tax base) is that the
taxpayer in that country is receiving fewer services. (It is also quite
possible that higher services are available, but are being funded by
another tax sector.) Along this line, tax competition behavior may
reflect different "marginal costs" among competing countries, which,
in the language and analysis of the market, should be a valid basis for
competition among jttrisdictions. 284 Resolution of some (but not all)
of this debate will require further empirical evidence regarding the
nature of cross-border tax competition and the nature of the deci-
sions by countries to offer inducements and of taxpayers to accept
them. Does the market model, with tax competition producing
efficient levels of government service, aptly capture the behavior? Or
does tax competition in this regulatory environment dictate a differ-
ent interpretation? 285 Other issues will remain after the empirical
analyses, including how to weigh competing values (for example,
efficiency, equity, administrability, and sovereignty) and how to rate
the likely outcomes of alternative responses to tax competition.
Where does cross-border tax arbitrage connect to this picture of
tax competition—beyond the important observation that both issues
wrestle with the proper relationship between and among nations' tax
regimes? First, many of the fundamental concerns identified with ar-
bitrage pertain to tax competition as well, including efficiency and
equity. Second, many of the same goals are implicated by the possible
responses, including sovereign ty286 and diversity.287
283 This thinking draws directly on the early theoretical tax competition analysis by
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 j. Pol.. ECON. 416 (1956). See,
e.g., Roin, supra note 15, at 545-46; see also Avi-lOnah, supra note 15, at 1611.
284
 See; e.g., Roin, supra note 15, at 550.
285 Modern tax competition economic scholarship has expanded the analysis front the
idealized Tiebout-based models to explore circumstances of wasteful tax competition. Sec
John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L Taxi. 269, 270-73 (1999).
286 For example, critics of the OECD Tax Competition Report (including the United
States during a change of position) characterize it as an attempt by a group of countries to
keep tax rates high and stifle competition. See, e.g., Robert Collider, New Coalition Strikes
Back at OECD Tax Haven Campaign, 89 TAX NOTES 1352, 1352-53 (2000) (detailing the
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What then are the major differences between lax competition
and arbitrage? First, the OECD's harmful tax competition report
identifies a distinction between "unintentional mismatches" and "spe-
cial" tax regimes. 298 Although there is reason to question the reliabil-
ity of "intentionality" as a touchstone for discriminating good and bad
tax practices here, the focus on the motivations underlying the tax
rules does identify important practical differences between arbitrage
and tax competition. 289 The degree of intentionality in the "creation"
of the tax benefit. may directly correlate with: (1) the country's per-
ception of its exercise of sovereignty in establishing the benefit; (2)
the likelihood that a conscious national cost-benefit. analysis was made
of the tax treatment (even a rough estimate); 29° and (3) the range of
probable resolutions to conflict with other countries' tax rules. If a
extensive efforts of the Center for Freedom and Prosperity to challenge and undo the
OECD's efforts to limit 'harmful tax competition"); Paul O'Neill, U.S. Treasury Secretary
Statement on OECD Tax Havens, 22 Tax Nunes !wet. 2617 (2001) ("I am troubled by the
underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect and by the notion that any
country, or group of countries, should interfere in any other country's decision about how
to structure its own tax system.... The United States does not support efforts to dictate to
any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be . „"). But see Cordia Scott, U.S.
Tirasury Secretary says OECD Tax Haven Crackdown is Out of Line, 22 Tax NorEs INT't, 2539,
2540 (2001) (OECD Secretary General Donakl Johnston complained that U.S. policymak-
ers do not understand the OECD position—and that the position "has nothing to do with
insisting that a jurisdiction use a particular tax structure or tax rate .... [W]hat the proj-
ect is aimed at is „ . tax cheats,"),
287
 The existence of different systems, as noted earlier, means that alternative ap-
proaches to issues can percolate. Cf. Jeffiry Owens Discusses Details of OECD Harmful Tax Prac-
tices Report, 21 TAX Ncyrrs 611 . '1.94 (2000) (Owens said, "Tax competition can have positive
effects. For example, the implementation in one country of a long needed tax reform may
encourage other countries to undertake similar tax reforms in order not to lose their rela-
tive international competitiveness,"),
288 OECD, supra note 15, at 15-16.
288 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 15, at 546 (describing tax competition as when `one coun-
try seeks to entice investment within its borders (and possibly enhanced tax revenues)
through the expedient of reduced business taxation").
288 For example, low tax rates (either general or targeted) are affirmatively enacted
and therefore more likely to be transparent. This observation has been generalized in the
regulatory context:
[1] here is good heterogeneity and bad heterogeneity—the principal line is
between heterogeneity that reflects honest differences in tastes and incomes
and a few related factors, and heterogeneity that reflects indifference, i n ade-
quate information or capture, Heterogeneity that arises for the first set of rea-
sons is not only acceptable but probably desirable as a policy matter. Hetero-
geneity driven by the second set of considerations is undesirable, and would
be eliminated (or its effects eliminated) in an ideal world,
Sykes, supra note 26, at 57.
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country is not seeking to encourage a particular transaction it may be
more amenable to cooperative or joint action.
Second, mismatches in arbitrage differ from tax competition on
rates because in the latter case there may be no "mismatch," just a
willingness on the part of the other country to forgo a portion of po-
tential revenue through ring fencing, nondisclosure, or other tech-
niques. If these strategies attract investment from U.S. and non-U.S.
taxpayers, a U.S. response to the situation can be difficult to craft,
other than matching the offer. For example, tax competition for port-
folio investment through reductions in withholding rates leaves few
options (other than seeking worldwide taxation for one's own taxpay-
ers). To the extent investment and business opportunities are compa-
rable, an act of tax competition must be countered in order to attract.
the investments at stake, if not the revenue. Thus, although some of
the harms in arbitrage and tax competition might be related (distor-
tions of behavior), the U.S. role and control differ.
Third, even where countries share similar views on "appropriate"
tax rates and behavior (for example, no "ring fencing"), arbitrage can
occur, though tax competition problems may be unlikely. These ro-
bust tax systems that seek to tax income comprehensively can still ex-
perience cross-border tax arbitrage because of the individuality of
their systems.291 A "victory" on the part of the OECD or other collec-
tive body in attacking harmful tax competition would not eliminate
cross-border tax arbitrage and would not answer the questions of how
to respond.
Finally, when tax competition problems do mirror those of arbi-
trage, the reactions and conclusions may be quite different. For ex-
ample, both may raise questions about the risks of convergence and
harmonization. In the tax competition context this concern may be
most commonly reflected in the Leviathan critique—fears of govern-
mental abuse in the absence of the constraining influence of competi-
tion.292 An accepted balance between the efficiency harms and the
positive benefits of competition may be reached by some agreed
minimum threshold of proper behavior (a minimum level of uniform-
ity), leaving tax competition in place beyond that leve1. 293 For arbi-
291 Although the striking similarities among tax systems are frequently noted in the tax
literature, the complexity of the regimes (both domestic and cross-border provisions) pro-
vides ample opportunity for cross-border tax arbitrage.
292 See, e.g., Avi-Ibnah, supra note 15, at 1614-16; Wilson, supra note 285, at 296-98.
293 See, e.g., EC Report, supm note 3, at 564 (recommendations); OECD, supra note 15,
at 43; Avi-Vonah, supra note 15, at 1666-74 (proposals for a refundable withholding tax on
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trage cases, such partial solutions may be less plausible and the trade-
offs with harmonization more direct.
Thus, not only are arbitrage and tax competition analytically and
empirically distinct (as they are currently defined) but the analysis of
good versus bad tax competition and the resulting policy conclusions
do not adapt directly to arbitrage. Current proposals for eliminating
what has been termed "harmfill" tax competition, such as withhold-
ing, would not impact most arbitrage opportunities. 294 Arbitrage is
less likely to be an inherently positive feature in the tax system, except.
to the extent that its existence proclaims the diversity of tax rules and
encourages countries to reevaluate their systems. Yet, substantial
elimination of arbitrage would create significant harmonization,
which forces contemplation of the risks in seeking more global uni-
formity.
One last. consideration on the relationship between arbitrage and
tax competition is whether arbitrage could become tax competition if
the rules are left in place once the arbitrage potential has been
identified. Perhaps yes, but typically no. Often the rule is left in place
because there is no clear support for change, the distortions may not
be significant, the domestic policy supporting the tax rule is powerful,
or the costs of change seem high. Also, "bad" tax competition is typi-
cally viewed as the use of "targeted" rules, whereas arbitrage can stem
from the opposite situation—domestically determined rules confront,
lug, not targeting, the global setting.
C. Tax Harmonization.
A pervasive theme underlying much of the discussion in the lit-
erature of tax competition, tax arbitrage, and globalization is the nag-
ging question of harmonization—how much should we be pursuing
it, and will it be happening in any event? The connection between
harmonization and the competition/arbitrage discussion is patent.
Where tax rules and tax rates are substantially harmonized, the op-
portunity for taxpayer behavior to be influenced by the arbitrage or
competition opportunities is substantially diminished. Of course, as
portfolio interest, and a refundable gross basis withholding tax on businesses selling goods
and services into a jurisdiction). But see Daniell Mitchell, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate
Tax Competition Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, 21 TAX No'rEs INT't. 1799, 1799
(Oct. 16, 2000) (characterizing the OECD proposal as "eliminating or substantially reduc-
ing the competition [the] high-tax nations face from low-tax regimes").
29' See EC Report, supra note 3, at 565; OECD Report, supra note 15, at 60; Avi-Yonah,
supra note 15, at 1652-74 (suggesting certain withholding and other mechanisms).
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with competition and arbitrage, the subject of harmonization is an
umbrella for discussing goals underlying the tax system—it alone does
not constitute a goal. Harmonization (generally contrasted with com-
petition) focuses on how nations' independent tax systems should in-
teract, and more specifically, how much they should pursue coordina-
tion. 295 This Section asks what can be added to the harmonization
debate from an improved understanding of tax arbitrage.
First, the effort in this Article to examine the sources of conflict
in tax rules highlights the differences between harmonization and
convergence of tax regulation. Taking harmonization to encompass
intentional and voluntary296 efforts to coordinate tax rules, it becomes
evident that certain types of conflict will be more susceptible than
others to a collaborative approach and in these cases harmonization is
realistic. For example, cases (such as residency rules) 297 in which the
tax rules have an arbitrary quality and are motivated by nontax policy
objectives may generate less hostility to a harmonization effort. Of
course, the absence of demonstrably strong national interests underly-
ing a tax rule does not guarantee cooperation, as suggested by IFA's
experience with leasing rules, especially if there is an insufficient
sense of urgency regarding the arbitrage problem.298 In other cases,
tax regulations may converge through no intentional effort of the na-
tions if sufficiently common goals are shared by the tax systems. A
prime example is the increasing attention to economic taxation and
accrual, particularly in financial contexts. Presumably the attention to
taxing economic income, combined with increasing sophistication
about timing and income, may lead countries to more similar rules
without a specific intent to harmonize. The claim is not that scientific
295 See, e.g., STEPHEN BOND ET AL., INsTrruTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, CORPORATE TAX
HARMONISATION IN EUROPE: A GUIDE '1'0 THE DEBATE (2000); HANS-WERNER SINN, THE
NEw SYSTEMS ComPrrrrioN (CESifo, Working Paper No. 623, Dec. 2001); Stewart, supra
note 175, at 115-18.
296 The terns is used loosely here in recognition of the realities of international coop-
eration. Decisions to join with other nations to adopt common practices can be motivated
by a range of factors, including the mere fact that a group has decided to harmonize or
that certain nations view the step as desirable and exert pressure on other nations to par-
ticipate. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 Nw.i,
L. & Bus. 736,753 (1996-97) (noting that smaller nations may find themselves to be "regu-
lation taker[s]").
297 Even this example is not without controversy. One can readily imagine the political
fallout that could develop if certain entities currently taxed as U.S. residents ceased to be
so treated under a new regime, even if other entities effectively replaced them.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 227-230. The proper interpretation of the !FA
experience on leasing requires a view as to whether the arbitrage was thought to support
exports.
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principles will ultimately dictate tax policy and provide uniformity in
regitnes,299 but instead that it is quite plausible that a certain degree
of convergence may occur independently and that it may occur in
predictable areas of taxation.
Harmonization and convergence as described here could appear
as polar opposites. In reality, the forces at work in each case can, and
likely do, combine in varying degrees. Thus, one can imagine that
harmonization efforts would be easier where there is no strong na-
tional policy underlying the specific rule but where there is a discern-
able and somewhat objective norm to guide the selection of a rule
(such as economic taxation of income). Even if the dominant force
behind multilateral cooperation on an issue is the lack of individual
national commitment to current rules, the ability to structure the dis-
cussion around an "objective" norm may facilitate a resolution.
The second observation on harmonization gleaned from the ar-
bitrage analysis concerns the ways in which harmonization may be
achieved. The fact that tax rules conflict for different reasons
influences how coordination can be managed. Arbitrage conflict may
be more readily resolved in the absence of an intentional availment of
that conflict by the country. Why? The absence of interest in utilizing
the arbitrage diminishes the likelihood of a net gain to the nation
from the conflict and of national reluctance to change the rule. Be-
yond assessing the basic potential for agreement, it may be possible to
predict whether a formal multilateral effort will be necessary and
whether it will be difficult. The classic example of regulatory coopera-
tion from the nontax literature involves aviation rules, such as com-
munication standards on landing."° Continued success in aviation
depends on widespread agreement on these matters, and the techni-
cal nature of the issues indicates that such agreement may be realistic
because it would not intrude upon important national policies."1 Tax
arbitrage may not offer as striking examples, but it is possible to envi-
299 See Atilt, supra note 296, at 736-39, 754, 758 (science can function as the baseline
for regulatory agreement, although there are significant limits to relying on science and it
may be unable to provide unchallenged principles of decisionmaking for regulators).
sm See general4 Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Coop-
eration, 32 CASs; W. REs, INV). I.. 387, 400 (2000).
291 "On mailers of technical compatibility (railroad gauges, communications protocols
fur fax machines), for example, where the issue involves a largely arbitrary choice among
competing standards, a single choice for all markets can exploit all conceivable economies
of scale and avoid wasteful incompatibilities." Sykes, supra note 184, at 263.
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sion such coordination with the losses of DRC. 302 The ability to draw
upon a range of mechanisms for harmonization of tax rules increases
the possibility of such harmonization by matching the technique to
the problem.
The third connection between arbitrage and harmonization
draws upon the difference between a case by case perspective on
harmonization and an overall assessment. The basic approach of this
Article has been to encourage the analysis of arbitrage problems
against the backdrop of competing objectives of our tax and regula-
tory system. The analysis is undertaken individually with the expecta-
tion that the answer will vary depending on how the factors coalesce.
Harmonization is not all desirable nor all objectionable, but is evalu-
ated based on the balancing outlined earlier. That said, is there some
cumulative effect on the goals of the tax system that is more than the
sum of the effects of the individual arbitrage conflict cases? For ex-
ample, in thinking about the value of sovereignty or diversity, is this
value weighted differently when a single rule is under scrutiny, as
compared to a decision to harmonize substantially a broad swath of
tax rules? Given this possibility, inquiry into harmonization takes on a
distinctive role because it looks to the broader impacts of significant
coordination, independent of the context-specific rationale for the
uniformity and independent of the mechanisms used to achieve it.
02 The closest parallel to tax arbitrage comes from the international banking world
and offers a useful insight on the relationship between multilateral efforts, sovereignty,
and administrabifity. The banking question concerns which country should govern a for-
eign bank branch—the home or host jurisdiction. Where conflicting positions were taken
(i.e. the home jurisdiction thought the host was responsible and vice versa) a serious gap
in regulatory coverage could result. Presumably, the bank could benefit from this gap by
being more risky in its behavior. The response to the international branch problem was
multilevel. On an international level, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) played
a key role in establishing standards for cross-border bank supervision. The Basle Concor-
dat of the BIS outlines "minimum standards for the supervision of international banking
groups and their cross-border establishments." Sec BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPER-
VISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR 'I'llE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL. RANKING GROUPS
AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS (June 1992). On a domestic level, the United
States enacted legislation controlling foreign bank activities in the United States, and re-
quiring certain federal permissions to establish a U.S. branch. See id., mprinted in Sco'u'r &
‘VELLONS, supra note 41, at 111-15. Approval is contingent upon a specified level of bank
supervision in the home jurisdiction. Id. at 113-14.
An interesting observation can be drawn from this rather singular example of itontax
regulatory arbitrage. Where arbitrage is a sufficiently rare occurrence, it may he possible to
reach agreement on a coordinated response. Not only is the threat to sovereignty rather
limited, in that only one issue is covered, but a comprehensive attack on arbitrage can be
envisioned because in fact there is so little to discuss (even if there are a range of policy
discussions and concerns regarding the final resolution).
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Finally, the balancing test for arbitrage supports the rather un-
surprising conclusion that a combination of harmonization and com-
petition/independence is the most desirable outcome in cross-border
tax regulation. 303 A remaining question, however, concerns how the
harmonization occurs and its longer-term effects: Is it possible that
the method by which harmonization on tax issues is achieved could
alter the dynamics among the nations and create a momentum that
would produce more harmonization than might otherwise be thought
desirable? An important dimension to the arbitrage analysis is the
recognition that there are multiple ways in which increased uniform-
ity of tax rules can be pursued by countries. Not only is a unilateral
approach a step toward harmonization, but within the category of
multilateral approaches the range of mechanisms is substantial, from
acknowledging that one's rules are out of step with a reasonable, de-
veloping consensus, to negotiating a compromise treatment through
an international body such as the OECD. Given this scope of harmo-
nizing responses, are there collateral effects to the choice among
methods? For example, would the creation or use of an international
body develop a pattern of interaction among jurisdictions that would
lead increasingly to more tax issues being subsumed under their har-
monizing influence? Initially, the question may seem extreme given
the absence of concerted efforts at tax coordination (for example, in
entity classification, residence, and leasing rules). When tax coordina-
tion is combined with other spheres of interaction, however, such as
monetary and market regulation along the lines of the European Un-
ion, the potential for a steam-rolling effect seems slightly more plau-
sible. Of course, this possibility should not be overstated. The degree
of difficulty experienced by the European Union in trying to harmo-
nize corporate taxation serves as a marker of the challenge in that
level of coordination Nonetheless, an important direction of re-
3° 3
 Such a general proposition has been espoused in the regulatory analyses: neither
full competition not complete harmonization is desirable in regulatory fields "where im-
portant international cross-border effects of regulation arise. Instead a considerable de-
gree of cooperation is almost always needed, yet non-homogeneity of regulatory policies is
almost always desirable as well." Sykes, supra note 184, at 257; see also Daniel C. Esty & Da-
mien Geradin, Regulatory Co-opctition, 3 J. INT. !. EcoN. L. 235, 237 (2000); DANIEL SIIAVIRO,
SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAX COMPETITION (N.Y. Univ.
Law Sch., Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 13, 2000).
5" See, e.g., Robert Goulder, OECD Tax Symposium Looks to Outside Governments for New
Era of International Cooperation, 21 TAX NOTES INT'L 91, 91 (2000) (OECD head of fiscal
affairs Jeffrey Owens observing that the goal of the OECD's project regarding tax competi-
tion "is about international cooperation to eliminate illegal tax evasion; it is not about tax
harmonization"). Even in the context of the European Union (E.U.), where independent
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search in regulatory harmonization will be the influence of harmoni-
zation techniques on future iterations of conflict and coordination
with a group of nations.
CONCLUSION
This Article has pursued two goals. First, it has argued that plau-
sible grounds for government intervention against cross-border tax
arbitrage can be articulated once the two extreme options (complete
acceptance and complete elimination of arbitrage) have been elimi-
nated. The decision to intervene turns on an assessment of factors
which, while not susceptible to automatic conclusions, are nonethe-
less familiar in a tax system beset by competing claims and goals. Sec-
ond, this Article has sought to specify a framework to use in organiz-
ing the analysis of competing goals so that examination of individual
arbitrages has a more consistent methodology. The result is the bal-
ancing test which is premised on identifying the set of national and
international goals that must be accommodated in arbitrage policy
and which evaluates those goals in the context of real decision making
by national actors against an international backdrop.
Clearly no uniform response to cross-border tax arbitrage is ap-
propriate or realistic. Nor is the ideal response readily apparent and
unanimously agreed. The challenge is to use the balancing test to or-
ganize discussion and evaluation of arbitrage. Important empirical
inquiries about arbitrage effects as well as challenging policy choices
must still be made domestically and in partnership with other coun-
tries. The process, however, can advance more systematically, with a
grounded theoretical overview of cross-border tax arbitrage in place.
Pursuing the analysis of cross-border tax arbitrage also requires
us to confront the core question underlying this and other major
problems in international taxation—how to envision the relationship
between and among countries' tax regimes. Several dominant obser-
vations emerge from the study of cross-border tax arbitrage. First, be-
nations exhibit a high level of cooperation, tax harmonization is a very sensitive subject.
For example, in the discussion of proposals and possibilities for E.U. corporate tax reform,
commentator Joann Weiner noted, in reaction to an Institute for Fiscal Studies Report,
that adoption in the E.U. of a formula-apportionment system like the one used in the
United States and in the Canadian provinces would face opposition because it "requires
the member states to give up their direct tax and create a central income tax. Member
states continue to oppose this step strongly, making [this option, an E.U.-level corporate
income tax,] an unlikely option for the near future." Institute for Fiscal Studies Issues Report
on EU Corporate Tax Harmonization, 20 TAx NOTES INT'L 2267, 2271 (2000).
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fore we can explore the interaction of countries' regulatory regimes
we must define the relevant criteria and goals by which to judge the
work of those regimes. Reference to competition and cooperation is
insufficient to direct policy on cross-border regulation. They are tools
and techniques of multilateral interaction, not substantive goals. Sec-
ond, we need to consider how those goals will be assessed by the dif-
ferent actors and how that may generate strategic behavior. Third, we
should draw upon the unique abilities of international organizations
in terms of gathering information, offering a forum for debate and
compromise, and lending credibility to national regulatory efforts.
The detailed cross-border tax arbitrage inquiry illustrates the tensions
in competing approaches to countries' relationships and reinforces
the need for a textured understanding of the many dimensions of the
relationships. As we gain more experience in the dynamics of cross-
border arbitrage, we should develop a more sophisticated vision of
inter-nation relations that emboldens international regulatory theory,
and ultimately enhances the intersections among regimes.
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APPENDIX305
It is useful to observe that the benefit is not the existence of a
"second set of deductions." In the case of a clear operating lease there
are two sets of deductions. The owner would take depreciation deduc-
tions and lessee would take rental deductions. The advantage of the
double-dip case is that unlike rental deductions, the second set of de-
ductions is deemed to be for depreciation and thus taken at a more
accelerated rate. In addition, credits may be available. The following
example demonstrates this comparison by calculating deductions for
three scenarios: (1) the lease is treated as lease (lessee gets rental de-
ductions), (2) the lease is treated as sale but depreciation is not accel-
erated, and (3) the lease is treated as sale and depreciation deduc-
tions are accelerated.
Hypo: A leases aircraft to B for 3 years (the expected life of
the plane). B agrees to pay "rent" of $1000 in year 1, $500 in
year 2, and $250 in year 3. On the basis of this we might
imagine that A paid $1510 for this plane at the beginning of
year 1 (assuming the present value discounted at 10% from
the 3-year stream of income from the plane). In this case,
what would be the tax results if:
(1) country B treats as lease




A has income as follows:




= TI of $151
Year 2 $ 500 $433 = T1 of $ 67
Year 3 $ 250 $228 = T1 of $ 22
B has expense deductions as follows:
Year 1	 Rent of $1000
Year 2	 Rent of $ 500
Year 3	 Rent of $ 250
$1750
305 Some of the economic depreciation numbers in this example were derived from an
economic depreciation chart by Alvin C. Warren, Jr., on file with the author.
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2.a. Sale Characterization for B with Economic Depreciation
A: (saute treatment)
B:
• Interest* (deduction) Depreciation**
Year 1 $151 $ 849 $1000
Year 2 $ 67 $ 433 $ 500
Year 3 j $ 228 $ 250
$240 $1510 $1750
* The purchase price would have been $1510 for this asset that can generate the following
income stream ($1000, $500, $250 over its 3-year life) given a discount of 10%. However,
deferring payment of the $1510 over 3 years at 10% interest produces payments to the
seller-financer of $1000, $500, $250 where in year 1 the interest component is $151, in year
2 it is $67 and in year 3 it is $22. The balance in each year is the payment of principal.
** Assuming economic depreciation and given that this asset was purchased for $1510 at
the outset because it will produce a stream of income over its 3-year life of $100, $500, and
$250 given a 10% discount rate.
Note: The total annual deduction allowed B is the same whether the transaction is viewed
as a lease or financial sale—assuming these facts—i.e., assuming economic depreciation
deductions granted by country B.




Year 1 $151 $ 920 = $1071
Year 2 $ 67 $ 510 .. $ 577
Year 3 $ 22 $	 80 = $ 102
$240 $1510 $1750
* Assuming same purchase price etc. as in prior scenario ($1510) but accelerated
depreciation deductions.
Two important observations emerge from this example:
(1) the total deductions allowed to taxpayer B by country B
are the same in all examples
(2) where B is viewed as a lessee or as a purchaser getting
deductions for economic depreciation, the deduction pattern is
the same and the characterization should have limited im-
pact. (if there is an investment tax credit the sale version
would be desirable). However, where B is viewed as a pur-
chaser and is allowed to "accelerate" depreciation deduc-
tions, the difference in timing can be valuable. In such cases,
obtaining conflicting tax treatment in the two countries
produces a positive value to the parties in the form of the
acceleration of the second set of depreciation deductions.
